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 This dissertation demonstrates how the playwright Aeschylus contributes to the 
development of ancient Greek rhetoric through his use and display of πειθώ (often translated 
“persuasion”) throughout the Oresteia, first performed in 458 BCE. In this drama, Aeschylus 
specifically displays and develops πειθώ as a theme, a goddess, a central principle of action, and 
an important concept for his audience to consider. By tracing connections between Aeschylus’ 
innovations with πειθώ and later fifth and early fourth century conceptions of Greek rhetoric, I 
argue that Aeschylus plays a more important role in the development of practical principles and 
concepts of the rhetorical art than has been previously acknowledged. Methodologically, in this 
dissertation I combine word studies and thematic analysis together with examinations of choral 
narratives and staging, iconographical research on the goddess Peitho, and a close study of 
Athena’s speeches to the Erinyes (Eu. 778-891) through the lens of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Through 
these diverse modes of analysis, this dissertation validates Aeschylus as a conceptually 
innovative playwright and offers an approach for further examination of early Greek rhetoric 
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PREFACE: Outline of Chapters  
 
 This dissertation examines πειθώ and its connection with the idea and practice of Greek 
rhetoric in the fifth and early fourth centuries BCE. Specifically, I demonstrate how Aeschylus 
contributes to the development of rhetoric through his use and display of πειθώ in the Oresteia 
(458BCE). In this drama, Aeschylus assigns the goddess Peitho new features that will become 
characteristic of ancient Greek rhetoric; he presents his new ideas of πειθώ as central to the plot 
movement of the entire trilogy; and, at the culmination of the drama, he stages a work of 
persuasion framed in terms of πειθώ and in the form of masterful speeches (Eu. 778-891) that 
seem to anticipate the model of deliberative speech discussed much later in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.  
 Chapter One: Greek Rhetoric, Drama, and Πειθώ, provides the scholarly context for 
my argument: discussions of the history of rhetoric together with the role of drama in the 
development of this art. It also surveys scholarship on πειθώ, a term which has not yet been fully 
incorporated into scholarly accounts of rhetoric’s history in ancient Greece. This discussion of 
the state of scholarship is then balanced with a catalog of the pre-Aeschylean usage of πειθώ as a 
verb, a personified goddess (Peitho), and an abstract noun. The term emerges from an erotic 
tradition with little or no explicit connection with public, political speech. Yet, after Aeschylus, 
is frequently seen in conjunction with what will eventually be called “rhetoric.” Aeschylus, I 
argue, has a crucial role to play in this shift in πειθώ’s meaning and associations. 
 Chapter Two: The Goddess Peitho: Personified Aspects of Rhetoric? examines the 
four instances where Aeschylus depicts Peitho as a personified deity. It examines the role of 
personifications in developing Greek thought as well as their potential effect when brought to the 
fore in a dramatic performance. I note how each time Peitho “appears” in the Oresteia, 
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Aeschylus removes her from her traditional contexts and slightly alters her characterization 
towards that of a personage involved with what contemporary and later playwrights, 
philosophers, and theorists associate with rhetorical speech. These changes are noticeable and 
remarkable considering Peitho’s earlier mythical and cult tradition. Pre-Aeschylean literary, 
artistic and cult references present her as a complex personification with predominantly private 
and erotic associations. In the fifth and early fourth century BCE, however, the goddess Peitho 
becomes equated—in literature, drama, and political texts—with rhetoric. As the first extant poet 
to systematically change Peitho’s traditional representation, Aeschylus plays a key part in this 
evolution.  
 Drawing on previous work by recent scholars of Greek literature and art history, Chapter 
Two examines evidence from poetry, inscriptions, vase painting, and cults in order to understand 
each of Aeschylus’ depictions of Peitho against the backdrop of her previous tradition and, at the 
same time, looks forward to her future. In the Oresteia Aeschylus uproots and transforms Peitho 
by giving her a new genealogy (Ag. 385), new working companions (Cho. 726), and a firmly 
established role in civic society with relation to speech (Eu. 885; 926). Also, in each of these 
cases, Aeschylus gives Peitho qualities which are specifically associated with rhetoric by later 
playwrights, sophists, philosophers and rhetorical theorists: forcefulness, trickery, and a close 
relationship with civic speech. 
  Chapter Three: The Centrality of Πειθώ to the Oresteia analyzes πειθώ’s important 
role within the drama itself. Combining a word study of πειθώ together with analyses of choral 
narratives and theme, this chapter demonstrates how πειθώ comes to the fore as an important 
concept for the audience to consider while watching the play. In the first place the entire plot or 
main actions of each play take place not through the decisions of blind Fate, but through 
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dynamic moments where one person must win over another in order for the action of the play to 
progress. Each of these dramatic moments, moreover, features a word (or words) derived from 
the verb πείθω. In addition, Aeschylus gives each of these actions dramatic prominence through 
his use of parallel or mirroring myths and through the characters’ invocation of Peitho 
personified in closely related scenes (Ag. 385-411; Cho. 613-622; Eu. 723-730). In these three 
ways, this chapter concludes that Aeschylus seems to invite his audience to ponder the nature of 
πειθώ itself.   
 Chapter Four: Πειθώ and Athena’s Rhetoric at Eumenides 778-891 argues that 
Aeschylus stages a performance of rhetoric through the speeches of Athena to the Erinyes at the 
end of the Oresteia, speeches which not only conclude the trilogy but also highlight the influence 
of Peitho in a civic situation. The first section of this chapter argues that in the encounter 
between Athena and the Erinyes at Eumenides 778-891 Aeschylus presents a display of the 
persuasive process which would have called the attention of the audience as important. Through 
the use of various staging techniques, he sets up the scene as dramatically prominent and gives 
Athena a task of persuasion more momentous than any other in the Oresteia. The second section 
of this chapter consists of a close analysis of these speeches through the lens of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric. I demonstrate how, in content, Athena’s work anticipates Aristotle’s description of 
deliberative speech. Its form resembles the three basic modes of internal argumentation (ethos, 
pathos, logos) and the basic speech structure laid out in the Rhetoric. In this way Aeschylus 
resolves the entire Oresteia with a display of the work of πειθώ as effective deliberative rhetoric 
in the speeches of Athena in Eumenides 778-89.   
 In Conclusion, I argue that Aeschylus contributes to the development of rhetoric through 
his depiction of Peitho personified, through his presentation of πειθώ as the main theme and 
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action of the drama, and through the speeches of Athena at the end of the Eumenides. It is hoped 
that with the arguments presented in this dissertation, Aeschylus’ Oresteia may find an enduring 




 1  
CHAPTER ONE: Greek Rhetoric, Drama, and Πειθώ 
 
I. Introduction 
 In this dissertation I argue that rhetoric, the ideas and underlying principles of a prose 
discourse used in the late fifth and early fourth century BCE for civic and political speech, 
underwent significant development in Greek drama through πειθώ (often translated “persuasion”), 
a dynamic concept and action which the playwright Aeschylus presents in innovative ways 
throughout his Oresteia. Through my analysis of this dram, I suggest that as early as its first 
performance in 458 BCE, we see underpinnings and the concept of rhetoric being displayed and 
developed on the stage.  
 Most scholars agree, at least in general, that Greek drama was an important site of 
intellectual innovation. This genre flourished during a time of great cultural ferment marked by the 
expansion of literacy and an intense concern for formal arguments in the law courts of the 
Athenian democracy.
1
 Greek drama connected with the community by performing and 
commenting on relevant civic and political issues at the festivals of Dionysus before the citizenry 
of democratic Athens.
2
 Also, within its own texts, it created divisions between sung meter (choral 
lyric) and unsung meter (character speech), and immersed its audience into the dynamics of 
antithetical conversation and thought.
3
  
                                                          
1
 “One may, then, productively consider tragedy as a central participant in the fifth-century examination of language. 
The expansion of democratic and legal institutions along with the concomitant importance of persuasive speech, the 
growth of interest in rhetorical theory, and the increasing popularity of studying the art of public speaking must be 
understood as forming part of the context in which most surviving tragedy was produced,” (Barrett 2002, 8). 
2
 Buxton calls “tragedy, the genre which, above all others, exposed ambivalences generated by the cultural world of 
Greece,” (Buxton 1982, 66). See also Bers 2009, 11-21. 
3
 According to Walker, this unsung meter of drama gradually developed into the unsung, un-metered “poetic” prose of 
the early sophists (Walker 2000, 2). Also, Sansone 2012, 60, 223-224; Bromberg 2009, 78-81; Collins 2004; Murphy 
et al. 2003, 21 and Rosenmeyer 1982, 209-210, who discuss drama and its important work with antithesis and the 
cultivation of antithetical thought. 
 2  
 Not all scholars, however, acknowledge the influence of the dramatists as part of a gradual 
influence of poetic discourse on the prose used in civic situations and eventually identified as 
rhetoric.
4
 Scholars who look to the dramatists, moreover, tend to focus their research on the work 
of Aristophanes and Euripides, who are unmistakably in dialogue with the sophists and orators of 
their time. Aeschylus, however, is often considered irrelevant. Yet by neglecting to analyze his  
drama as well, studies on the history of rhetoric run the risk of misunderstanding and 
misrepresenting the multifaceted origins of the art. 
 Additionally, within Aeschylus’ work, the term πειθώ deserves more careful consideration. 
During the fifth and early fourth centuries BCE, πειθώ was not only closely associated with 
rhetoric (as a synonym and personification of the art) but also described as rhetoric’s end or 
purpose. Scholarship on the history of rhetoric, however, often takes for granted πειθώ’s 
connection with rhetoric. As a result, the history of rhetoric is often constructed based upon the 
theoretical or technical works of prose writers and philosophers such as Gorgias and his λόγος 
(427 BCE),
5
 Plato and his use of the adjective ῥητορική (c. 385 BCE),6 Isocrates, who refers to 
the abstract ῥητορεία in 392 BCE, or Aristotle and his theoretical discussions in the Rhetoric 
(350-336 BCE).
7
 By focusing their analyses on such discussions, scholars often omit any 
reference to πειθώ at all. At best, they treat πειθώ in early literature as representing an un-theorized 
collection of practices pertaining to verbal persuasion.
8
  
                                                          
4
 An exception to this is Homer, whom almost every writer of a history of rhetoric mentions if only briefly in the 
beginning of their work. 
5
 Date is from Kennedy 1963, 47. 
6
 Plato, Gorgias 448d9. While it cannot be absolutely proved that Plato first coined the word, there have been many 
studies made defending the assertion. For a summary of this argument see Timmerman and Schiappa 2010, 9-10. 
Regardless, it is in Plato that we have the first extant reference to the term. The date 385 BCE is also subject to dispute; 
it is taken from Schiappa 1990, 457; for a similar date, see Kennedy 1963, 47. 
7
 The word appears three times in Isocrates, first in Against the Sophists 21 (c. 392 BCE) and also in Niccoles 8 (c. 374 
BCE) and in Antidosis 25 (c. 354/3 BCE). These dates are taken from Schiappa 1990, 460. The dates for Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric are taken from Kennedy 1999, 76. 
8
 This evaluation obscures traditional nuances of the word (and particularly the personification) πειθώ and the 
 3  
  I argue, however, that, throughout the Oresteia, which was first performed around 458 
BCE, the playwright Aeschylus makes use of πειθώ in innovative and important ways that look 
forward to later discussions about the art of rhetoric.
9
 The Oresteia is one of Aeschylus’ most 
important dramas and his only extant trilogy.
10
 Throughout this drama, Aeschylus gives πειθώ 
meanings and associations which place it in connection and subordination to early Greek ideas 
about rhetoric, a developing assortment of ideas and techniques used in fifth and fourth century 
prose discourse aimed at winning over of audiences in public, often political, speech.
11
 
 Πειθώ appears12 in the Oresteia as a personified goddess, as a central structural principle 
and theme, and as the beginning and end of elaborately wrought persuasive speeches (Eumenides 
778-891) which resolve the entire tragedy. I argue that in each of these aspects, Aeschylus presents 
aspects of πειθώ which anticipate ideas and practices of rhetoric as it will be discussed, 
categorized, and analyzed by prose authors of the fifth and fourth centuries. Ultimately, this 
examination suggests that, through πειθώ, a self-conscious understanding of rhetoric existed in 
ancient Greece earlier than the arrival of the sophists or the use of the term ῥητορική by the 
philosophers, indeed, as early as the Aeschylus’ performance of the Oresteia. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
transitional role which it plays in evolving Greek conceptions of the art. While I am sensitive to the nuanced 
differences between the forms of the word (these differences are also discussed extensively in Section III below), for 
the sake of simplicity, I use “πειθώ” when referring to the general concept or abstract noun. When referring 
specifically to the verb form, I use “πείθω.” When referring to the personification, I use “Peitho.” 
9
 Date is from Sommerstein 2010, 8. 
10
 Although technically the Oresteia is a tetralogy, because of the scarcity of evidence—or text, for that matter—for 
the satyr play Proteus, I do not incorporate this play in my analysis. As a result, I also refer to the Oresteia as a trilogy 
throughout. 
11
 We cannot operate under the assumption that rhetoric in 458 BCE was a monolithic concept and practice, or 
cohesive discipline. In the fourth and fifth century, different ideas about the art of civic persuasive speech emerged not 
only in the abstract treatise of Aristotle, but also in the discussions of the philosophers and practices of the sophists and 
orators. As a result, I define rhetoric as above. 
12
 While πειθώ never appears visibly on stage, the word occurs in a variety of forms and functions throughout the 
entire dramatic production. 
 4  
II. Scholarship on the History of Greek Rhetoric 
A. Prose-Based Accounts 
 Many accounts of the history of rhetoric begin by highlighting the value placed on eloquent 
speech in ancient Greek culture from the times of Homer and Hesiod.
13
 The most-quoted text is 
Hesiod’s Theogony 79-97, where persuasive speech is called a gift of the Muses for kings.14 The 
Homeric references generally include examples such as Phoenix’s words and speeches to Achilles 
in Iliad 9.443, along with descriptions of speakers such as Nestor (Hom. Il. 1.248-49), Thersites 
(Hom. Il. 2.275), and Menelaus compared with the eloquent Odysseus (Hom. Il. 3.212-224).
15
 
Much has also been written about the construction of persuasive speeches in Homer. Even in 
antiquity, Homer was considered foundational to rhetoric.
16
 Knudsen, in Homeric Speech and the 
Origins of Rhetoric (2014), argues that Homer possessed an acute and remarkable awareness of 
available rhetorical practices and what she calls “an internalized systematicity in its practice."17 
Less radically, other scholars assert a general continuity of development from Homeric speeches 
(dated to the eighth century BCE),
18




 Scholars often point to the mid-fifth century arrival of the Sicilian sophists (Corax, Tisias, 
and certainly Gorgias) and their model speech handbooks as the “official” beginning of rhetoric, a 
                                                          
13
 E.g., Gagarin 2007, 27-28 in Worthington’s Blackwell Companion to Greek Rhetoric; also Kennedy 1963, 35-36; 
Murphy 1983, 3. 
14
 See West 1988, 5. 
15
 See Taplin (ed.) 2000, 99, 174. 
16
 See particularly Knudsen 2014, 21-28, who references Pseudo-Plutarch’s Essay 172; O’Sullivan 1992, 67 n.35; 
Kennedy 1999, 5-12. On ancient writers who were opposed to using Homer as model, see Enos 2012, 21. 
17
 Knudsen 2014, 94. For other work on the origins of rhetoric within Homer see the book by Knudsen 2014, articles 
by Nünlist 2012, Toohey 1994, and Karp 1977; and references in Cairns 1972, 34-40. Examples of earlier studies on 
Homer include Fenik 1968, an entire book on types of speeches in battle scenes, and Lohmann 1970, another book 
which focuses on the construction of Homeric speeches. 
18
 The dating of Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey are subject to debate. 
19
 Carey writes: “If we jump three and half centuries from Homer’s Greece to the fourth century BCE, we find 
ourselves struck more by the continuity than by any radical change,” (2000, 174). Other scholars who trace the 
emergence of rhetoric from within early poetry are Walker 2000, 7-21 and Havelock 1982, 32. 
 5  
codified series of techniques of persuasion on the Greek mainland.
20
 Corax and Tisias are 
mentioned by Cicero in Brutus 46, but most modern scholars now consider them shadowy figures 
given the scant evidence which we have for them and their work.
21
 Gorgias, however, remains 
central to the story of early rhetoric in most modern texts on the subject and consistently receives 
full treatment in surveys of the history of ancient Greek rhetoric.
22
 Some go so far as to equate 
Gorgias with the true “birth” of rhetoric in ancient Greece, as in Wardy’s 1996, The Birth of 
Rhetoric: Gorgias, Plato, and their Successors, and Pratt’s 2015 article about Gorgias, On the 
Threshold of Rhetoric. On the other hand, Kennedy, in his surveys of rhetorical history, argues that 
“rhetoric in argument, in style, and in arrangement was not introduced into Greece suddenly and 
dramatically in 427 B.C. by Gorgias, but was already present in most respects.”23 It remains a 
more common supposition that Gorgias and the other sophists of the late fifth century were merely 
part of a gradual process of rhetoric’s development in ancient Greece.  
 The fourth century likewise featured the emergence of many more rhetorical handbooks, 
practical guidebooks containing techniques and illustrative speeches which seem to have been 
circulated by the sophists such as Rhetorica ad Alexandrum by Anaximenes.
24
 Some evidence 
suggests that such rhetorical handbooks were written and used even earlier. For example, Haase 
2011 compiles many ancient references to rhetorical handbooks written by pupils of Isocrates 
                                                          
20
 Corax and Tisias seem to have come to Athens around 476 BCE (Usher 1999, 2). See also Murphy et al. 2003, 8, 23; 
Rutherford 2005, 78. 
21
 The following authors, for example, do not think that Corax and Tisias should be treated with such prominence as 
has been given them in the past: Hinks 1940, 61-69; Kennedy 1963, 58-61; Cole 1991, 65-84; Sansone 2012, 173. 
There is fairly recent speculation that “Corax” was just an insulting nickname for Tisias (e.g., Carawan 2007, 56-59). 
Also, Gagarin 2007, 30. The same can be said of the lost work (also handbooks) of the sophist Thrasymachus and the 
tragedian Theodorus, which may have been in circulation around this time, or a little later. See Haase 2011, 9-42. 
22
 See Bons 2007, 37-46 in Worthington’s Companion to Greek Rhetoric; Nam Duh-Kim 2009, 75-90 in Pernot’s 
New Chapters in the History of Rhetoric; and Kennedy 2011, Chapter 3.  
23
 Kennedy 1963, 47. 
24
 Dating for the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum is still uncertain, but recent work by Mayhew and Mirhady attribute it to 
Anaximenes, who lived from 380-320 BCE; thus they date the book to about 344 BCE, which is earlier than 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric. See Mayhew and Mirhady 2011, 450; also Chiron 2007, 90. 
 6  
(436-338 BCE) and by a servant of Theodectes (380-340 BCE).
25
 Yet whether or not these 
handbooks actually existed or were in use at the time cannot be ascertained with absolute certainty 
on such scanty evidence.
26
 Nonetheless, regardless of when they were written, the rhetorical 
handbooks, in time, they had an enormous influence on the solidification and dissemination of 
ideas and especially practices of rhetorical speech.  
 The philosopher Plato is also considered a key player in the development of rhetoric, even 
though he posed as one of its most vehement opponents in the early fourth century. There is a 
unique trend in scholarship on the topic which marks the true “beginning” of rhetoric as the 
moment of Plato’s supposed coinage in the phrase ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη (“the rhetorical art”) around 
385 BCE.
27
 Schiappa wrote The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece (1999) and 
“Rhetorike: What’s in a Name? Towards a Revised History of Early Greek Rhetorical Theory” 
(1992); in 1991, Cole wrote The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece. These texts distinguish 
between the pre-rhetorical times of the poets, the pre-disciplinary times of the sophists, and the 
time when rhetorical theory truly emerged with the use of the word ῥητορική by Plato and its 
corresponding theoretical explication by Aristotle.
28
 By contrast, in Greek Rhetoric before 
Aristotle (1993), Enos defines rhetoric as "an intentional use of language to persuade," and 
proposed a more evolutionary model which acknowledged the general contribution of Homer, the 
poets and the tragedians and the specific contribution of the pre-Socratics.
29
 Scholars continue to 




                                                          
25
 See Haase 2011, 23. 
26
 Knudsen, argues that Homer had access to and used available written texts on rhetoric (2014, 86). 
27
 See Schiappa 1999, 11. 
28
 See especially Schiappa 1999, 28, 109; also, 2003, 39-54; Cole 1991, x, 3. 
29
 Enos 1993, 29-30. Enos also writes later: “Attempting to pinpoint a precise moment in history muddles the more 
important goal of understanding the processes that led to the establishment of rhetoric,” (2012, xvii). 
30
 For some explicit definitions of rhetoric, see Cole 1991, ix; Murphy 1983, 3-4; Knudsen 1983, 6. For the purposes 
 7  
 Surveys of rhetorical history, after discussing the handbooks and Plato, generally turn to a 
close analysis of Aristotle. As the earliest extant theoretical compilation and presentation of the art 
in Greek literature, Aristotle’s Rhetoric (c. 350-336 BCE) marks, as it were, a culmination in the 
development of Greek rhetoric.
31
 In Aristotle we have a relatively holistic and theoretical 
presentation of the rhetorical art together with a categorization of various practices and techniques 
of persuasive speech and when they should be applied. Scholars assert (and I would agree) that in 
the Rhetoric a synthesis is achieved, and a first relatively complete articulation of the rhetorical art 
finally emerges in ancient Greece.   
 For many years, the early history of rhetoric in ancient Greece has been retold in this 
fashion. This is not an entirely inaccurate representation of the influence of the early poets, the 
sophists and orators and their handbooks, and the work of the philosophers. Nonetheless, the lack 
of attention given to the work of the dramatists and their contribution to this history needs to be 
remedied.  
 The omission or very brief treatment of drama (with the exception of some work on 
Euripides and Aristophanes) may arise from a number of presuppositions about the genre. The first 
may lie in a lingering modern prejudice towards examining poetic texts for evidence of intellectual 
development in antiquity. Griffith asserts that “[c]ritics shrink from ascribing too much subtlety, 
self-consciousness, or allusiveness to Greek authors and audiences before the arrival of Euripides 
and the sophists in the later ﬁfth century.”32 In Greek Drama and the Invention of Rhetoric, 
Sansone also notes a lingering scholarly reluctance to attribute self-consciousness and/or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of this dissertation, I adopt an understanding of rhetoric which correlates more closely with the model proposed by 
Enos 1993 and 2012. My definition of rhetoric also accords closely with that of Walker 2000, iii which will be 
discussed below. 
31
 Sansone (personal correspondence) has pointed out to me that there may have been other theoretical treatises which 
predated Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Sections of Plato’s Phaedrus (c. 360’s or so), for instance, seems to presuppose the 
existence of theoretical discussions (and possibly published material) on the topic. 
32
 Griffith 2002, 246. 
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intellectual inventiveness to poets and dramatists.
33
 Whether or not this prejudice exists with the 
pervasiveness which these scholars suggest, general overviews on the history of rhetoric give only 
very summary reference to the poetic utterances of drama. An exception, perhaps, is Walker 2000, 
who addresses this issue directly in defending the continuum between Rhetoric and Poetics in 
Antiquity.
34
 Walker writes what he calls a “sophists’ history of rhetoric,” and argues that rhetoric 
came not so much from practiced oratory as from poetic and epideictic modes of expression.
35
 
 The second reason is more historical. Since fifth and fourth century dramatic performances 
occurred in a multifaceted oral society, drama was very likely subject to influence from displays of 
the sophists, procedures and expressions used in courtroom oratory, and speeches presented in the 
democratic assembly.
36
 Thus, Knudsen remarks: “Tragic rhetoric is simply…not as 
chronologically remarkable…[and it] lacks the pristine state of Archaic poetry with respect to 
theorized rhetoric."
37
 For these and other reasons, many scholars have focused on outside 
influences but have neglected to look more closely at drama as a site of rhetorical innovation in 
and of itself. 
 
B. The Role of Drama in Histories of Rhetoric 
 Scholars analyze drama and rhetoric from several different angles. In a brief but 
informative article entitled “Rhetoric and Rhetorical Devices,” Bromberg 2014 lists a number of 
                                                          
33
 See Sansone 2012, 6-7. Also see O’Sullivan 1992, 17-19. 
34
 See also “Poetic Speakers, Sophistic Words,” (Knudsen 2012, 31-60). Walker barely mentions drama in his 
monograph, because he—and other scholars—often place drama with poetry as a different but not entirely distinct 
category of poetic expression. See for instance Walker 2000, 20. See also Sansone 2012, 47.  
35
 Walker 2000, ix. He describes rhetoric as “the art of epideitic argumentation/persuasion that derives originally from 
the poetic tradition and that extends in ‘applied’ versions of itself to the practical discourses of public and private life,” 
(Walker 2000, viii). 
36
 See Kennedy 1963, 27. 
37
 Knudsen 2014, 136. 
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these approaches.
38
 He notes that some scholars tend to identify outside influences to explain the 
figures of speech, arguments, and formal debate scenes found in drama.
39
 Others discuss the 
cultural ambivalence towards rhetoric which is later picked up in drama,
40
 or analyze how the 
sophists and Attic orators may have inspired some of the thoughts and ideas expressed in 
tragedy.
41
 Still others note the structural resemblances between drama and contemporary legal 




 While various aspects of the historical context of the fifth and fourth century cannot be 
ignored, drama and the rhetoric of the courts also likely profited from a relationship of mutual 
influence.
43
 Dramatic practices probably influenced the speeches in the courts and vice versa. 
Bromberg, therefore, complains that for a long time scholars have seen the influence of rhetoric on 
drama without considering drama (and other poetic genres) as “sources of developments in 
effective public speech."
44
 Other scholars also observe that the tendency to analyze outside 
influences upon drama can be detrimental to a deeper examination of the innovative potential and 
impact of drama itself.
45
  
 Accordingly, a relatively new movement in scholarship has begun to mine ancient Greek 
comedy and tragedy for evidence of incipient rhetorical practices emerging almost exclusively 
                                                          
38
 See particularly Bromberg 2014, 1172 from H. Roisman’s, The Encyclopedia of Greek Tragedy. 
39
 For the influence of figures of speech, see Usher 1999, 16-21. On argument, see particularly Mastronarde 2010, 
207-245. For formal debate scenes and other evidence see Strohm 1957, 3-49; Lloyd 1992, 20-21; Scodel 1997, 
491-492; Dubischar 2006, 14-29; Hawthorne 2009, 27-28; Major 2013; Rutherford 2012, 52. 
40
 See Goldhill 1997, 133-35; Mastronarde 2010, 211-11. 
41
 See Navarre 1900, 72-7; Rose 1976 wrote an article entitled Sophocles' Philoctetes and the Teachings of the 
Sophists; similarly, Conacher has an entire 1998 book entitled Euripides and the Sophists: Some Dramatic Treatments 
of Philosophical Ideas. On the orators and tragedy, see Bers 1994, 189-91. 
42
 On legal procedures and drama, see Garner 2014; Hall 2006, 353-92. 
43
 See McDonald 2007, 474. 
44
 Bromberg 2009, 44; 2014, 1172. 
45
 Sansone 2012, 223. 
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within the genre of drama.
46
 While these scholars may examine drama in ways similar to the 
scholarship referred to above, they operate under different assumptions about its potential for 
developing rhetoric. Mastronarde comments: "Many of the techniques of rhetoric are native to 
traditional forms of oral discourse and poetry and not an invention of those who explicitly 
organized and taught the art in the second half of the fifth century."
47
 For example, O’Sullivan 
shows how certain stylistic types were developed in the comedies of Aristophanes, thereby 
contributing to their eventual formalization in rhetorical theory.
48
 Another example is Castelli’s 
Meter Sophiston: La Tragedia nei Tratti Greci di Retorica (2000), which seeks to locate the 
origins of rhetorical technique within drama by cataloguing all of the tragic texts which are used 
later by fourth century rhetorical theorists.  
 Bromberg’s 2009 dissertation, “Tragic Persuasion and Early Greek Rhetoric,” takes a step 
further and re-contextualizes Aristotle’s Rhetoric “within a tradition of speech making and 
argument largely shaped by tragedy.”49 Focusing on tragedy’s persuasive purpose and close 
attention to audience response, Bromberg sees in drama not “the influence of sophistic relativism” 
but “a native tragic predilection for antithetical thought, resulting from the introduction of two 
individual actors who shared the stage and interrogated one another.”50 Closely aligning with and 
expanding upon Bromberg’s work is Sansone’s Greek Drama and the Invention of Rhetoric 
(2012). Sansone proposes that the unique intellectual moment occasioned by dramatic 
                                                          
46
 Halliwell 1997, 123. See also Goldhill 1986, Chapter 9, who emphasizes that tragic rhetoric did not merely reflect 
sophistic culture, but was a parallel symptom to a fundamental concern with the power of language. Also Murphy et al. 
2003, 21 states: “The consciousness of antithesis [a speaker and a chorus going back and forth] as it was played out on 
the Greek stage, is a significant prelude to the establishment of a rhetorical consciousness among the Greeks.” See also 
Bers 1994, 179. 
47
 Mastronarde 2010, 208-209. 
48
 O’Sullivan, Alcidamas, Aristophanes, and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory (1992). 
49
 Bromberg 2009, 239. 
50
 Bromberg 2009, 84, 21, 223-24. 
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composition and performance changed the “character of verbal expression”51 and thereby 
introduced techniques (for instance, the argument from probability and the figure of anticipation) 
which later became “representative features of rhetorical speech.”52 Another important text, 
Walker’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity (2000), does not deal extensively with drama; but he 
proposes that ancient Greek rhetoric (in its definition as ideas and techniques forming the art of 
persuasive prose used for civic and political speech) ultimately descends from modes of 
expression used in poetry and song.
53
 In his view, Greek tragedy, while not intentionally aimed at 
developing rhetoric,
54
 played a large role in shaping ancient Greek culture and, I would add, the 
way in which that culture expressed itself.
55
 
 The scholars I have cited all highlight the innovative potential of Greek drama with regards 
to the development and emergence of rhetoric in ancient Greece. My analysis builds upon the work 
of these scholars—particularly that of Walker, Bromberg, and Sansone—by advancing their 
theoretical approach and applying it to Aeschylus’ Oresteia. 
 Despite changes in scholarly perspectives on the importance of Greek drama to the history 
of rhetoric, reluctance to include Aeschylus has persisted. This is perhaps due to the comparatively 
small extant corpus of Aeschylean text,
56
 or to Aristophanes’ presentation of Aeschylus as less 
rhetorical than other Greek tragedians (Ar. Ran.1069-1082). Even Aristotle, who selects most of 
his examples for his Rhetoric from tragic dialogue, only mentions Aeschylus once throughout the 
                                                          
51
 Sansone 2012, 5. 
52
 Sansone 2012, 146; see also 119-145 for a more complete presentation of his argument on the importance of tragedy 
to the development of Greek rhetoric. 
53
 He considers rhetoric “in more or less sophistic terms as centrally and fundamentally an art of epideictic 
argumentation/persuasion that derives originally from the poetic tradition and that extends, in ‘applied’ versions of 
itself, to the practical discourses of public and private life,” (Walker 2000, viii). 
54
 The primary aim of ancient Greek drama was to win over the audience and the judges in the contest. 
55
 See Walker 2000, 9. Walker bases much of his work on Gentili 1988. See also Wardy 1996, 29; Cole 1991, 89. 
56
 This is the opinion, inter alios, of Castelli 2000, 148; I would agree. 
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entire text (Arist. Rh. 1388a8).
57
 While the later dramatists provide many instances of rhetorical 
sophistication which can be easily recognized, categorized, and analyzed, Aeschylus has been 
traditionally disregarded as too archaic to be of much use.  
 Modern scholarship has perpetuated the supposedly non- (or possibly pre-) rhetorical 
status given to Aeschylus in antiquity. For example, Usher writes that “[d]isappointingly but 
perhaps predictably, the earliest tragedian, Aeschylus, does not add much to our knowledge of 
early rhetoric.”58 Although Navarre’s 1900 Essai sur la Rhétorique Grecque avant Aristote 
includes rhetorical techniques which Gorgias may have inherited from Aeschylus, his list is 
relatively short compared with those of other playwrights,
59
 and in Castelli’s similar 2000 work, 
reference to Aeschylus is almost nil. 
 Scholars who study Aeschylus often limit their examinations to a few plays or scenes or to 
analyses of style. For instance, in his 1992 article “Aischylos bei den Anfängen der Griechischen 
Rhetorik,” Jarcho briefly analyzes the legal wording and the rhetorical situation of the events of 
the Oresteia in the light of evidence from the later rhetorical handbooks. His main contribution is 
the idea that the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and ad Herennium reveal “elements of the rhetorical 
way of thinking on Attic soil at least thirty-five years earlier than Gorgias came to Athens,” (die 
Elemente der rhetorischen Denkweise auf dem attischen Boden mindestens 35 Jahre früher finden, 
als Gorgias nach Athen kam).
60
 Focusing on the Eumenides, Rossi’s 1999 “Strategie oratorie nelle 
Eumenidi di Eschilo” does not discuss the possible impact of the trilogy as a whole. Other scholars 
have worked on individual plays, e.g., Carroll’s 1996 dissertation, “The Use and Function of 
                                                          
57
 Aristotle quotes Aeschylus in a section of his Rhetoric on the emotion of envy. See also Schmalzriedt 1980, 104, 
106; Jarcho 1992, 69. 
58
 Usher 1999, 16. 
59
 Navarre 1900, 98. The main techniques from Aeschylus which Navarre lists are repetition and homeoteleuton. 
60
 Jarcho 1992, 73. He suggests that a rhetorical way of thinking may have arisen with Aeschylus, or possibly also 
from outside influence such as from the courts. Ibid., 69. 
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Rhetoric in Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound," which examines how this drama as a whole could be 
considered as a forensic defense speech. Similarly, Gödde’s 2000 monograph focuses on ritual and 
the rhetoric of supplication in Aeschylus’ Suppliants. From a different perspective, Blasina’s 2003 
article “Retorica e Tragedia: Maestri e Atti Didattici in Eschilo” examines Aeschylus’ rhetorical 
contributions, but only “in contexts relating to the teaching effectiveness of the word.”61 Novelli 
2006 analyzes examples of anacoluthon throughout Aeschylus’ extant corpus. Sansone 2012 too 
discusses rhetoric as exhibited in Danaus’ rhetorical instructions to his daughters in the Suppliants, 
but even this analysis takes up less space than his treatment of Euripides. Most recently, 
Rynearson’s 2013 article examines evidence for amatory rhetoric in Aeschylus but focuses 
exclusively on scenes in the Eumenides, the last play of the Oresteia.
62
     
 None of these accounts, however, is comprehensive enough to definitively instate 
Aeschylus as a transitional figure in an evolutionary account of the history of rhetoric. My work 
expands and builds upon the studies of the scholars who seek evidence of rhetorical development 
within the drama of Aeschylus, regardless of potential outside influence. In order to understand 
more holistically the rhetorical innovation of Aeschylus in his drama and its possible impact on the 
audience, I analyze a complete trilogy of Aeschylus and identify evidence for the development of 
ideas about Greek rhetoric in his innovations with πειθώ. 
 
III. Πειθώ: A Catalog of Uses Before and After Aeschylus 
 Πειθώ (loosely translated as “persuasion”) is not only present in significant ways 
throughout the Oresteia, but has a tradition and common usage—as a verb, a goddess, and a 
                                                          
61
 From Blasina 2003, 21: esplicitamente in contesti riguardanti la didattica sull’efficacia della parola. Blasina’s 
emphasis on a “conceptual though not systematic rhetoric” (una retorica concettuale, pur se non sistematica) 
correlates closely with my own perspective (Ibid.). 
62
 For more on amatory rhetoric and its popularity in the fifth century BCE, see Section IV below. 
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noun—which precedes that of Aeschylus. Yet after him, the term is used explicitly with reference 
to the art and theory of rhetoric itself. 
 
A. Verb 
 According to etymologists, the origin of the noun πειθώ lies in the present stem of the verb, 
πείθω, or the present middle, πείθομαι, which is historically prior. While the most common 
translation of this word is “to persuade,” and in the middle “to obey, or be persuaded,” scholars 
have collected several other nuanced meanings based on its Proto-Indo European roots. Schulz, for 
instance, claims that the middle means “to trust or believe” and, only later, “to obey.”63 
Mourelatos, in view of the fact that πείθ/πίθ- words in Greek are related to fid- words in Latin, 
considers that “the core idea for the middle πείθομαι would seem to be: ‘to commit oneself to 
another,’ hence ‘to agree to be ruled by him,’ and ‘to place trust in him.’”64 As far as the active 
form of the verb is concerned, Pepe and others consider it a factitive verb which means “to make 
someone obey…conveying the general notion of a subject's ability to extend his influence over 
another person and make that person obey his will, without specifying how this influence is 
obtained.”65 Mourelatos also suggests that πείθω could also carry meanings such as “‘to enlist,’ or 
‘to engage,’ or ‘to win over,’ towards the performance of an act, or toward the adoption of an 
attitude or belief.”66 
 The verb πείθω occurs with great frequency in Homer, from whom Aeschylus is said to 
have borrowed much of his material and language (Athenaeus 8.347e). According to LSJ, the 
active form of the verb in Homer can be translated “to persuade” (Il. 22.91; 5.252); or “to prevail 
                                                          
63
 Schulz 1952, 62-63. 
64
 Mourelatos 1970, 136-37. 
65
 Pepe 1967, 4. See also Buxton 1977, 39-40 who defines it as to “get someone to acquiesce.” Fraenkel 1950, 338 
n.15: “willig machen.” 
66
 Mourelatos 1970, 136-37. 
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upon”…“by fair means,” “by entreaty” (Il.1.100), or “by misleading” (Il.1.132; 6.360). Iliad Book 
9 illustrates some of these usages in the embassy to Achilles. Nestor, to begin with, urges the 
council to think about how they might “prevail upon” Achilles “with gentle words and soothing 
gifts” (πεπίθωμεν / δώροισίν τ᾽ ἀγανοῖσιν ἔπεσσί τε μειλιχίοισι, Il. 9.112-113).67 Nestor later 
reiterates his appeal with the verb πείθω (Il. 9. 181), and the ambassadors make their best effort (Il. 
9. 184). Achilles acknowledges their attempt to persuade him but directly rejects their plea: οὔτ᾽ 
ἔμεγ᾽ Ἀτρεΐδην Ἀγαμέμνονα πεισέμεν οἴω (“I don’t think that Agamemnon son of Atreus will 
persuade me,” Il. 9. 315). In the end, Achilles asserts even more strongly, as if in direct opposition 
to Nestor’s intentions: οὐδέ με πείσει (“He will not persuade me, Il. 9. 345) and, later: οὐδέ…κεν 
ὧς ἔτι θυμὸν ἐμὸν πείσει᾽ Ἀγαμέμνων (“Not even in this way will Agamemnon prevail upon my 
spirit,” Il. 9. 386). 
 The meaning of the earlier middle/passive form varies even more widely. It can mean “to 
obey or listen to” (Il. 1.79, 289, 3.260, 18.273) or “be prevailed upon, won over, or persuaded” 
(Il.5.201). In Iliad Book 23, it can also mean “to let oneself comply with” (Il. 23.48) or “to yield or 
succumb” (Il. 23.645). The first example takes place in the scene just after Achilles has taken leave 
of the body of Patroclus on the day before his funeral. Since it is evening, the other Greek leaders 
urge Achilles to cleanse himself of blood and compose himself before coming to dinner, but the 
grief-stricken hero refuses to do so. He does, however, agree to eat: ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι νῦν μὲν στυγερῇ 
πειθώμεθα δαιτί (“But for now, let us yield to feasting, though it is hateful,” Il. 23.48). Nestor use 
the verb similarly in a latter portion of the same book when, during the funeral games for 
Patroclus, he comments on his inability to compete in athletic events due to his age: ἐμὲ δὲ χρὴ 
γήραϊ λυγρῷ / πείθεσθαι, τότε δ᾽ αὖτε μετέπρεπον ἡρώεσσιν. (“It is necessary for me to yield to 
miserable old age, but at that time I distinguished myself among the warriors,” Il. 23. 644-645). 
                                                          
67
 All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. 
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Other translations of the middle/passive as to “trust in” or “to believe something” can also be 
found in the Iliad and Odyssey.
68
 For instance, in Odyssey Book 16, when Odysseus arrives home 
to Ithaca and reveals himself to his son Telemachus, the young man does not at first believe that it 
is his father: Τηλέμαχος δ᾽, οὐ γάρ πω ἐπείθετο ὃν πατέρ᾽ εἶναι, / ἐξαῦτίς μιν ἔπεσσιν ἀμειβόμενος 
προσέειπεν (“But Telemachus did not yet believe that it was his father, and once more replying 
with words he addressed him,” Od. 16.192-193). 
 Homer’s usage, then, when combined with the conjectures of etymologists and 
lexicographers, suggests that the verb πείθω originated and was used throughout the times before 
Aeschylus as a broadly conceived action of one person making another willing to either do or 
believe something. What is more, this “prevailing upon,” seems to have consistently involved a 
process of entreaty akin to the English word “persuasion.” 
 
B. The Name 
 No extant Greek author before Aeschylus seems to use the abstract common noun πειθώ.69 
Indeed, the noun πειθώ, while derived from the verb πείθω seems to have first occurred not as an 
abstract concept but as an erotic female goddess companion of Aphrodite: Peitho.
70
 This makes 
the name of this goddess unusual since more often the impersonal form precedes its 
personification.
71
 As a result, however, in etymological dictionaries Πειθώ (Peitho) comes 
                                                          
68
 For examples of the meaning “to trust in,” see Il. 12.238 or Od. 20.45. 
69
 Here it must be noted that the classical Greeks did not differentiate between the upper and lower case πειθώ but 
editors, etymologists, and lexicographers do for ease of recognition and categorization. 
70
 Given this etymology and the nuanced meanings of the verb, the abstract, and the personified deity, this Chapter 
leaves Peitho untranslated. This also prevents any premature associations with the English word “persuasion” which 
contains connotations not present in the Greek word for this deity. Perhaps the most accurate translation for Peitho 
might be “Inducement.” Dowden, in the Oxford Classical Dictionary (ed. Simon Hornblower, Antony Spawforth, and 
Esther Eidinow, 2012), calls her the personification of “Winning Over.” Mourelatos calls her a “goddess of 
Inducement” and “the personified power of agreeable compulsion” (Mourelatos 1970, 139, 158). 
71
 See Buxton 1982, 49; Pepe 1967, 8; and especially Smith 2011, 55. See also Webster 1954, 11. It has been argued 
that “this constant to-ing and fro-ing between the element (or the abstraction) and the divinity constitutes the very 
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immediately after the entry for the verb but before the entry for the common noun. Chantraine and 




 Peitho as a goddess does not occur in Homer, but she is depicted in several other texts and 
vase paintings which predate Aeschylus’ Oresteia, principally in association “with birth, sex, and 
marriage, and above all, with Aphrodite.”73 Peitho’s role in Greek art, poetry, and cult generally 
involves a specifically erotic and sometimes forceful action of winning over another person so that 
he or she would willingly comply with another person’s wishes. Among the few examples of 
Peitho’s pre-Aeschylean depiction in vase painting, a fragment of a skyphos at the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art in New York (c. 490 BCE) provides clear example of her association with 
Aphrodite (Fig. 1): 
 
Fig.1. Peitho and Aphrodite. Fragment of a terracotta skyphos by a follower of Douris, c. 490 BCE. 
MMA 1907. 286.51. Photo from collections of Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
foundation of mythological thought,” (Aellen 1994, 13, tr. Stafford). For more on this fluidity, see Stafford 2000, 4; 
Shapiro 1993, 13; Burkert 1985, 185. On personifications more generally, see Chapter Two Section I. 
72
 Smyth 279, 70-71; Chantraine 1933, 116-117. 
73
 Shapiro 1993, 186; Smith 2011, 55. 
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Here a veiled Peitho (far left) appears behind Aphrodite and a small winged figure of Eros. The 
rest of the scene on the vase likely depicted the seduction of Helen.
74
 Peitho is also depicted with 
Aphrodite in a fragment of a skyphos by the Douris painter (MMA 1907.286.51), dated to 460-450 
BCE.
75
 Early lyric poets corroborate this association with Aphrodite or other erotic deities. 
Sappho, for instance, explicitly names Aphrodite as Peitho’s mother: 
  εν.[  ]Κυθερήας τρό- 
 φος[   θ]ρέπτη ἐν ἄλλοις  
 δὲ θυγ[ατέρα (τῆς) Ἀφρο]δίτης εἴρηκε τὴ[ν 
   Πειθώ   (Sappho fr. 90.5-8V).76 
  
 …(foster)-child of Cytherea,  
 …but in other places,  
 she calls the nursling daughter of Aphrodite 
   Peitho…  
 
Another possible reference in Sappho to Peitho as the servant of Aphrodite is the following 
passage: Σαπ]φῶ{ι} δὲ τὴ[ν] θεὸν χρυσοφάη<ν> θεράπαιναν Ἀφροδίτας (“Sappho [calls] the 
goddess [Peitho] the golden-shining attendant of Aphrodite,” Sapph. fr. 23 V, quoted in Philodem. 
Piet. Gomperz 1866, 42).
77
 
 This association with Aphrodite is also evidenced by cult inscriptions found throughout 
Greece and dated from as early as the mid sixth century BCE.
78
 According to Pausanias (1.43.6), 
there seems to have been a statue of Peitho and other lesser erotic deities such as Praxis, Paregoros, 
Eros, Himeros, and Pothos in a shrine to Aphrodite at the temple of Dionysius in Megara. Peitho 
also had other cult images and shrines in Argos, where she seems to have been worshiped with 
                                                          
74
 See also Shapiro 1993, 149, 124; Icard-Gianolio 1994, 234. 
75
 This vase is in a very fragmented condition. For more see Icard-Giancolio 1994, 234. 
76
 Found in the scholiast to Hesiod Op. 73, Voigt and the Campbell both accept the above lines as actual text, despite 
its fragmentary condition. See Voigt 1971, 100 especially. Buxton, however, mentions this text without comment in a 
footnote (Buxton 1982, 197 n. 39). 
77
 While this text is of questionable authorship, Lidov comments in a personal correspondence that “the reference to 
Peitho is not at all well established but…it is an old conjecture and was taken for granted for a long time.” 
78
 Smith 2011, 55; Rosenzweig 2004, 82-91. See also IG II. 4583; SEG 41.1848; MMA 1981.11.9. 
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Artemis as a marriage goddess (Pausanias 2.21.1), and in Daphni, as a close associate of Aphrodite 
(IG II.5.1558.1). In Mytilene (IG XII 2.73) and Pharsalos (IG IX.2.236), however, Peitho is 
referred to more as a cult epithet of Aphrodite than as an individual deity.
79
 
 Like Aphrodite herself, Peitho and her actions seem to vary between direct and indirect, 
gentle and violent kinds of erotic inducement. In the first place, Peitho very often works in 
nurturing contexts bestowing gifts which young people need in order to woo their lovers. For 
instance, a Splanchnopt pyxis (c. 460-450 BCE) at the Archeologico Museo Regionale delle 
Marche in Ancona, Italy, depicts Peitho at a scene representing the birth of Aphrodite.
80
 In 
Hesiod’s Theogony, the Oceanid Peitho is entrusted with the responsibility of bringing up youths 
(ἄνδρας κουρίζουσι, Hes. Theog. 347); and in the Works and Days, she adorns the newly created 
Pandora with golden necklaces: 
ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ Χάριτές τε θεαὶ καὶ πότνια Πειθὼ  
ὅρμους χρυσείους ἔθεσαν χροΐ·… (Hes. Op. 73-74) 
 
And around her, the divine Charites and lady Peitho  
placed on her skin golden necklaces;… 
 
Golden necklaces such as the ones Peitho presented to Pandora have long been symbolic of the 
beauty and charms of womanhood and the ability to win over someone in love.
81
  
 The particular graces which Peitho bestows upon the young person are typically those 
                                                          
79
 See Buxton 1982, 32-33; for Peitho as an aspect of Aphrodite and a discussion of personifications and epithet 
theory, see Stafford 2000, 3. 
80
 See also Stafford 2000, 129; Smith 2011, 60; ARV (2) 899.144, 1674; BA 211902. 
81
 The erotic connotations associated with golden necklaces find precedence in various places in earlier literature. In 
Odyssey 17.295-96, the suitors present necklaces to Penelope to woo her. In the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, 
Aphrodite adorns herself with necklaces (line 88) before attempting to seduce Anchises and, in the other Homeric 
Hymn to Aphrodite, she is depicted as adorned with golden necklaces at her birth (VI.10-13). See Pepe 1967, 130 and 
Buxton 1982, 37 for further conclusions based on these texts. Even outside of erotic contexts, golden necklaces have 
been associated with the work of Peitho, for instance, in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, where there is direct correlation 
between the necklaces and Peitho: Iris offers Eileithyia necklaces in order to convince her to help Leto in childbirth 
(Hom. Hym. Merc. 103, 113). They also call to mind the girdle used in the dios apate scene of the Iliad (Hom. Il. 
14.215) and in Choephoroi 613-622 where Minos persuades Scylla to kill her father by enticing her with golden 
Cretan necklaces.  
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which render her (or him) erotically attractive.
82
 For example, Peitho occurs in a fragment of 
Ibycus addressed to the handsome young man, Euryalus:  
Εὐρύαλε γλαυκέων Χαρίτων θάλος < > 
καλλικόμων μελέδημα, σὲ μὲν Κύπρις 
ἅ τ’ ἀγανοβλέφαρος Πει- 
θὼ ῥοδέοισιν ἐν ἄνθεσι θρέψαν. (Ibyc. fr. 288 PMGF) 
 
Euryalus, child of blue-eyed Charities,   
delight of the fair-haired [Horai], Aphrodite 
and gentle-eyed Peitho  
nurtured you in rose-flowers. 
 




 ε]ὔ μαρ[ες μ]ὲ ν οὐ.α.μι θέαισι μόρ- 
     φαν ἐπή[ρατ]ον ἐξίσω- 
 σθ αι συ[..]ρο ς ἔχη<ι>σθα[…].νίδηον 
[                        ]το [.(.)]ρατι- 
     μαλ[                            ].ερος  
 καὶ δ[.]μ [                  ]ος Ἀφροδίτα 
καμ [                           ] νέκταρ ἔχευ’ ἀπὺ 
     χρυσίας [                ]ν αν 
 …(.)]απουρ [                 ] χέρσι Πείθω 
[             ]θ[..]η σενη  
     [                  ]ακις 
 [                         ]......αι 
[                           ]ες τὸ Γεραίστιον 
     [                        ]ν φίλαι (Sappho fr. 96.21-34V) 
 
It is not easy for us to rival goddesses in loveliness of figure…of  
Adonis…Aphrodite poured nectar from a golden…her hands…Persuasion… the 
Geraesteum …dear… (tr. Campbell). 
 
According to Page, the content of the poem as a whole does not reveal much more than “the mutual 
                                                          
82
 “This convention [where Peitho is associated with the childhood of a person] indicates a special relationship 
between these gods and the human person, which embodies and guarantees the person’s physical beauty” (Pepe 1967, 
149). 
83
 Although the line (and the text immediately surrounding it) is extremely fragmented (and some would say 
indecipherable, e.g. Page 1955, 92), the presence of the proper noun Peitho is clear. Joel Lidov comments that the 
presence of Peitho as a proper noun is an assumption more reasonable than not because “the lines above and below 
make it look like we are in a third person singular environment, so it would be hard to get a first person verb in,”(from 
personal correspondence). See also Vogliano 1942, 114. This passage is not mentioned in Buxton 1982. 
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love of Atthis and the absent girls, and the desire of Sappho to comfort Atthis.”84 Yet it again 
shows Peitho in an erotic context bestowing beauty on a beloved.
85
 In Pindar, the youth blessed 
with the nurturing presence of Peitho is Theoxenos: ἐν δ’ ἄρα καὶ Τενέδῳ / Πειθώ τ’ ἔναιεν καὶ 
Χάρις / υἱὸν Ἁγησίλα (“So, after all, in Tenedos / Persuasion and Grace dwell / In the son of 
Hagesilas,” Pind. fr. 123.13-15 Snell, tr. William H. Race).86 In Pindar’s Pythian 9, at one point 
the Centaur instructs the young lover Apollo about how to approach his beloved seemingly 
without force but with the help of Peitho: κρυπταὶ κλαΐδες ἐντὶ σοφᾶς / Πειθοῦς ἱερᾶν φιλοτάτων 
(“the hidden keys of holy lovemaking belong to clever Peitho” Pind. Pyth. 9.39).87 It is Peitho 
who nurtures the young lovers and also grants them the qualities they need to “win over” their 
beloved. 
 Additionally, Peitho’s actions can be a bit forceful, as on a skyphos by Makron (490-480 
BCE), one of two extant vase paintings depicting Peitho painted before the time of the Oresteia 
(Fig.2).
88




                                                          
84
 Page 1955, 93. 
85
 The only strange thing here may be the reference to Geraesteum, but Page writes that, “occasional glimpses of the 
subject –matter (Aphrodite, Peitho, and pouring of nectar, Geraestus) reveal nothing irreconcilable” (Page 1955, 
95-96, fn. 2). 
86
 See further Bérard 1974, 91-92, 161-164. 
87
 On the other hand, as Joel Lidov points out in a personal correspondence that there could be connotations of 
forcefulness in this passage since we don’t precisely know how Apollo’s beloved in this passage got to Libya.  
88
 The other is a Euthymides oinochoe (c. 510-500 BCE) in New York also depicting the judgment of Paris, but in a 
very fragmentary condition (MMA 1981.11.9; Shapiro 1993, 122; Stafford 2000, 130). 
89
 The seduction and/or abduction of Helen is a common scene for Peitho in Greek vase painting (Smith 2011, 58). 
 22  
 
 
Fig. 2. The abduction of Helen. Skyphos by Makron, c. 490-480 BCE; Boston 13.186. 
Peitho is on the far right, holding a flower. Photo from collections of the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. 
 
 
Paris grasps Helen by the wrist to drag her off to Troy. Behind Helen stand Aphrodite, adorning 
Helen with a wreath, and Peitho holding a flower. She is in a simple erotic pose yet supporting a 
violent deed.
90
 In a similarly complex situation, in Pindar’s fr.122 Snell, a band of prostitutes are 
referred to as the servants of Peitho: Πολύξεναι νεάνιδες, ἀμφίπολοι / Πειθοῦς ἐν ἀφνειῷ Κορίνθῳ 
(“Young girls who welcome many guests, attendants of Peitho in rich Corinth,” Pind. fr. 122.1-2 
Snell). These courtesans have been forcibly dedicated to Aphrodite in fulfillment of the promise 
made by the Olympic winner, Xenophon of Corinth; but according to another line in the poem: σὺν 
δ’ ἀνάγκᾳ πὰν καλόν (“with compulsion all is fair,” Pind. fr. 122.9 Snell). Here too Peitho 
becomes a guardian and mistress of individuals forced into erotic activity.  
 With an even more explicit emphasis on compulsion, Pindar’s Pythian 4 portrays 
Aphrodite helping Jason to win the love of Medea by engaging the service of Peitho’s whip:91 
                                                          
90
 On this depiction Stafford writes: “The ‘persuasion of Helen’ raises the question of Peitho’s modus operandi: do 
mortals have any choice when up against her power? ...when does seduction become rape?” (Stafford 2000, 130). 
91
 In addition to using the whip of Peitho, Aphrodite in the scene also makes use of a magic bird charm called an iynx, 
a “bird of madness” (μαινάδ’ ὄρνιν, Pind. Pyth. 4. 214). “The iynx, a love charm intended to instill a responsive 
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             …λιτάς τ’ ἐπαοιδὰς  
 ἐκδιδάσκησεν σοφὸν Αἰσονίδαν·   
 ὄφρα Μηδείας τοκέων ἀφέλοιτ’ αἰ-  
 δῶ, ποθεινὰ δ’ Ἑλλὰς αὐτάν    
 ἐν φρασὶ καιομέναν δονέοι μάστιγι Πειθοῦς. (Pind. Pyth. 4.216-219) 
 
 She [Aphrodite] taught the son of Aison  
 to be skillful in prayers and charms;  
 so that he might take away Medea’s respect for her parents,  
 and so that desire for Hellas  
 might set her mind afire and drive her with the whip of Persuasion (tr. Race). 
 
Desire (Ποθεινὰ) here drives (δονέοι)92 Medea by means of the whip of Peitho (μάστιγι Πειθοῦς). 
Yet by the end of this story, Pindar describes the marriage of Jason and Medea as one to which they 
both consented: καταίνησὰν τε κοινὸν γάμον / γλυκύν (“and they were betrothed in a common 
sweet marriage,” Pind. Pyth. 4.222).93 Peitho, like her mother, traditionally fluctuates between 
actions of violence and the gentle agreements of lovers. 
 Another instance of this ambiguity in Peitho’s actions can be found at Sappho 1.18V, 
where the speaker (presumably, Sappho herself) begs Aphrodite to use Peitho’s forceful qualities 
in order to “release her from the pangs of unrequited love.”94 Aphrodite responds to Sappho’s plea 
in the lines below: 
  τίνα δηὖτε πείθω 
.].σάγην [ἐς σὰν φιλότατα; τίς σ’, ὦ 
 Ψά]πφ’, [ἀδικήσι  
κα]ὶ γ[ὰρ αἰ φεύγει, ταχέως διώξει, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
passion in the person desired as a lover, consisted of a wryneck attached to a small wheel,” (Race 1997, 287 n. 5). 
Braswell comments that "the name of the bird and also the magical practices associated with it were familiar long 
before Pindar,” (Brasewell 1988, 297, n.214b). There also seems to have been an ancient association between the iynx 
and Peitho as mentioned by a scholiast on Theocritus 2.17 and in the Suda, where Iynx [the nymph associated with the 
love charm] was considered either the daughter of Echo or Peitho. See also Diogenes Laertius 6.75; Pepe 1967, 153 
n.8). 
92
 This word is also found in Sappho 40 and Ar. Ec. 954 meaning “to terrify” or “disturb,” and thus, in an erotic 
context, “to agitate” or “excite” (LSJ). 
93
 Buxton is surprised at the poetic imagery of the “lash of Peitho” and seeks to explain it as an instance of “the 
satisfying frisson of oxymoron, since Peitho is normally opposed to force-compulsion,” (Buxton 1982, 40). Pepe 
likewise claims that Pythian 4 “is in basic conflict with the non-violent idealization of Peitho in Pythian IX,” (Pepe 
1967, 154), but I think that Peitho’s association with force and gentleness merely mirrors the ambiguous nature of her 
mother, Aphrodite. 
94
 Page 1955, 14. 
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αἰ δὲ δῶρα μὴ δέκετ’, ἀλλὰ δώσει, 
αἰ δὲ μὴ φίλει, ταχέως φιλήσει 
 κωὐκ ἐθέλοισα. (Sappho fr.1. 18-24V.)  
 
          Who must I persuade this time  
to lead you back to her love? Who  
 wrongs you, Sappho?  
If she runs away, soon she shall pursue;  
if she does not accept gifts, why, she shall give them instead;  
and if she does not love, soon she shall love  
 even against her will (tr. Page). 
 
Although it is uncertain whether the noun or verb is present,
95
 the noteworthy aspect of these lines 
is not so much the debate on the word but on the κωὐκ ἐθέλοισα of line 24. Aphrodite promises to 
achieve the desired result through Π/πειθώ even if the other person, Sappho’s beloved, is 
unwilling.
96
 The traditional representation of Peitho thus tends to combine depictions of both 
gentle and forceful aspects of erotic action. 
 Despite this complex erotic tradition, Peitho seems to have held some civic roles in 
antiquity as well. In the Theogony, Hesiod calls Peitho one of the Oceanids, lesser divinities whom 
Pepe categorizes into two basic types. There are those whose names refer to the physical attributes 
of the ocean, such as Καλλιρόη (fair-flowing, 351), Γαλαξαύρη (breeze-calming, 354) or Ἰάνθη 
(violet, 349). Secondly, there are those whose names related to “various qualities and processes 
which are beneficial to man’s existence in general, especially his political life,”97 such as Πλουτώ 
(wealth, 355), Τελεστώ (accomplisher, 358), Τύχη (good fortune, 360), and Πειθώ (Hes. Theog. 
349). Another clear place in literature where a seemingly civic Peitho occurs without Aphrodite is 
                                                          
95
 These scholars suggest that the goddess herself may be present: Page 1955, 4; Voigt 1971, 29; Pepe 1967, 136, 
although most admit to the uncertainty. Lidov states that “Sappho 1.18 is the one passage in the poem whose text has 
resisted all attempts at clarification,” (personal correspondence). Though he translates it as a verb, Buxton still 
assumes the goddess’ presence (Buxton 1982, 38). 
96
 Some scholars see a foreful and magical element in Sappho’s fragment 1.18V, noting that the lines in which the 
word πειθώ appears seem to closely resemble formulaic love spells, “an antithetical arrangement, assisted by 
repetition, alliteration and assonance,” (Petropoulos 1993, 46). See also Cameron 1939, 1-17. 
97
 Pepe 1967, 101, 102-103. Pepe notes something similar with the catalog of the Nereids, which contains both 
nymphs with watery names and those relating to life in society (e.g. Protomedea, Leagora, Euagora, Themisto, etc). 
See Pepe 1967, 103-04. 
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in a fragment of Alcman which describes the family members of Tyche: 
  Εὐνομίας <τε> καὶ Πειθῶς ἀδελφὰ  
 καὶ Προμαθήας θυγάτηρ…(Alc. fr. 64 PMGF) 
 
Sister of Eunomia and Peitho,  
And daughter of Prometheia… 
 
Buxton comments that this genealogy is a sort of “oddity, since everywhere else in extant lyric 
Peitho’s function is unambiguously erotic.”98 
 Peitho’s civic role is attested in Athenian culture as well. An Athenian cult to Aphrodite 
Pandemos and Peitho was established well before Aeschylus’ time, as seems to be indicated by a 
later inscription describing their worship in “ancient times” in the Aphrodisia festival.99 The cult 
was founded by either the legendary Theseus,
100
 by Solon around 594 BCE,
101
 or by Cleisthenes 
during his unification of the demes of Athens around 508/7 BCE.
102
 Its prominence at Athens at 
the time is further confirmed by Pausanias’ report that the sanctuary was situated on the south-west 
slope of the Acropolis (Pausanias 1.22.3).
103
   
 Regardless who founded the cult, the circumstances surrounding its foundation were 
predominantly political ones, albeit with some erotic undertones. According to Rosenzweig, the 
worship of Peitho as a civic divinity seems to have sprung from the worship of Aphrodite as a 
goddess of unity and harmony between man and wife (the core of the polis) and amongst the 
                                                          
98
 Buxton 1977, 26; Buxton 1982, 41-42. There is very little one can decipher from such a fragment, however, Pepe 
speculates upon the meaning when he writes: “When intelligent planning employs persuasion as a political tool within 
a society enjoying the rule of law, then a state of political stability and prosperity can arise and endure,” (Pepe 1967, 
142; 143). See also Weisäcker 1846, 24. 
99
 The inscription (IG II (2) 659) dates to approximately 287/7 BCE. See Smith 2011, 56 and especially Scholtz 2007, 
16-17. 
100
 For this version of the story, see Pausanias 1.22.3 and Thucydides 2.15.102. 
101
 See account of Nicander of Colophon in Athenaeus 13.569d. 
102
 On these various foundation stories, see Anderson 2003, 134-146; Smith 2011, 55; Rosenzweig 2004, 15-17. 
Unfortunately, although there seems to be solid material evidence for the existence of the cult to Aphrodite Pandemos, 
there are no fragments of inscriptions from that site which refer to Peitho. 
103
 See Rosenzweig 2004, Fig. 1; Smith 2011, 56. 
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people of the polis at large.
104
 This would also account for the detail which Athenaeus supplies 
that the cult of Aphrodite Pandemos and Peitho was founded on the profits of Athenian brothels 
(Athen.13.569d). In summary, Rosenzweig states:  
What can be gleaned from the evidence thus far is that the founding of the cult of 
Aphrodite Pandemos [and Peitho] arose from people gathering together: people in 
the agora, meeting in the assemblies; people from the demes of Attica, coalescing 





Further evidence for the cult of a pre-Aeschylean civic Peitho may lie in certain silver coins, 
triobols (510-490 BCE), which depict the faces of Peitho and Aphrodite Pandemos as a 
Janus-headed goddess, and, on the reverse, possibly Athena (Fig. 3). 
 
 
  Fig. 3. Triobol coins depicting Peitho and Aphrodite Pandemos. 
  c. 510 - 490 BCE (Illustration reprinted from Seltman 1924, Plate XXII, dd-ee). 
 
 
These coins may have been what Anacreon was referring to when he wrote about a previous age: 
“at that time, Peitho did not yet shine silver” (οὐδ’ ἀργυρῆ κω τότ’ ἔλαμπε Πειθώ, Anac. fr. 384 
                                                          
104
 See Aristotle’s Politics 1280b33-39 on how marriage is central to the life and functioning of the polis. Smith 
writes: “Aristoteles shared with some contemporaries and perhaps predecessors the view that a successful polis was 
reliant on the distribution of grace and virtues such as philia, a sort of civic friendship, among oikoi. Philia, kharis, and 
arete resulted from and resulted in marriage,” (Smith 2011, 52). For more on the bond of marriage and its similarity to 
the bond of citizens in the polis, see Buxton 1982, 36. See also Rosenzweig 2004, 4 and Section IV below on the 
popularity of amatory vocabulary in the civic situation of this time.  
105
 Rosenzweig 2004, 18. See also Pala 2010, 214; Stafford 2000, 125. 
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PMG, tr. Pepe). The idea of a silver Peitho (aside from the existence of these triobols) is not 
attested elsewhere. Yet, since Anacreon worked in Athens as a court poet between 528/7-514 
BCE, it is entirely plausible that he might have encountered these coins.
106
 While it is uncertain 
whether these triobols coincided with Cleisthenes’ reforms and possible erection of the 
above-mentioned sanctuary, they nonetheless provide further evidence of Peitho in the public 




 In sum, then, Peitho is traditionally represented as an erotic, sometimes civic, goddess 
companion of Aphrodite, whose sphere of action encompasses both nurturing and beautifying 
roles as well as dangerously seductive ones. The most significant difference which can be noted 
between Peitho and the verb πείθω is that the goddess is a strongly erotic persona who 
infrequently—if ever—uses carefully constructed speech or entreaty in her work.108 More often, 
she is depicted with instruments (whips, necklaces, charms, flowers, etc). The verb, on the other 
hand, operates more broadly and with frequent reference to speech. Even in the first book of the 
Iliad, πείθομαι appears with μύθῳ (Il. 1.33; 1.273) and ἔπεσι (Il. 1.150).109 The verbal πείθω can 
also involve lengthly entreaties and a certain drawn out process of persuasion which involves 
convincing someone intellectually about something and in a wide variety of social contexts such as 
the embassy to Achilles examined above. The pre-Aeschylean Peitho, by contrast, is found mostly 
in private amatory situations using instruments to make someone yield in love—and rather 
                                                          
106
 The objection to this supposition is the fact that the triobol was a fractional coin (half of a drachma) and hence “had 
a rather small issue and may not have enjoyed wide distribution,” (Rosenzweig 2004, 18). 
107
 Smith 2011, 56; Rosenzweig 2004, 18; for the opposite opinion, see Seltman 1924, 94-95; 98. See Simon 1970, 
12-13, pls 2.4 for another picture and further discussion. One commentator goes so far as to say that “in view of the 
fact that these coins with (supposedly) Aphrodite and Peitho on one side have (unmistakably) Athene on the other, 
Simon suggests that we have here a sort of pre-echo of the end of the Oresteia, where Athene relies on the power of 
Peitho,” (Buxton 1982, 33). 
108
 Thanks to Joel Lidov, who first pointed out to me this detail about entreaty in a personal correspondence. 
109
 But also see Oguse 1965, 524-27; Table I and Mourelatos 1970, 137, who point out that the use of this verb with an 
accusative and infinitive construction only comes into use with Sophocles. 
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quickly, it seems. Aside from these differences, however, both the personified noun and the verb 
involve the winning over of one person by another, or, as Mourelatos sums up: “causation, 
instigation, or inducement.”110  
 
C. Abstract Noun 
 The abstract, impersonal noun πειθώ is almost never used in extant Greek texts before the 
time of Aeschylus and in any texts wher it odes occur, it seems either closely rlated to the goddess 
or simply meaning “conviction” or “persuasion.”111 One pre-Aeschylean text which uses the 
impersonal noun is a fragment (dated between 600’s-500’s BCE) supposedly from the 
Apophthegmata of the Seven Sages (fr. 6.12). At the end of a list of moral exhortations, the 
passage states that the person who follows these wise sayings will have, among other things: 
“caution at the right moment, nobility in character, mastery in work…[and] persuasiveness in 
speech” (καιρῶι εὐλάβειαν, τρόπωι γενναιότητα, πόνωι ἐγκράτειαν…λόγωι πειθώ, Septem 
Sapientes, Apophthegmata, fr. 6.11-12).
112
 Here the noun clearly refers to an abstract idea 
divorced from the nuanced meanings associated with the goddess Peitho. 
 The term πειθώ also occurs in some fragments of pre-Socratic philosophers who may have 
been near-contemporaries of Aeschylus. These philosophers seem to fluctuate between an 
understanding of πειθώ as a divinity or as an impersonal abstract. Parmenides (c. 515-450 BCE) 
writes about a Π/πειθώ which seemingly functions as a divinity and accompanies another 
                                                          
110
 Mourelatos 1970, 138. 
111
 Aeschylus first uses πειθώ as an abstract, non-deified, “uncapitalized” noun at Ag.87 and 106. These texts will be 
discussed further in Chapter Two. 
112
 Unfortunately, whether or not this texts is verbatim or paraphrased cannot be verified. Other passages from the 
Seven Sages contain πειθώ in verb form, and usually in direct commands to obey the the laws, customs, or rulers of a 
given place. For example, the exhortation “Obey the laws” (Νόμοις πείθου) is found twice in Septem Sapientes, 
Sententiae 216. 9, 38. A similar command is in Septem Sapientes Praecepta 217. 3. And, another instance of the verb 
meaning “obey” can be found in Septem Sapientes, Apophthegmata 2.34.2. These verbal examples are not surprising 
considering the wide use and application of the verb even in Homer. 
 29  
semi-divine abstract (Truth), by marking the best road of inquiry for his philosophical agenda: 
 εἰ δ’ ἄγ’ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας, 
 αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι·  
 ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, 
 Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος (Ἀληθείηι γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ),…(Parm. DK fr. 2.1-4)  
 
 But come, I will tell you, and—you—pay attention and hear my story,  
 which are the only roads of inquiry to consider; 
 The first one, that “it is” and that it is not possible to “not be,” 
 This the path of Peitho/conviction (for she/ it attends upon Truth)… 
 
It is challenging to decide whether Parmenides means the goddess Peitho or the purely abstract 
idea of conviction. This passage is preceded by the mythological and semi-amatory lines of the 
earlier fragment (DK. fr. 1.1-10) which features a goddess and daughters of the sun who guide the 
man to the light of true philosophy by throwing off their veils. Thus, Blank argues that the 
“invocation of Peitho in fragment 2 …is quite in keeping with the motif of seduction or temptation, 
philosophical or otherwise, introduced by the unveiling of the sun-maidens.”113 He continues: 
“Parmenides… although he argues for this [the Way of true faith] logically,…[he] begins by using 
the seductive power of persuasion.…”114 The wording of this scholar’s comments again illustrates 
the challenge of how to translate Π/πειθοῦς in the thought of this pre-Socratic philosopher: as a 
goddess or as “the seductive power of persuasion?”  
 A similar ambiguity also can be found in a fragment of Empedocles (c. 495-435 BCE), a 
pre-Socratic philosopher who speaks about Π/πειθώ as a semi-divine skill. The passage is taken 
from Clement of Alexandria (Clem. Al. Strom.V. 81):  
  γάρ τοι θεῖον, ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνός φησι ποιητής,  
  οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθαι ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτόν 
   ἡμετέροις ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν, ἧιπέρ τε μεγίστη  
  πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἁμαξιτὸς εἰς φρένα πίπτει. (Emp. DK fr.133.1-5) 
 
 For the divine, says the poets of Acragas, 
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 Blank 1982, 174. 
114
 Blank 1982, 177. 
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  ‘Is not to be reached and made accessible by the eyes,  
 nor grasped with the hands, though by this way the broadest  
  path of persuasion enters the heart of men.’ (tr. Guthrie). 
 
While Π/πειθώ has come down and made (herself/itself) available for men to use and tread upon in 
ordinary human activities, divinity, by contrast, always remains above mankind and out of reach. 
Empedocles is therefore referring to a Π/πειθώ that, while divine in origin, ends up becoming a 
secular, human skill. This and the above examples reveal that the abstract common noun πειθώ, 
while it occurs in a few pre-Aeschylean texts, is either difficult to distinguish from the goddess 
Peitho or else closely linked to meanings such as “conviction,” “persuasion,” or persuasiveness. 
 
D. After Aeschylus: The Verb, Goddess, and Noun 
 After Aeschylus, the verb, but especially the personified goddess Peitho and its abstract 
noun counterpart πειθώ, undergo a transformation. There seem to be two main strands of 
development here, which I will discuss in sequence.
115
 The first takes place soon after the time of 
Aeschylus and just into the fourth century BCE. During this time, πειθώ becomes explicitly 
associated with the newly developing ideas about the art of persuasive speech, an art which will 
later be referred to as rhetoric.  
 Aristophanes provides an excellent example of the change in the perception of πειθώ and a 
new use in association with sophistic speech. In the Frogs, Aristophanes stages a competition 
between Euripides and Aeschylus where the two playwrights utter some lines from their tragedies. 
Meanwhile, Dionysus uses a scale to measure the “weight” of their lines. Euripides begins the 
dialogue:  
                                                          
115
 It must be admitted that it is difficult to ascertain the existence of these two strands of development with absolute 
certainty due, in large part, as Lawrence Kowerski has pointed out to me, to the dearth of evidence (personal 
correspondence). 
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 Εὐριπίδης 
 ‘οὐκ ἔστι Πειθοῦς ἱερὸν ἄλλο πλὴν λόγος.’ 
 
 Αἰσχύλος 
‘μόνος θεῶν γὰρ Θάνατος οὐ δώρων ἐρᾷ.’ 
 
 Διόνυσος 
μέθεσθε μέθεσθε: καὶ τὸ τοῦδέ γ᾽ αὖ ῥέπει:  
θάνατον γὰρ εἰσέθηκε βαρύτατον κακόν. 
 
 Εὐριπίδης 
ἐγὼ δὲ πειθώ γ᾽ ἔπος ἄριστ᾽ εἰρημένον. 
 
 Διόνυσος 
πειθὼ δὲ κοῦφόν ἐστι καὶ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον. (Arist. Ran. 1931-1396) 
 
 Euripides: 
 “Persuasion has no other shrine save speech.”116 
 
 Aeschylus: 
“Death is the only god that loves not bribes...” 
 
 Dionysus: 
Let go, let go! This one's is tilting once again. 
For he inserted Death, weightiest of ills. 
 
 Euripides: 
 And I—Persuasion—a saying beautifully expressed. 
 
 Dionysus: 
Persuasion is but light, and makes no sense…(tr. Dillon). 
 
In his first line, Euripides removes Peitho from ritual worship and associates her directly with 
speech (λόγος, 1391).117 Euripides is angered that his line did not outweigh that of the older 
playwright; he defends himself, but once again refers to a πειθώ that can somehow be spoken or 
“expressed” (εἰρημένον, 1395). Dionysus then dismisses persuasion entirely in his last line (1396). 
By the end of this passage, Π/πειθώ has been slightly removed from cult status and connected with 
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 The full quotation from Euripides fr. 170 (Nauck) is as follows: οὐκ ἔστι Πειθοῦς ἱερὸν ἄλλο πλὴν λόγος / καὶ 
βωμὸς αὐτῆς ἔστ’ ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει (“There is no shrine of Peitho other than speech, and her altar is in the nature of 
man”). 
117
 Stafford comments that Euripides could be referring to the nearby temple of Aphrodite Pandemos and Peitho on 
the Acropolis (Stafford 2000, 126-127). 
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beautifully spoken speech—the kind of speech, however, which can be light, fickle, and empty 
(κοῦφόν…καὶ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, 1396). This last description may well be a reference to the use of 
πειθώ by sophists who practice rhetoric and play with words to stun and deceive the crowd.118 
 Peitho as a goddess, but also as an abstract noun, also forms the basic terminology of 
several fifth century prose passages from historians. Herodotus (c. 484–425 BC) tells of 
Themistocles’ political reliance on Peitho when engaged in conflict with the Andrians: 
προϊσχομένου Θεμιστοκλέος λόγον τόνδε, ὡς ἥκοιεν Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ ἑωυτοὺς 
ἔχοντες δύο θεοὺς μεγάλους, Πειθώ τε καὶ Ἀναγκαίην, οὕτω τέ σφι κάρτα δοτέα 
εἶναι χρήματα,… (Hdt. Hist. 8.111) 
 
Themistokles gave them [the Andrians] to understand that the Athenians had come 
with two great gods to aid them, Peitho and Ananke (Necessity), and that they [the 
Andrians] must therefore certainly give money,… (tr. Godley). 
 
Peitho and Necessity here seem to be a pair of complementary opposites: the Athenians’ power lies 
in the assurance that if their words of Peitho fail, force can still avail.
119
 In Thucydides also, the 
Plataean leader Lacon complains to the Lacedaemonians about the small hopes he has of winning 
them over by argumentation: χαλεπῶς δὲ ἔχει ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἡ πειθώ (“In addition to 
other things, the possibility of persuading you also poses difficulty for us,” Thuc. 3.53.4).120 
 Later Greek sophists and philosophers likewise use the verb and the non-divine term πειθώ 
to describe their art.
121
 In the Encomium of Helen, for example, Gorgias gives a brilliant excursus 
on the power of Π/πειθώ in speech.122  
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 The association of the goddess Peitho with speech, especially in the civic sphere, will be discussed at greater length 
in Chapter Two Section IV. 
119
 See Buxton 1982, 42; 1977, 28 who refers to the following ancient note: In Atheniensium potestate esse, vi ab illis 
obtinere quod petebant, si verbis s.dicendi facultate et artificio non possent (TGL VI, col 665). 
120
 For the translation of πειθώ here see note in the Smith 1894 commentary which indicates “only here in 
Thucydides.” Hobbes’ translation renders it “the means of persuasion;” Buxton translates the entire line as follows: 
“But we find ourselves confronted by a further difficulty, in that we have to convince you,” (Buxton 1982, 31). 
121
 For recent arguments against the centrality of persuasion to the work of the sophists, however, see Gagarin 2001, 
277 and Porter 1993, 267-299. 
122
 Many scholars agree that the Encomium expresses the core of Gorgias’ agenda and may even be representative of 
fifth century rhetorical theory. See Kerferd 1981, 78; Segal 1962,102. 
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 ὁ μὲν οὖν πείσας ὡς ἀναγκάσας ἀδικεῖ, ἡ δὲ πεισθεῖσα ὡς ἀναγκασθεῖσα τῶι 
λόγωι μάτην ἀκούει κακῶς. ὅτι δ' ἡ πειθὼ προσιοῦσα τῶι λόγωι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἐτυπώσατο ὅπως ἐβούλετο… (Grg. Enc. 12-13) 
 
 He who persuaded (as constrainer) did wrong; while she who was persuaded (as 
one constrained by means of the discourse) is wrongly blamed. Persuasion 
belonging to discourse shapes the soul at will… (tr. Donovan). 
 
The philosopher Plato associates πειθώ directly with the art of rhetoric: τὸ πείθειν…οἷόν τ᾽εἶναι 
τοῖς λόγοις (“the ability to persuade with speeches,” Pl. Grg. 452e1, tr. Lamb). Later in the 
dialogue, Socrates also says to Gorgias: εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ 
ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ (“If I at all take your 
meaning, you say that rhetoric is a producer of persuasion, and has therein its whole business and 
main consummation,” Pl. Grg. 453a1-2, tr. Lamb).123 In the Phaedrus, Socrates reiterates this 
broad πειθώ-centered definition when he condemns the art as a mere compilation of rules, skills, 
and techniques. To Socrates, the most essential requirement for the art and practice of rhetoric is a 
deep understanding of the human soul which enables the rhetor “to try to make or instill 
conviction in this one [in the soul of the interlocutor]” (πειθὼ… ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ, Pl. 
Phaedr. 271a2).
124
 In Plato, πειθώ has become the end or purpose of ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη. Aristotle 
likewise subordinates πειθώ to rhetoric when he defines the art as: δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον θεωρῆσαι 
τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν (“the ability, in each case, to see the available means of persuasion,” 
Arist. Rh. 1355b 25-26; tr. Kennedy).
125
 
 Similarly, πειθώ-centered perceptions of rhetoric persisted for many years in the ancient 
Greco-Roman world. Many of these descriptions and definitions make use of the word 
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 For more on Gorgias’ view of rhetoric and πειθώ, see Chapter Two Section II. 
124
 See Pl. Phaedr. 271c-272b, for a complete list of what is involved in rhetoric according to Plato. He also calls 
rhetoric ψυχαγωγία (271c10). 
125
 For Aristotle, the πιθανόν—the means available to πειθώ—includes everything from the basic modes of 
argumentation and stylistic techniques to theoretical evaluation and knowledge about human psychology. For more on 
Aristotle’s view of rhetoric see specifically Chapter Four Section III.  
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“persuasio,” which, while not etymologically related to the Greek “πειθώ,” seems to have been 
understood as synonymous by Latin-speaking theorists on the topic. For instance, a follower of 
Aristotle, the second century (BCE) Greek peripatetic Critolaus, adapts Aristotle’s definition and 
(according to Quintilian) describes rhetoric as: scientia videndi et agendi in quaestionibus 
civilibus perorationem popularis persuasionis (“the science of seeing and conducting speech of 
popular persuasion on civic issues,” Quint. Inst.Orat. 2.15.19).126 In the first century BCE Cicero 
also defines rhetoric as something aimed at winning over the people involved: dicere adposite ad 
persuasionem (“to speak appropriately in order to persuade,” Cic. De Inv. 1.6; Quint. Inst.Orat. 
2.15.5-6). By the first century CE, Quintilian describes rhetoric again in a way which resonates 
with that of Critolaus, Cicero, and the Greek predecessors: rhetoricen esse vim persuadendi 
(“rhetoric is the force of persuading,” Quint. Inst.Orat. 2.15.35).  
 In conclusion, the verb πείθω, the goddess Peitho, and the noun πειθώ have meanings 
spanning from inducement to persuasion, from instantaneous erotic seduction to a process of 
instilling intellectual conviction. After the time of Aeschylus, however, the word seems to 
experience a shift in meaning, becoming predominantly with speech in the civic sphere. Πειθώ 
forges close ties with conceptions of that art being practiced and discussed so extensively during 
the late fifth and early fourth centuries BCE: rhetoric. After Aeschylus, in fact, πειθώ becomes the 
end or purpose of the rhetorical art in ancient Greece.  
 
IV. Rhetorical, Civic, Public Πειθώ: A Fifth Century Phenomenon? 
 In addition to appearing frequenrly in descriptions of the rhetorical art, after Aeschylus 
πειθώ also reappears in her private and erotic roles. This seeming reversion of πειθώ to the erotic 
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 Critolaus supposedly also called rhetoric the usum dicendi (“the practice of speaking,” Quint. Inst.Orat. 2.15.23), a 
definition which could include many different aspects of communication. 
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sphere can perhaps best be explained through scholarly discussions on the use of amatory 
terminology to describe rhetoric during the fifth century BCE. The erotic understanding and 
expression of rhetorical speech is the second strand of developments to which πειθώ contributes. 
 In the first place, this later Peitho retains her close connection with speech, but in 
predominantly private and amatory situations. In the first century BCE, for instance, Peitho 
reappears several times in Meleager’s erotic epigrams.127 One example describes his beloved 
Zenophila: 
 Ἡδυμελεῖς Μοῦσαι σὺν πηκτίδι καὶ Λόγος ἔμφρων  
 σὺν Πειθοῖ καὶ Ἔρως Κάλλος ὑφηνιοχῶν,  
 Ζηνοφίλα, σοὶ σκῆπτρα Πόθων ἀπένειμαν, ἐπεί σοι  
 αἱ τρισσαὶ Χάριτες τρεῖς ἔδοσαν χάριτας. (Mel. Anth. Graec. 5. 140) 
 
 The sweet-singing Muses with the lyre, and canny Speech  
 with Persuasion, and Love with Beauty under his reins,  
 invested you, Zenophila, with sovereignty over the Desires, since  
 the three Graces gave you three graces (tr. Paton). 
 
Peitho here is connected with Speech (Λόγος) that has a certain rational quality (ἔμφρων). On the 
other hand, this Peitho is a predominantly erotic deity who operates in the private sphere. Much 
much later also, in the fourth/fifth century CE, Nonnus describes a beautiful youth with the gifts of 
Peitho: χείλεα σιγήσαιμι· τὸ δὲ στόμα, πορθμὸν Ἐρώτων, Πειθὼ ναιετάουσα χέει μελιηδέα φωνήν 
(“I would not speak of his lips; but Peitho dwells in his mouth, the ferry of the Loves, and pours 
out honey-sweet speech,” Nonn. Dion. 4.139-141, tr. Rouse). The Peitho of sweet speech will 
remain in the private erotic sphere for years to come.
128
 
 Also, during the first centuries BCE and CE, the abstract noun πειθώ recurs in texts on the 
art of speaking. Dionysus of Halicarnassus’ On the Composition of Words and Longinus’ On the 
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 Also see references to Peitho in Meleager, Greek Anthology 5.137, 5.195, 12.95. 
128
 The same applies to vase paintings; a good example of how Peitho continues to be depicted throughout the 
centuries, other than in scenes of the seduction of Helen, is a Meidias pelike (c. 420-410 BCE) at the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art in New York. This vase depicts Musaios and his wife Deiope looking at their baby Eumolpos, who is 
accompanied by Aphrodite, Pothos, Peitho, and other erotic deities (MMA 37.11.23). 
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Sublime belong to a sophistic movement which, according to de Romilly, sought to recapture the 
spirit of the fifth century, that time “when things were not yet separated and isolated, when 
rationalism and irrational habits, mythos and logos, inspiration and techne, went hand in hand."
129
 
In these texts, the authors refer to πειθώ most often to describe the semi-magical or erotic power of 
word arrangement and of the orator’s influence. Dionysus, for example, writes that: τὴν τάξιν… 
ἡδονὴν καὶ πειθὼ καὶ κράτος ἐν τοῖς λόγοις…οὐκ ὀλίγῳ κρείττον᾿ ἐκείνης [ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων 
ἐκλογὴ] ἔχει (“arrangement…[for the achievement of] pleasure, persuasion and strength in 
discourse...is far more potent than the other [word selection],” Dion. Hal. Comp. 2.14). In 
Longinus’ On the Sublime, πειθώ also occurs in his discussion of word arrangement.130 On the 
topic of asyndeton, Longinus writes: Ἄκρως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ σύνοδος τῶν σχημάτων εἴωθε 
κινεῖν, ὅταν δύο ἢ τρία οἷον κατὰ συμμορίαν ἀνακιρνάμενα ἀλλήλοις ἐρανίζῃ τὴν ἰσχὺν τὴν 
πειθὼ τὸ κάλλος (“The combination of several figures often has an exceptionally powerful effect, 
when two or three combined cooperate, as it were, to contribute force, conviction, beauty,” Long. 
Subl. 20.1-2, tr. Fyfe).
131
 In other words, when πειθώ occurs in connection with speech again, it is 
within the tradition of the non-political, private, erotic, semi-magical goddess Peitho.
132
 
 The depiction of Peitho in these much later texts perhaps attests to the fifth century 
perception of politics and rhetoric as quasi-erotic. Several scholars speculate that a preference for 
erotic terminology originated from an amatory understanding of the social bond held in Athens at 
the time.
133
 Words relating to love and passion, such as πειθώ, would be used to describe the effect 
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 De Romilly 1975, 88, 84. 
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 See Long. Subl. 39 and de Romilly 1975, 78-79. 
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 Also, I think that Longinus thinks of his “sublime” in ways that early Greek poets (and some sophists such as 
Gorgias) thought of Peitho. For example, see Long. Subl. 17.1-3, which is discussed in Chapter Two Section V. 
132
 Another example of this is Dio Chrysostom’s (first century CE) invocation of Peitho and the Muses at the 
beginning of one of his orations. He calls upon them particularly to help make his philosophical oration palatable by 
making it like music. See Dio. Chrys. Or. 1.9.10). 
133
 Grg. Enc. 13, for example, is discussed in Karadimas 2008, 13. On erotic terminology in fifth century texts of 
literature, philosophy, history, medicine, and the sophists, see Karadimas 2008, 36-37; Ludwig 2002, 151. An 
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of political orators on their audience. Thucydides’s describes the audience, after listening to 
Nicias’ speech, as follows: καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι (“All alike were seized 
with a passionate desire to sail,” Thuc. 6.43.3, tr. Jowett). Other orators whom Thucydides 
describes with a similarly erotic impact through their speech include Pericles and Diototus.
134
 
Ludwig comments that during this time, “an orator could recommend himself to the people on 
analogy with courtship, addressing the devotion, sacrifice, and subservience of one stricken by 
eros.”135 If this was indeed the case in fifth century Greece, then it would not be a surprise that 
“[e]ros [became] an indispensable and central constituent of a sound rhetorical theory…”136 The 
popularity of erotic terminology would also have been beneficial for fostering connections 
between πειθώ and the art of civic speech. Mourelatos points out:  
It is only in late fifth-century literature that the association of πειθώ with rhetoric 
becomes firm. What doubtless underlies this development is the conception of 
πειθώ as ἔρως-like inducement, and as the power of agreeable compulsion.137 
 




 Whether πειθώ contributed or merely profited from this fifth century popularity of amatory 
terminology and notions of political speech, the ephemeral nature of this trend may also explain 
the brief tenure which πειθώ had with relation to civic rhetoric. While amatory undertones remain 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
example of this idea of the social bond can be found in the establishment of the cult to Aphrodite Pandemos and Peitho 
at the time of Cleisthenes’ unification of the demes, which has been discussed above. 
134
 Thuc. 2.43. See Ludwig 2002, 140-141; also, Rynearson 2013, 4. 
135
 Ludwig 2002, 144. These scholars also claim that both Euripides (e.g. Eur. Med. 663-718) and Aristophanes (Ar. 
Ach. 142-44) speak of politics and compose their rhetorical speeches in ways that reflect the amatory poetic literature 
of the past (meaning, the fifth century BCE). See also Aristophanes’ Knights 1341-1342. For this argument, see 
Karadimas 2008, 37 and Ludwig 2002, 141-143. 
136
 Karadimas 2008, 56. For a further explication of this theory, see Karadimas 2008, 25. 
137
 Mourelatos 1970, 139. For further discussion on how Peitho may have developed into her more rhetorical role via 
ἔρως, see Wardy 1996, 47-50 and Goldhill 2000, 161-179. 
138
 Karadimas 2008, 7. 
 38  
in discussions of rhetoric, particularly with the Socratics,
139
 in the early 400’s BCE these 
undertones are gradually fall out of use in actual civic oratory and discussions on rhetoric.
140
 De 
Romilly blames Plato, but especially Aristotle, for this change.
141
 She also argues that a modern 
preconception of rhetoric as a science stripped of non-logical elements is biased because of Plato 
and Aristotle’s approach. According to de Romilly, Plato thought that "[i]n order to save rhetoric 
as a techne, in order to keep some room for it in the classification of techne, one had to ignore all 
connection with magic [or the erotic, for that matter].”142 Aristotle goes a step further, de Romilly 
argues: in order to make rhetoric a scientific techne, Aristotle causes the art of persuasive speech to 
become absorbed (and purified) by logic.
143
 
 On the other hand, after the fifth century, πειθώ may have been simply replaced by the 
more commonly used terms λόγος and ῥητορική. Even the fifth century sophist Gorgias refers to 
persuasive speech predominantly as λόγος in his Encomium of Helen.144 In Encomium 8, for 
instance, he speaks about a general idea of λόγος ὁ πείσας (“persuasive discourse”), but glorifes 
λόγος even more specifically: λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν (“discourse is a great potentate,” Grg. 
Enc. 8, tr. Donovan). Throughout the entire text, moreover, λόγος appears a total of 34 times 
whereas the noun πειθώ only thrice.145 Both λόγος and ῥητορική take precedence in Plato’s and 
Isocrates’ discussions on this art as well. In Plato’s Phaedrus, the phrase τέχνη λόγων (“the art of 
speech,” Pl. Phdr. 273d7) is quite common; the word λόγος, used 164 times throughout the 
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 See for example Xen. Hel. 5.2.28; Mem. 3.9.7; Isoc. Hel. 10.52.1, Antid. 15.275.4; 15.318.8; 10.55.5; 8.65.2; 
8.113.8; 15.245.5; but also note Ludwig’s comments that “the Socratics created their own idiom and treated language 
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(Ludwig 2002, 153).  
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 Karadimas 2008, 26-27; Ludwig 2002, 151. 
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 De Romilly 1975, 51. 
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 De Romilly 1975, 43. 
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or magical association with force by placing her in direct opposition to force and necessity (Arist. Eth. Eud. 1224a39). 
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 See also Buxton 1982, 53. 
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Phaedrus, predominates by a large margin compared with either πειθώ (4) or ῥητορική (14).146 
The term ῥητορική (88) is used more frequently, but still not quite as much as λόγος (157) in 
Plato’s Gorgias as well; in this text, even the noun πειθώ occurs 19 times, but, relative to the other 
words, this is hardly remarkable. Isocrates prefers the use of λόγος or λέγειν in most descriptions 
of his work and rhetorical/educational agenda.
147
 A text search reveals that in the entire speech of 
Isocrates’ Against the Sophists the words under consideration occur as follows λόγος (15), 
ῥητορεία—not ῥητορική—(1), and πειθώ (0). Finally, by the time of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the 
words λόγος and ῥητορική seem to have taken over from πειθώ completely. Throughout this 
treatise on effective and persuasive speech, the noun λόγος appears 151 times, ῥητορική about 30 
times, but πειθώ only once, within a quotation (Arist. Rh. 1406a4). From this evidence, we can 
conclude that πειθώ, while used by Aeschylus and others during a time of transition in the history 
of rhetoric, was ultimately replaced by λόγος and ῥητορική, terms for the art which have persisted 
through the centuries. 
 The gradual demise of πειθώ for discussing the art of persuasive political speech likewise 
explains the scholarly neglect in the history of rhetoric. Studies on development of rhetoric in a 
Greek tragedy through an analysis of the word πείθω and its derivatives are even less numerous. 
Art historians and classicists who specialize in personified deities and abstractions tend to discuss 
only Peitho’s status and depiction as a cult goddess in Athens and elsewhere in ancient Greece.148 
Scholars who trace the idea of πειθώ as a theme throughout the drama of Oresteia typically remain 
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 While I have not determined the fact absolutely, it is reasonable to assume that most of the occurrences of the word 
λόγος in these particular texts are used in reference to the art of persuasive civic speech, the main subject under 
discussion. 
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 See Schiappa 1990, 460-461. 
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 See, for example, the full monograph by Jahn 1846, together with longer treatments by Pepe 1967, esp. 191-206, 
and Buxton 1982, 30-66. Discussion of Peitho in this way also occurs in accounts by art historians such as Shapiro 
1993, 186-207; Icard-Gianolio 1994, 242-250; Stafford 2000, 111-140; Smith 2011, 55-60. More extensive treatment 
of these scholars can be found in Chapter Two of this dissertation. 
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in the realm of literary interpretation.
149
 And while other scholars have observed that Aeschylus 
alters and displays the goddess Peitho and the action of πείθω in unprecedented ways throughout 
the Oresteia, they do not generally consider whether these changes contributed to the development 
of rhetoric in the world outside of the play as well.
150
   
 Nonetheless, πειθώ remains a formative albeit short-lived term which had an impact on 
early conceptions and definitions of rhetoric in both poetic and prose literature of the late fifth and 
early fourth centuries BCE. As such, πειθώ deserves a more thorough and careful examination, 
particularly in the transitional work of the playwright Aeschylus, who uses, displays, and changes 
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 The following scholars provide smaller or larger general and thematic observations and comments about πειθώ as 
the word and/or goddess occurs throughout the drama: see Fraenkel 1950, 184, 200; Owen 1952, 83-84, 123-129; 
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dissertations by Bailey 1962, Buxton 1977, and Zweig 1982. See also Pepe 1967, 147-206 and Headlam 1906, 
114-119. More extensive treatment of these and other scholars can be found in Chapter Two and Three. 
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CHAPTER TWO: The Goddess Peitho: Personified Aspects of Rhetoric? 
 
I. Introduction 
 Given the ancient Greek fascination with persuasion and argument,
151
 one might assume a 
direct connection between the functions of both the art of rhetoric and the goddess Peitho: both as 
closely associated with winning over another. Yet, as far as can be seen from extant evidence, no 
Greek artist, poet, or devotee of the goddess Peitho seems to have articulated this connection until 
the playwrights and, specifically, until Aeschylus.
152
  
 Aeschylus changes the traditional representation of the goddess Peitho more radically than 
any other (extant) poet or playwright before him. This chapter proposes that Aeschylus’ Oresteia 
(first performed in 458 BCE) serves as a transition for Peitho’s association with fifth and early 
fourth century ideas about Greek rhetoric. Through each play of the trilogy, Aeschylus uproots 
Peitho from her traditional mythological heritage, gives her a new and unusual working partner, 
and expands her sphere of influence. While Aeschylus’ specific purpose in depicting Peitho in 
these ways is a dramatic one, these changes in her traditional representation connect her with ideas 
about the art of civic persuasion as it was being discussed, described, and often decried by 
near-contemporary philosophers, sophists, orators, and theorists in ancient Greece.  
  
A. The Abstract Noun in Aeschylus 
 Before analyzing Peitho as a goddess in Aeschylus, it must be noted that he also makes use 
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 See Chapter One Section II. 
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 One of the first to speculate about this seems to have been Zweig, although it has never been fully fleshed out. She 
writes that “this rhetorical meaning may have gained its vogue first in the drama, especially that of Aeschylus," (Zweig 
1982, 27). 
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of the abstract noun in the Oresteia, but its meaning, compared with his usage of the goddess 
Peitho, is relatively unremarkable in terms of the history of rhetoric. In the Oresteia the noun 
seems to express a meaning most closely related to the nuanced connotations of the verb πείθω: “to 
prevail upon or persuade.” No separate section of this dissertation will be dedicated to an 
examination of Aeschylus’ usage of the verb πείθω; rather, references to his uses will be woven 
throughout, and particularly highlighted in some textual analyses in Chapters Three and Four.  
 The impersonal πειθώ occurs twice in the trilogy. Aeschylus’ first use of the word πειθώ 
occurs in the Agamemnon towards the end of the parados where the Chorus is questioning the 
signals received about the fall of Troy. The Chorus addresses Clytemnestra, who has probably just 
arrived on the scene.
153
  
 σὺ δέ, Τυνδάρεω  
  θύγατερ, βασίλεια Κλυταιμήστρα,  
 τί χρέος; τί νέον; τί δ' ἐπαισθομένη        
 τίνος ἀγγελίας                                                                                                     
  πειθοῖ περίπεμπτα θυοσκεῖς; (Aesch. Ag. 83-87) 
 
 But, you, daughter of Tyndareus,  
 queen Clytemnestra, 
 what need is there? What’s new? Having perceived what,  
 at the instigation of what message  
 are you making burnt sacrifices sent round about? 
 
The Chorus marvels that Clytemnestra is so convinced about the truth of the recent news that she 
now engages in sacrifices of thanksgiving or exultation. Clytemnestra has been convinced about 
something (the fall of Troy); in this ways the word πειθοῖ expresses aspects of the verb πείθω. 
While Clytemnestra also responds to the “instigation of the message” by doing something, the 
non-erotic
154
 and even impersonal quality of the πειθοῖ process here seems to link this usage more 
closely with the meanings found in the verb than in Peitho, the companion of Aphrodite.  
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 Page 1957, 75. Taplin, however, does not think that she arrives until the end of the Chorus’ song (1977, 282-283). 
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 Kowerski, in a personal correspondence, suggests that this passage may not be completely dissociated from the 
erotic, since it refers to Clytemnestra, an almost essentially erotic figure. 
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 Other scholars also arrive at this conclusion by pointing out similarities between the 
abstract noun as used here and a nearly verbatim passage which uses a verbal construction. Here 
Clytemnestra is complaining and quoting those who derided her for her gullibility in believing the 
signals at Ag. 83-87: 
 …φρυκτωρῶν δία 
 πεισθεῖσα Τροίαν νῦν πεπορθῆσθαι δοκεῖς; (Aesch. Ag. 590-591) 
 
 …by beacon-fires  
 convinced, do you think that Troy has now been sacked? 
 
Fraenkel considers πεισθεῖσα (591) almost synonymous with πειθοῖ (87). His translation of the 
earlier πειθοῖ therefore takes on a strong verbal quality: “what message has prevailed upon thee, 
that by sending (messengers) around, thou arrangest sacrifices?”155 The connection between these 
two passages, moreover, confirms that Aeschylus’ conception of the abstract common noun πειθώ 
readily parallels the broader implications of the verb. While there is no process of entreaty 
expressed here, there are also no amatory undertones. At Ag. 87, the common noun πειθώ thus 
functions as little more than the basic expression of “winning over” or “prevailing upon” someone 
about something. 
 Aeschylus’ second use of the noun is at Ag.106. The Chorus is singing the opening parodos 
of the Agamemnon, just before recalling Iphigenia and the terrible back story of the events about to 
take place. Before continuing their tale, they pause to acknowledge their source of inspiration: 
κύριός εἰμι θροεῖν ὅδιον κράτος αἴσιον ἀνδρῶν  
ἐντελέων· ἔτι γὰρ θεόθεν καταπνεύει  
πειθὼ, μολπᾶν ἀλκάν σύμφυτος αἰών· (Aesch. Ag. 104-106) 
 
I have the authority to tell out the auspicious command  
of full-grown men; for still from heaven breathes down 
persuasion, and my time of life is naturally adapted to a song  
 of valorous deeds.  
 
                                                          
155
 Smyth 1926 renders it “convinced by what report.” So also Raeburn and Thomas 2011, 77. 
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Here πειθώ again functions in a non-erotic context referring to a “winning over” of those who are 
listening to the song. This also may be a case where the translation “persuasion,” is most 
appropriate. 
 Few scholars can agree on a single translation for these lines. In the first place, the noun 
πειθώ can be taken as either the subject or object of the verb καταπνεύει. Denniston and Page 
assert that while most of the Greek in this passage remains obscure, one can be certain of the text 
and meaning of the phrase ἔτι γὰρ θεόθεν καταπνεύει / πειθώ as “For still from heaven 
Persuasion breathes down…"156 Raeburn and Thomas completely reverse this translation by 
making πειθώ the object of καταπνεύει: “For still by divine favor the life born within me breathes 
over me persuasion, the vigor of song.”157 Πειθώ's relationship to μολπᾶν is also a vexed question. 
Raeburn and Thomas conflate the two words, whereas Fraenkel makes a clear distinction between 
the two, translating the phrase as follows: “For still from the gods the age that has grown within me 
breathes down upon me the persuasiveness of song to be my warlike strength.”158 At most, 
scholars agree that in Aeschylus’ Ag. 104-106, πειθώ refers to a Muse-like power which certifies 
the Chorus’ tale159 and/or renders the song convincing to their audience.  
 While it is worthy of note that the abstract noun πειθώ here is somehow perceived as an 
abstract power connected with the persuasiveness of song, Aeschylus’ portrayal of the goddess 
Peitho is even more remarkable and innovative with regard to the history of rhetoric. 
 
B. Personifications 
 In ancient Greece, personified gods like Peitho were in fact embodied abstract concepts, 
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 Denniston and Page 1957, 78. Favoring a depiction of the personified goddess Peitho here, Pepe 1967 follows the 
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157
 Raeburn and Thomas 2011, 79. 
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which functioned—particularly during the fifth century BCE—as vehicles for the development of 
thought.
160
 Personified deities arose from the sense of mystery with which people perceived facets 
of the human experience. Cicero explains: quarum omnium rerum quia vis erat tanta ut sine deo 
regi non posset, ipsa res deorum nomen optinuit (“Because the power of all these things was so 
great that it could not be governed without godhead, the things themselves acquired the title of 
gods,” Cic. Nat. D. 2.23.61, tr. Stafford).161 Yet after their conception, personifications also 
become tools—as it were—for thinking more about the world and human affairs. Shapiro 
describes the nature of personified deities as follows: 
For us the animation of inanimate things and ideas is purely an intellectual exercise, 
intended, like all figurative language, to produce a momentary and calculated 
effect, often simply one of greater vividness and intensity. But the Greeks and 
Romans, who felt themselves surrounded by countless divine and supernatural 
powers, naturally made things and ideas into gods, durable and individualized 




Not only was the fifth century a time of great intellectual ferment in ancient Greece, but it was also 
when the use and development of personifications was, according to Smith, “most prevalent.”163 
For this reason, these divinities are a rich source for the study of intellectual development in 
ancient Greece at this time. 
 The personified goddess Peitho seems to have embodied that complex human experience 
whereby one person wins over another in an erotic situation, and often without use of logical 
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argumentation. According to the etymological dictionaries, the name Peitho (in Greek, Πειθώ or 
πειθώ) is derived from the present stem of the verb πείθω (to make someone obey/ to get someone 
to acquiesce), or, more specifically, from the notion of the present middle πείθομαι (to obey).164 
Peitho therefore symbolizes or embodies some power involved in making people willing to 
acquiesce. And, based on the cult and literary tradition, the Peitho received by Aeschylus seems to 
have been a complex figure, predominantly erotic and yet bridging the private and public, the 
mythological and the secular spheres.
165
  
 Throughout his Oresteia Aeschylus presents Peitho several times in recognizably divine 
form: with a genealogy, companions, and human-like functions. She thus fulfills the three standard 
criteria for identifying a personified deity in Greek art and literature.
166
 Also, while previous poets 
or artists seem to have faithfully received and transmitted Peitho’s traditional mythological 
heritage with little or no alteration, Aeschylus changes Peitho radically.
167
 He depicts her as 
unambiguously evil (Ag. 385), associates her with Hermes and trickery (Cho. 726), and then gives 
her a clear civic role as patroness of political speech (Eu. 885; 970). In these ways, this playwright 
becomes the first to endow Peitho with specific features which later Greek prose writers and 
theorists will identify with rhetoric itself. 
 
II. A New Genealogy and Persona (Ag. 385) 
 In the Agamemnon, Aeschylus gives Peitho a new genealogy, replacing her traditionally 
ambiguous
168
 status with dark, irresistible, and forceful characteristics. In this first reference, the 
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Chorus sings about Peitho as the force behind Paris’ abduction of Helen, and an important agent in 
the general ruin and destruction which ensues. 
 βιᾶται δ' ἁ τάλαινα Πειθώ 
 προβούλου παῖς ἄφερτος Ἄτας. (Aesch. Ag. 385-386) 
 
 Wretched Peitho compels him,  




Before Aeschylus, no author or artist had ever depicted Peitho with Ate as a mother. It is Alcman, 
in fact, who first gives Peitho a slightly unusual genealogy, but he assigns her Prometheia as a 
mother (Alc. fr.64 PMGF). Aeschylus reverses this relatively benevolent lineage as Pepe describes 
it: “in one case she [Peitho] is the child of forethought, in the other of fore-planning infatuation.”170 
Aeschylus’ Peitho has become wretched (τάλαινα); her mother is now Ate; and her works amongst 
men, unambiguously destructive. 
 At first glance, one might argue that the context of Ag. 385, Paris’ abduction of Helen, is a 
standard erotic context for Peitho.
171
 Yet in retelling the myth, Aeschylus does not at all highlight 
the erotic dimension of this event. The choral song in which these lines are ensconced focuses 
much more on the destructive consequences of Peitho’s influence upon Paris, the Trojans, 
Agamemnon, and the house of Atreus itself.
172
 Aeschylus involves Peitho in clear act of force 
(βιᾶται), οrdered by Ruin (Ἄτη), causing ruin, and provoking more ruin upon families, cities, and 
citizens for generations to come.  
 Genealogically, however, Peitho is more often seen with Aphrodite in ambiguous contexts 
rather than as a forceful daughter of evil Ruin. In the Suppliants, a drama which seems to have 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
antithesis, bia" (Pepe 1967, 200; see also Conrad 1956, 15). Yet, although the existence of a clear polarity between 
peitho and bia has been argued at length (Buxton 1982, 58-63), recent studies have argued that ambiguity is not only 
fundamental to her (which Buxton does admit: 1982, 66) but it is even more essential to her nature than any apparent 
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been performed before the Oresteia,
173
 Aeschylus himself provides an example of Peitho’s 
traditional mythological companions and ambiguous features. In this passage, the Danaids, who 
have spent the entire play seeking refuge from the violence of the Aegyptoi, now beg for the help 
of Peitho together with her family and friends: Aphrodite, Pothos, Harmonia and Eros. 
μετάκοινοι δὲ φίλᾷ ματρὶ πάρεισιν  
Πόθος ᾇ τ᾽ οὐδὲν ἄπαρνον  
τελέθει θέλκτορι Πειθοῖ.  
δέδοται δ᾽ Ἁρμονίᾳ μοῖρ᾽ Ἀφροδίτας  
ψεδυρᾷ τρίβῳ τ᾽ Ἐρώτων. (Aesch. Suppl. 1037-1041) 
 
In the train of their beloved mother [Aphrodite] are  
Desire and she to whom nothing is denied, 
the charming Peitho; 
and the inheritance of Aphrodite has been given to Harmony  
and to the whispering touch of the Loves. 
 
While her family members here seem relatively benign, Peitho is given a vaguely sinister and 
forceful mien: ᾇ τ᾽ οὐδὲν ἄπαρνον / τελέθει… (“she to whom nothing is denied,” Aesch. Suppl. 
1038-1039). The ambiguity of this semi-forceful Peitho is further complicated by how the story of 
the Danaids plays out. With Peitho’s help, the Danaid suppliants convince the resident king 
Pelasgus to protect them, but only by effectively forcing him with a threat of suicide.
174
 Also, in 
the lost third play of the drama, the Danaids end up murdering the Aegyptoi on their wedding 
night, thereby employing the very force which they had been supposedly rejecting all along.
175
 
This passage provides yet another example of how, before the Oresteia, Peitho embodied both a 
gentle, positive persuasive process with certain aspects of force.
176
 In a radical move, however, 
Aeschylus changes this tradition by associating Peitho in the Agamemnon with the unambiguously 
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forceful and the ineluctable nature of a new mother, Ate. 
 While a genealogical connection between Peitho and Ate does not seem to have been 
perpetuated after the Oresteia’s performance,177 Peitho’s threatening and forceful image persists 
in many passages of ancient drama.
178
 In Prometheus Bound, for instance, Peitho reappears as a 
deity who tries to use force in order to effect the will of Zeus. Prometheus defiantly asserts: 
καί μ᾽ οὔτι μελιγλώσσοις Πειθοῦς  
ἐπαοιδαῖσιν θέλξει, στερεάς τ᾽ 
οὔποτ᾽ ἀπειλὰς πτήξας τόδ᾽ ἐγὼ  
καταμηνύσω, πρὶν ἂν ἐξ ἀγρίων  
δεσμῶν χαλάσῃ ποινάς τε τίνειν  
τῆσδ᾽ αἰκείας ἐθελήσῃ. (Aesch. PV 172-77)  
 
Not even by Peitho’s honey-tongued  
enchantments will he charm me, nor will I,  
having cowered from his threats, make known this thing,  
until he loosens me from these savage bonds  
and is willing to pay for this outrage. 
 
While Peitho may not be as sinister or irresistible as in the Agamemnon, neither does she seem 
adverse to the use of threats, bonds, and general savagery.
179
    
 The characteristics with which Aeschylus endows Peitho at Ag. 385 are precisely the 
qualities which will be given to later depictions of Peitho and rhetoric in drama. For instance, on 
the stage of Sophocles’ (fragmentary) Nausicaa, Odysseus, the Homeric rhetorician 
par-excellence, makes the following comments about Peitho: δεινὸν τὸ τᾶς Πειθοῦς πρόσωπον 
(“terrible is the face of Peitho,” Soph. fr. 865)180 and ταχεῖα πειθὼ τῶν κακῶν ὁδοιπορεῖ (“Peitho 
travels about swiftly for evil,” Soph. fr. 870).181 In like manner, Euripides’ Hecuba dubs Peitho 
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“the only tyrant over men” (τὴν τύραννον ἀνθρώποις μόνην, Eur. Hec. 816) in a line where she 
(Hecuba) is bewailing her inability to win over Agamemnon in speech: 
 τί δῆτα θνητοὶ τἄλλα μὲν μαθήματα  
μοχθοῦμεν ὡς χρὴ πάντα καὶ ματεύομεν,  
Πειθὼ δὲ τὴν τύραννον ἀνθρώποις μόνην  
οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐς τέλος σπουδάζομεν  
μισθοὺς διδόντες μανθάνειν, ἵν᾽ ἦν ποτε  
πείθειν ἅ τις βούλοιτο τυγχάνειν θ᾽ ἅμα; (Eur. Hec. 814-819) 
 
 Why, oh! why do we mortals toil, as we must,  
 and seek out all other sciences,  
 but Persuasion, the only real mistress of mankind,  
 we take no further pains to master completely  
 by offering to pay for the knowledge, so that any man  
 could convince his fellows as he pleased and gain his point at once? (tr. Coleridge). 
 
In her despair and distress, Hecuba realizes that there is no better art than that which, through 
irresistible Peitho, can make others do one’s bidding through eloquent speech purchased at any 
price. Her reference to paying for training in this art (817-819) is no doubt an oblique nod to the 
practice of paying sophists for their services.  
 Peitho’s irresistible qualities merge with ideas about rhetoric even more explicitly in later 
fifth and early fourth century prose authors. The sophist Gorgias presents the most evident 
example of this in his Encomium of Helen, which highlights the irresistibility of rhetoric and 
Peitho.
182
 For this reason, Pepe traces a direct link between Aeschylus’ Peitho and that of 
Gorgias.
183
 Gorgias puts Peitho in a list with other ineluctable and divine forces which act upon 
persons without their willing it: the wishes of Fortune, the plans of the gods, Necessity, and force 
(ἢ γὰρ τύχης βουλήμασι καὶ θεῶν βουλεύμασι καὶ ἀνάγκης ψηφίσμασιν ἔπραξεν ἃ ἔπραξεν, ἢ βίαι 
ἁρπασθεῖσα, ἢ λόγοις πεισθεῖσα, Grg. Enc. 6). Further on in the passage, Gorgias describes 
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rhetoric as compelling and constraining (ἠνάγκασε, ἀναγκάσας, Grg. Enc. 12) as well as shaping 
or, more literally, “hammering out,” the soul however it might wish (ἐτυπώσατο ὅπως ἐβούλετο, 
Grg. Enc. 13). In a similar fashion, he describes Peitho as a vile force that exerts influence through 
black magic and noxious drugs: οἱ δὲ πειθοῖ τινι κακῆι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ 
ἐξεγοήτευσαν (“Οthers, by a certain vile P/peitho drug and bewitch the soul,” Grg. Enc. 14, 10). 
In the end, moreover, Gorgias excuses Helen from all guilt due to the omnipotence of rhetorical 
speech and sinister Peitho.
184
 
 In Plato’s Philebus also, while Socrates is discussing the superiority of dialectic, 
Protarchus contradicts him by saying that Gorgias considers πειθώ to be the best of all the arts (ὡς 
ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν, Pl. Phil. 58a8) because it can make all things a slave 
to itself (πάντα γὰρ ὑφ᾽ αὑτῇ δοῦλα…ποιοῖτο, Pl. Phil. 58b1-2). In the Gorgias, Plato puts similar 
words into the mouth of Gorgias himself: 
καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἕξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν 
παιδοτρίβην: ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ 
αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη. (Pl. Grg. 452e4-8) 
 
And I tell you that by virtue of this power you will have the doctor as your slave, 
and the trainer as your slave; your money-getter will turn out to be making money 
not for himself, but for another—in fact for you, who are able to speak and persuade 
the multitude (tr. Lamb). 
 
The power of rhetoric is that of being able to force other persons (even a whole multitude) into 
slavery.
185
 Plato even has have Gorgias boast about rhetoric as something supernatural and 
all-powerful (Pl. Grg. 456a; 457a).  
 Plato’s Socrates, moreover, rejects contemporary rhetoric precisely because it appears to 
be an imposition on human freedom and intelligence (Pl. Grg. 459b-c; Phdr. 260a-d). So, in the 
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Phaedrus, Socrates conjures up—with his own sort of prosopopoeia—the gentle figure of “Lady 
Rhetoric” (τὴ τῶν λόγων τέχνη, Pl. Phdr. 260d4, tr. Scully) as a fittingly beneficent philosophical 
replacement for Aeschylus’ Peitho τάλαινα. 
 
III. Peitho's Companions (Cho. 726) 
 In the Choephoroi, Aeschylus alters the traditional Peitho by giving her an atypical 
working partner, Hermes, and a corresponding share in his deceptive qualities. The lines in 
question occur immediately after the disguised Orestes has entered his mother’s house. The 
Chorus, seeing the events of the play about to become deadly, exclaim: 
 νῦν γὰρ ἀκμάζει Πειθὼ δολίαν  
 ξυγκαταβῆναι, χθόνιον δ᾽ Ἑρμῆν  
 καὶ τὸν νύχιον τοῖσδ᾽ ἐφοδεῦσαι  
 ξιφοδηλήτοισιν ἀγῶσιν. (Aesch. Cho. 726-729) 
 
 Now is the moment for tricky Peitho  
 to go down (into the arena), 
 and for Hermes of the underworld,  
 gloomy as night, to watch over  
 contests of death by the sword. 
 
Aeschylus’ choice of Hermes as a companion is noteworthy since personified gods often take up 
different roles and shades of meaning depending on the major deity with whom they are paired.
186
 
Peitho often appears with Aphrodite or with other erotic deities such as the Graces, the Seasons, or 
Harmony and Eros.
187
 Peitho and Hermes, on the other hand, are much less frequently associated.  
 In Hesiod’s Works and Days, Hermes appears just a few lines before Peitho at the 
adornment of Pandora; but they do not specifically work together. Hermes gives Pandora “a dog’s 
mind and a thievish character” (κύνεόν τε νόον καὶ ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος, Hes. Op. 67-68); and, later, he 
                                                          
186
 See Shapiro 1993, 17; Smith 2011, 16-17. 
187
 As mentioned above, even in the Suppliants, Aeschylus depicts her as a companion to Harmonia and Eros, 
daughter of Aphrodite, and sister to Pothos (“Desire,” Suppl. 1037-1042). Although the text here is uncertain, the 
presence of these divinities with Peitho is clear. 
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puts in her breast “lies and guileful words” (ψεύδεά θ᾽ αἱμυλίους τε λόγους, Hes. Op. 78).188 
Peitho, on the other hand, arrives with Aphrodite, the Graces, and the Seasons, bringing beauty and 
attractiveness symbolized by “golden necklaces” (ὅρμους χρυσείους, Hes. Op. 74). Stafford 
comments: “Persuasions’ gift is not one of eloquence—that comes from Hermes—but of sexual 
attractiveness, expressed in visual terms.”189 Also, while a late Mytilenean inscription exists 
which refers to a joint-cult of Aphrodite Peitho and Hermes, Peitho here is not an individual 
autonomous deity, but a cult-title of Aphrodite.  
     θέος. τύχα ἀγάθα. 
 ὄ κε θέλη θύην ἐπὶ τῶ βώμ[ω] 
 τᾶς Ἀφροδίτας τᾶς Πεί- 
 θως καὶ τῶ Ἔρμα, θυέτω 
  〚— — — — — — — — —— —〛 
 ἰρήϊον ὄττι κε θέλη καὶ 
 ἔρσεν καὶ θῆλυ πλ[ὰ]γ χοί[ρω], 
 καὶ ὄρνιθα ὄ[τ]τι[νά κε θέλη]. 
 — — — — —— — — — — — — — — ——  
       IG XII (2).73 
 
    The god. Good fortune. 
 Whoever wishes to sacrifice on the altar 
 of Aphrodite Peitho  
 and to Hermes, let him sacrifice 
 […] 
 whatever victim he wishes, 
 both male and female, except a pig, 
 and whatever bird he wishes  […] (tr. Stafford). 
 




 In Aeschylus’ Oresteia, however, tricky Peitho joins forces with Hermes in a completely 
non-erotic context. Indeed, the words present in the passage deal more with athletic contests than 
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the works of Aphrodite. Hermes and Peitho, for example, “go down into the arena,” 
(ξυγκαταβῆναι, Cho. 727) and “watch over contests of death by the sword,” (ἐφοδεῦσαι 
ξιφοδηλήτοισιν ἀγῶσιν, Cho. 728-729).191 Also, here Hermes’ most characteristic trait, trickery, 
is transferred to Peitho for the first time in an extant text.  
 Peitho and Hermes do not often appear together during the fifth and fourth centuries except 
a few times in drama. In Prometheus Bound, Hermes, as an ambassador of Zeus, approaches 
Prometheus to try to make him reveal his secrets. During their exchange of harsh and yet cleverly 
spoken words, Prometheus explicitly rejects “the honey-tongued charms of Peitho” 
(μελιγλώσσοις Πειθοῦς / ἐπαοιδαῖσιν, Aesch. PV 172-173). Prometheus sees Hermes’ guileful 
words and Peitho’ trappings as nearly identical to various forms of sinister and tricky speech. 
Therefore when Hermes’ persists in his attempts to win over the captive god, Prometheus retorts: 
ὀχλεῖς μάτην με κῦμ᾽ ὅπως παρηγορῶν (“You are troubling me in vain, as though trying to appease 
a wave,” Aesch. PV. 1001).192 Peitho also works obliquely with trickery (but not explicitly with 
Hermes) in Sophocles’ Trachiniae as the goddess who charms the deadly robe that Deineira will 
offer to her husband. The Chorus, in their ignorance, sing of Peitho as a deity who can erotically 
help attract Heracles towards his wife: ὅθεν μόλοι †πανάμερος, / τᾶς Πειθοῦς παγχρίστῳ / 
συγκραθεὶς ἐπὶ προφάσει θηρός† (“May he [Heracles] come from there full of desire [for 
Deineira], steeped in love on the pretext of the robe by Persuasion's all-powerful ointment,” 
Soph. Trach. 660-662, tr. Jebb). Ironically, the robe anointed by Peitho turns out to be a trick, a 
false pretext (προφάσει, 662), through which first Heracles and then Deineira will be destroyed.  
 Aeschylus gives Peitho the unusual title δολίαν and also associates her with a god who has 
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 The word “contests” finds a loose connection with the fact that the sophists engaged at length in eristic contests. 
See Plato Lesser Hippias 363c-364; Protagoras 335a; DK 82B11-11a; Diog. Laert. IX.52. Two of Protagora’s works 
on argumentative strategies apparently had the alternative titles of “On Wrestling” and “Kataballontes.” 
192
 See Pepe 1967, 186. 
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a long tradition of association with trickery in speech. Commenting on a passage of Pausanias 
7.27.1, Garvie notes that the word δόλιος “appears as a cult title of Hermes at Pellene in 
Achaea.”193 Yona also comments that in Hesiod’s Catalogue of Women (Hes. fr. 65, 68), even 
Hermes’ offspring are associated with thievery, trickery, and deception.194 Hermes’ deceitful 
qualities likewise form the basis for his connection with the work of the sophists. Yona suggests 
that “Hermes may symbolize the birth of sophistry within the context of human civilization.”195 In 
Homeric Hymn to Hermes (469), Hermes craftily makes stolen cattle walk backwards so that their 
tracks seem to lead in a different direction; the author calls this a δολίης τέχνης (“a tricky device,” 
Hymn. Hom. Merc. 62). At the same time, he escapes along a δολιχὴν ὁδόν (“a tricky road,” Hymn. 
Hom. Merc. 85, 143) by wearing shoes that erase his footsteps.
196
 Through these and other means, 
the baby god prevails over the stronger gods with his deceitful actions and tricky speech, just as the 
sophists (such as Protagoras) would endow the weaker argument with superior strength through 
clever twists of phrase (Arist. Rhet.1402a23–5 (=DK 80B6b)). By associating Peitho with Hermes, 
therefore, Aeschylus draws out her deceptive qualities and thus links her even more closely to the 
newly emerging ideas about the art of rhetorical speech in society. 
 While Hermes and Peitho do not seem to be coupled again in the fifth century,
197
 examples 
of tricky cleverness and its association with πειθώ through speech can be found in fifth and fourth 
century poetical prose and philosophy. Gorgias, for example, speaks at length about both Peitho 
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 Yona, 2015, 367. 
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 Yona 2015, 383. The discussion of the rhetorical significance of Hermes’ actions in the Homeric Hymn which 
follows is largely taken form Buxton 1982, 63-64. 
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 The adjective appears twice more at the end of his escapade describing how he craftily re-wraps himself in 
swaddling clothes and pretends to be waking from a nap after he accomplished the theft (Hymn. Hom. Merc. 245, 361, 
391). 
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 The next time we see Peitho and Hermes will be in erotic depictions and texts about marriage cults. Plut. Conjug. 
Praec. 138d; Maximus of Tyre, Diss. 19.1.1-4; Nonnus Dion. V. 574, VIII. 220. See also Stafford 2000, 136. This is to 
be expected considering both Peitho’s traditional representation and—after the trend of erotic political terminology 
during the 5th century—her re-association with private amatory situations. 
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and Logos in his Encomium of Helen, and concludes at one point about his art: ὅσοι δὲ ὅσους περὶ 
ὅσων καὶ ἔπεισαν καὶ πείθουσι δὲ ψευδῆ λόγον πλάσαντες (“Those who have persuaded and do 
persuade anyone about anything are shapers of lying discourse,” Gorg. Hel. 10-11, tr. 
Donovan).
198
 The deceitful potential of rhetoric is another reason why Socrates rejects the 
sophistic art in Plato’s Gorgias. Comparing rhetoric to cookery, flattery, and the self-adornment of 
makeup (ἡ κομμωτική), he says 
 …κακοῦργός τε καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννὴς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ 
χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ ἐσθῆσιν ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος 
ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. (Pl. Grg. 465b3-6) 
  
 …with its rascally, deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal nature it [makeup/ rhetoric] 
deceives men by forms and colors, polish and dress so as to make them, in the effort 
of assuming an extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort that comes through 
gymnastic (tr. Burnet). 
 
In the Republic, rhetoric is again condemned because of its deceitful aims. In this passage under 
consideration, Socrates asks: “Is it by justice or by crooked deceit” (πότερον δίκᾳ …ἢ σκολιαῖς 
ἀπάταις, Pl. Rep. 365b3) that one should live his life and achieve success? But he condemns those 
who live and teach trickery: 
 Ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν συνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρίας συνάξομεν, εἰσίν τε πειθοῦς 
διδάσκαλοι σοφίαν δημηγορικήν τε καὶ δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, 
τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. (Pl. Rep. 365d2-6) 
 
  …with a view to lying hid we will organize societies and political clubs, and there 
are teachers of cajolery who impart the arts of the popular assembly and the 
court-room, so that, partly by persuasion, partly by force, we shall contrive to 
overreach with impunity. (tr. Shorey). 
 
When referring to “teachers of cajolery” (πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι) he no doubt means the sophists.199 
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 It is no wonder, then, that in Sophocles’ Philoctetes (a play about the ethical dimensions of persuasive speech), 
when Odysseus demands that the young Neoptolemus use persuasion—like a sophist—on Philoctetes, his line is as 
follows: λέγω σ᾽ ἐγὼ δόλῳ Φιλοκτήτην λαβεῖν (“I tell you to overcome Philocetes by deceit,” Soph. Phil. 102). 
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 See also Lys. 12.32-33 where the use of βία is less punished than the use of πειθώ due to the common perception of 
πειθώ’s corrupting influence. See also Stafford 2000, 30. Ironically, Socrates himself is accused of this crime of 
trickery, a crime of this deceitful species of rhetoric. See Pl. Ap.18b-c. 
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 Aristotle will continue using the terminology of trickery and theft to describe an effective 
piece of rhetoric, although with a slightly different wording: 
ἔτι τοῖς ἀνάλογον μὴ πᾶσιν ἅμα χρήσασθαι (οὕτω γὰρ κλέπτεται ὁ ἀκροατής): λέγω 
δὲ οἷον ἐὰν τὰ ὀνόματα σκληρὰ ᾖ, μὴ καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τοῖς 
ἁρμόττουσιν: εἰ δὲ μή, φανερὸν γίνεται ἕκαστον ὅ ἐστιν. (Arist. Rh.1408b5) 
 
Further, do not use all analogous effects [of sound and sense] together; for thus the 
hearer is tricked. I mean, for example, if the words are harsh, do not deliver them 
with a harsh voice and countenance. Otherwise, what you are doing is evident. (tr. 
Kennedy). 
 
Another example from Aristotle is as follows: κλέπτεται δ’ εὖ, ἐάν τις ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου 
ἐκλέγων συντιθῇ (“The ‘theft’ is well done if one composes by choosing words from ordinary 
language,” Arist. Rh. 1404b24-25; tr. Kennedy). Many years later, Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
describes Lysias’ narrative in similar terms:  
 ὥστε μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι μήθ’ ὅλην διήγησιν μηδεμίαν μήτε μέρος αὐτῆς ψευδὲς ἢ 
ἀπίθανον εὑρεθῆναι· τοσαύτην ἔχει πειθὼ καὶ ἀφροδίτην τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ οὕτως 
λανθάνει τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἴτ’ ἀληθῆ ὄντα εἴτε πεπλασμένα. (Dion. Hal. Lys. 18) 
 
It is difficult to find a narrative that appears false and unconvincing, either in whole 
or in part, such is the persuasive charm of the story as he tells it, and his power to 
deceive his audience as to whether it is true or fictitious. (tr. Usher). 
 
Particularly interesting in this last passage is the presence of Peitho with Aphrodite, but now, four 
hundred years later, as an abstract concept referring to the tricky power of rhetoric. It seems then, 
that a synthesis has occurred. Peitho doesn’t entirely lose her connection with the erotic; yet, by the 
time of the fifth and fourth century sophists, orators, speech writers, and philosophers, she also 
began to assume deceitful qualities connected with artful argument. It is this development then, to 
which Aeschylus’ depiction of tricky Peitho contributes. 
 
IV. Peitho's Role and Function (Eu. 885, 970) 
 In the last play of the trilogy, the Eumenides, Aeschylus alters and expands Peitho’s sphere 
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of influence even further, associating her with an explicitly political situation and giving her power 
to influence the sophisticated civic-minded speeches of the goddess Athena.  
 
A. Peitho in Civil Society  
 Throughout Eumenides 778-891, Peitho works on behalf of Athena, the non-erotic goddess 
patroness of the city, daughter of Zeus. Peitho’s task is to procure the common good for the polis 
by assuaging the anger of the Erinyes who threaten to destroy it. Peitho’s actions, moreover, take 
place against the supposed backdrop of the Acropolis, near the Areopagus where the reforms of 
Ephialtes had just recently taken place in Athens (c. 460’s BCE). Orestes’ trial has just finished; 
the Athenian jury is still in attendance, watching to see whether the results of the trial will take 
effect or whether the Erinyes’ anger will nullify their work and wreak even greater havoc. Athena 
first invokes Peitho when addressing the Erinyes themselves, beckoning them to worship Peitho 
and let go of their wrath: ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἁγνόν ἐστί σοι Πειθοῦς σέβας / …σὺ δ᾽ οὖν μένοις ἄν· (“But 
if you have holy reverence for Peitho…then you certainly might remain;”Aesch. Eu. 885, 887). 
Athena calls upon Peitho to help persuade the Erinyes to let go of their anger and integrate 
themselves into Athenian society as benevolent deities.  
 Aeschylus seems to have begun associating Peitho with the political sphere in earlier 
dramas as well. For instance, in the Suppliants, Aeschylus has King Pelasgus invoke Peitho and 
Tyche before going to address his people on behalf of the Danaids. At the end of his speech to the 
Danaids, he departs with these words to the suppliants: 
πρὸς ταῦτα μίμνε καὶ θεοὺς ἐγχωρίους  
λιταῖς παραιτοῦ τῶν σ᾽ ἔρως ἔχει τυχεῖν.  
ἐγὼ δὲ ταῦτα πορσυνῶν ἐλεύσομαι.  
Πειθὼ δ᾽ ἕποιτο καὶ Τύχη πρακτήριος. (Αesch. Supp. 519-523) 
 
Remain here and with prayers beg the native gods  
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That the things you desire may happen. 
But I will go to arrange these things. 
May Peitho follow and efficacious Tyche. 
 
Aeschylus also places Peitho in a clear civic role in some fragments of the play about Dike. Here 
Dike (Justice) is explaining her plan for carrying on and administering human affairs: 
 Δίκη 
το]ῖ ς μὲν δ[ι]καίοι ς  ἔνδι κ ον τείνω β ί ο [ν .  
 
 Δίκη 
τοῖς δ’’ αὖ μα]ταίοις  τ [ὰ]ς [μά τ α ς ὀρθ ῶ ] φ ρ [ενῶν. 
 
 Χορός 
Πειθοῦς ἐ]πωιδαῖ ς  ἢ κατ’ ἰσχύος τρόπο [ν];  
 
 Δίκη 
γράφουσα] τ ἀ  π λ ακ ήματ’ ἐ ν δέλτωι Διό [ς. (Aesch. fr. 281.17, 19, 20-21)  
 
Justice:  
For the righteous I prolong their righteous life. 
 
Justice:  
For the wicked, on the other hand, [I cause them to change their ways ()] 
 
Chorus:  
By the charms [of Peitho], or by the method of force?  
 
Justice:  
[By writing down] their transgressions on the tablet of Zeus (tr. Sommerstein). 
 
The text is uncertain, of course, since the word Πειθοῦς (line 20) is supplied by an editor 
(Pohlenz). Nonetheless, one can see a rationale behind his suggestions: namely, that the presence 
of ἐ]πωιδαῖ ς (magic charms) is contrasted with κατ’ ἰσχύος (by force/might) as a way of 
administering human affairs for the cause of justice in political society.
200
 This passage thus 
presents another example of a secular Peitho with the particular role of serving Dike (Justice) in 
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 This may not be an instance of the personified Peitho by the standards articulated by Shapiro and others (Shapiro 
1993, 14-16) because she is being paired with ἰσχύος, not Bia, who is a clearer example of a personification. Perhaps 
for these reasons this reference to Peitho is not mentioned in Pepe 1967 or Buxton 1982. In Suppliants 523, by 
contrast, there seems to be good grounds for assuming that the personified goddess is meant; part of the reason for this 
is that her companion, Tyche, is an attested personification as well. 
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the civic community.   
  There is a general consensus, as stated by Buxton, that “by the middle of the fifth century, 
the political dimension of Peitho became more prominent."
201
 During the fifth and into the fourth 
century BCE, for example, more representations of Peitho on vases appear coupled with political 
divinities such as as Eudaimonia, Eukleia, Eunomia, Hygieia, and perhaps Themis.
202
 A civic 
Peitho, perhaps distinct from the cult of Aphrodite Pandemos and Peitho,
203
 also began to be 
worshiped by Athenians during this time. Demosthenes alludes to this cult in the beginning of his 
Exordium 54, when he reassures his audience that before beginning his speech the appropriate 
sacrifices have been to Peitho and other deities who watch over the good of the city. He says: 
 καὶ δίκαιον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ καλὸν καὶ σπουδαῖον, ὅπερ ὑμεῖς εἰώθατε, καὶ 
ἡμᾶς προνοεῖν, ὅπως τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβῶς ἕξει. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἡμετέρα γέγονεν 
ἐπιμέλει᾽ ὑμῖν εἰς δέον: καὶ γὰρ ἐθύσαμεν τῷ Διὶ τῷ σωτῆρι καὶ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ καὶ τῇ 
Νίκῃ, καὶ γέγονεν καλὰ καὶ σωτήρια ταῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν τὰ ἱερά. ἐθύσαμεν δὲ καὶ τῇ 
Πειθοῖ καὶ τῇ Μητρὶ τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι, καὶ ἐκαλλιεροῦμεν καὶ ταῦτα.  
        (Dem. Exord. 54) 
 
 It is just and right and important, men of Athens, that we too should exercise care, as 
you are accustomed, that our relations with the gods shall be piously maintained. 
Therefore our commission has been duly discharged for you, for we have sacrificed 
to Zeus the Saviour and to Athena and to Victory, and these sacrifices have been 
auspicious and salutary for you. We have also sacrificed to Persuasion and to the 
Mother of the Gods and to Apollo, and here also we had favorable omens (tr. 
DeWitt). 
 
Since the sacrifice to Peitho and these other civic deities produced favorable signs and portents, 
Demosthenes is confident that his appeal will be in the best interests of the citizenry of Athens. On 
this passage, Stafford comments: “Although we can gather little new information about Peitho 
from this, it does suggest that her cult was sufficiently well known by this period to be included 
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without comment.”204 
 Others use the terminology of πειθώ as a verb to describe general programmatic and 
philosophical views on how to live properly as a human being in political society.
205
 Democritus 
(c. 460-370 BCE) uses the term in a civic and ethical context as the best way to promote upright 
living. 
                    … κρείσσων ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν φα-  
 νεῖται προτροπῆι χρώμενος καὶ λόγου πειθοῖ ἤπερ νόμωι 
 καὶ ἀνάγκηι. λάθρηι μὲν γὰρ ἁμαρτέειν εἰκὸς τὸν εἰρ- 
 γμένον ἀδικίης ὑπὸ νόμου, τὸν δὲ ἐς τὸ δέον ἠγμένον   
 πειθοῖ οὐκ εἰκὸς οὔτε λάθρηι οὔτε φανερῶς ἔρδειν τι   
 πλημμελές….    (Democr. DK fr. 181.1-6) 
 
The man using exhortation and reasonable persuasion  
leads better to virtue than he who uses law and force.  
For the man who is prevented by law from wrongdoing will likely  
do wrong in secret, whereas the man led towards what is right by persuasion  
is not likely to do something out of tune either secretly or openly (tr. Berquist).  
 
Isocrates writes about the importance of πειθώ more generally for the humanizing of mankind: 
 …ἐγγενομένου δ᾽ ἡμῖν τοῦ πείθειν ἀλλήλους καὶ δηλοῦν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ 
ὧν ἂν βουληθῶμεν, οὐ μόνον τοῦ θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἀπηλλάγημεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
συνελθόντες πόλεις ᾠκίσαμεν καὶ νόμους ἐθέμεθα καὶ τέχνας εὕρομεν…  
          (Isoc. Antid. 254) 
 
 …but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other 
and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the 
life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws 
and invented arts…(tr. Norlin). 
 
Even the orator Lysias in his funeral orations says something similar about how πειθώ makes man 
human by enabling him to live in a democratic society.  
 …ἡγησάμενοι θηρίων μὲν ἔργον εἶναι ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων βίᾳ κρατεῖσθαι, ἀνθρώποις δὲ 
προσήκειν νόμῳ μὲν ὁρίσαι τὸ δίκαιον, λόγῳ δὲ πεῖσαι, ἔργῳ δὲ τούτοις ὑπηρετεῖν, 
ὑπὸ νόμου μὲν βασιλευομένους, ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ διδασκομένους. (Lys. 2.19) 
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 Stafford 2000, 128; also Conrad 1956, 15. Bers, in a person correspondence, notes that these Exordia are regarded 
as spurious or stitched together out of existing speeches. This, however, does not necessarily damage the argument. 
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gradually gained predominance in describing the art of speaking persuasively in public. 
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 For they deemed that it was the way of wild beasts to be held subject to one another 
by force, but the duty of men to delimit justice by law, to convince by reason, and 
to serve these two in act by submitting to the sovereignty of law and the instruction 
of reason (tr. Lamb). 
 
In sum, civic πειθώ differentiates men from beasts and gives them the ability to live ethically and 
promote the common good of the larger political entity. Given all these examples with the others 
mentioned previously, Peitho seems to find increased employment in the public sphere during the 
years following her dramatic debut as a civic divinity in Aeschylus’s Eumenides.  
 
B. Peitho and Speech  
 Aeschylus’ second innovation with Peitho at Eu. 885 and 970 lies in the new role which he 
gives her with regard to carefully crafted political speech. Athena seems to depend heavily on 
Peitho’s intercession for her eloquent work of persuasion. In the first reference, Athena is 
appealing to the Erinyes through Peitho: 
  ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἁγνόν ἐστί σοι Πειθοῦς σέβας; 
 γλώσσης ἐμῆς μείλιγμα καὶ θελκτήριον, 
 σὺ δ᾽ οὖν μένοις ἄν· … (Aesch. Eu. 885-887) 
 
 But if you have holy reverence for Peitho  
 regarding the soothing charm and enchantment of my tongue,  
 then you certainly might remain. 
 
In the second instance the Erinyes have been won over, and are now blessing the land; Athena 
sings of Peitho in thanksgiving.  
 …στέργω δ᾽ ὄμματα Πειθοῦς,  
 ὅτι μοι γλῶσσαν καὶ στόμ᾽ ἐπωπᾷ  
 πρὸς τάσδ᾽ ἀγρίως ἀπανηναμένας: (Aesch. Eu. 970-972) 
 
 I am grateful to Peitho, that her glance  
 kept watch over my tongue and mouth,  
 when I encountered their fierce refusal.  
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Speculating on these passages, Zweig writes that Peitho "appears...as the handmaiden of Athena, 
that rational and reasoned form of persuasion that [she] comes to mean in the rhetoric of the 5th 
century."
206
 In other words, Athena acknowledges a new function and power which has been 
given to Peitho: significant influence over speech in a civic situation. Words for “tongue” and 
“mouth” are repeated in both passages. Peitho grants to these speech organs “soothing charm and 
enchantment” (μείλιγμα καὶ θελκτήριον, 886) and, with her eyes, has “kept watch” over them 
(ἐπωπᾷ, 971) so that they take effect. With these lines, Aeschylus gives Peitho a role in civic life 
with explicit reference to the persuasive power of the spoken word. 
 Yet pre-Aeschylean Peitho often operated with instruments. A list of her tools from early 
vase paintings and lyric poetry could include jewelry, golden nectar, magic spells, charms, her 
eyes, whips, and keys.
207
 Until Aeschylus, there is no extant evidence of the goddess Peitho 
explicitly influencing or working with the spoken word. In the Eumenides, Aeschylus gives Peitho 
powers over well-argued, civic-minded, and effective speech in the cause of justice.
208
 
 Interestingly, however, Aeschylus’ civic Peitho remains associated with a beneficent sort 
of magic, as expressed by several words in the above passages: μείλιγμα (Eu. 886), θελκτήριον 
(Eu. 886) and ὄμματα (Eu. 970). These words, together with an additional one—ἐπαοιδή (or 
ἐπῳδή)—also appear with Peitho in Prometheus Bound. Prometheus defiantly speaks against 
Zeus’s attempt at persuasion with the following words: καί μ᾽ οὔτι μελιγλώσσοις Πειθοῦς / 
ἐπαοιδαῖσιν θέλξει (“Not even by the honey-tongued enchantments of Peitho will he charm me,” 
Aesch. PV 172-77). An ἐπαοιδή/ἐπῳδή is a song or an incantation, or quite simply, a charm or 
enchantment. It is found with reference to Peitho in Pind. Pyth. 4.215 and also in a fragment from 
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Aeschylus’ play about Dike (Πειθοῦς ἐ]πωιδαῖ ς , Aesch. fr. 281.20, ed. Pohlenz). Words with the 
root μελιγ/χ- denoting soothing gentleness and a wheedling quality aimed at appeasement.209 One 
such word occurs in Pythian 9, where the Centaur instructs Apollo to go to Peitho for help in 
carrying out “the gentle impulses [of love]” (μείλιχος ὀργά, Pind. Pyth. 9.43) which he feels 
towards Cyrene. Thirdly, the root θελγ/ξ/κτ- can refer to either soothing offerings to the gods or to 
the beguiling power of desire; it is often translated as “charm.” Aeschylus applies a word from this 
root (θέλκτορι) directly to Peitho in Suppliants 1040. Conrad also points out that Peitho’s most 
frequent epithets in vases contain the θελγ/ξ/κτ- root.210 Additionally, after Peitho has worked her 
magic and Athena has won over the Erinyes in the Eumenides, these goddess will exclaim: θέλξειν 
μ᾽ ἔοικας καὶ μεθίσταμαι κότου (“It seems likely that you will charm me, and I am shifting from 
my wrath,” Eu. 900).  
 Aeschylus’ reference to Peitho’s eyes (ὄμματα Πειθοῦς, 970) is also an allusion to her 
magical erotic powers. The association of Peitho with eyes has precedent in earlier literature, 
although often in a strictly private, erotic, and non-rhetorical context.
211
 Ibycus refers to Peitho as 
ἀγανοβλέφαρος (“gentle-eyed,” Ibyc. fr. 288 PMGF). In Pindar fr. 123 Snell, the poet rebukes 
anyone who, after looking (δρακείς, line 3) upon Theoxenos—a youth in whom Peitho dwells 
(Πειθώ τ’ ἔναιεν, line 14)—does not esteem him.212 In describing this passage, Pepe writes: “Thus 
Peitho is an interior quality, residing in the person of extreme physical beauty and performing an 
erotic function.”213 Peitho seems to exercise her power through the eyes in order to make a person 
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 Pindar condemns such a blind and hardened person to being dishonored by bright-eyed Aphrodite herself 
(Ἀφροδίτας ἑλικογˈλεφάρου, line 6). He also describes the Peitho-blessed youth as someone whose beauty shines 
forth from his eyes (ὄσσων, line 2). 
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lovely and beloved.
214
 By contrast, the eyes of Peitho in Eumenides 970 do not bestow beauty 
upon Athena, but, rather lend effectiveness to her speech. All in all, by using the terms μείλιγμα, 
θελκτήριον and ὄμματα Aeschylus preserves some of Peitho’s magical and erotic characteristics, 




 Not long after Aeschylus, one finds several instances of a magical Peitho who is also 
associated with civic and political speech. For example, Eupolis (446-411 BCE) claims that Peitho 
helped Pericles excel beyond all others in speech: 
Πειθώ τις ἐπεκάθιζεν ἐπὶ τοῖς χείλεσιν·  
οὕτως ἐκήλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων  
τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις. (Eupolis fr. 94) 
 
A Persuasion of sorts perched upon his lips.  
That’s how he could cast a spell, and he alone of the speakers  
left a sting in his audience (tr. Storey).  
 
In other words, Pericles, a famed political figure in Greek history, was gifted by Peitho with the 
ability to work magic upon his listeners. Several sophists after Aeschylus likewise incorporated 
magic into their idea of Peitho and rhetoric. Gorgias is a prime example of this trend. According to 
him, the power of persuasion lies precisely in its magical qualities, as can be seen in the following 
lines of the Encomium of Helen:  
αἱ γὰρ ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπωιδαὶ ἐπαγωγοὶ ἡδονῆς, ἀπαγωγοὶ λύπης γίνονται· 
συγγινομένη γὰρ τῆι δόξηι τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἐπωιδῆς ἔθελξε καὶ ἔπεισε καὶ 
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 Blank also analyzes Parmenides’ mention of Peitho in relationship to the symbolism and eyes and the unveiling of 
the sun-maidens which had taken place a bit earlier in the proem. See Blank 1982, 174. 
215
 Longinus will also use the imagery of the eyes in his description of effective rhetoric. When discussing the proper 
way to effectively persuade those who do not want to be persuaded (πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ τῶν λόγων πάντως 
ἀντιδιατίθεται, Long. Subl.17.1), Longinus concludes that one must speak in brilliantly concealed figures, so that their 
brightness attracts the eyes first and primarily rather than the rhetorical device itself: οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λόγων τὰ πάθη 
καὶ τὰ ὕψη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐγγυτέρω κείμενα διά τε φυσικήν τινα συγγένειαν καὶ διὰ λαμπρότητα, ἀεὶ τῶν 
σχημάτων προεμφανίζεται καὶ τὴν τέχνην αὐτῶν ἀποσκιάζει καὶ οἷον ἐν κατακαλύψει τηρεῖ (“So it is in writing. What 
is sublime and moving lies nearer to our hearts, and thus, partly from a natural affinity, partly from brilliance of effect, 
it always strikes the eye long before the figures, thus throwing their art into the shade and keeping it hid as it were 
under a bushel,” Long. Subl. 17.2-3, tr. Halliwell).  
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μετέστησεν αὐτὴν γοητείαι. (Gorg. Hel. 10) 
 
By means of words, inspired incantations serve as bringers-on of pleasure and 
takers-off of pain. For the incantation's power, communicating with the soul's 
opinion, enchants and persuades and changes it, by trickery (tr. Donovan). 
 
As a result of these and other passages, de Romilly calls Gorgias “the theoretician of the magic 
spell of words.”216 
 Isocrates also recognizes Peitho as goddess of civic rhetorical speech in Athenian culture 
although he himself understands persuasion as something disconnected from magic, being one of 
the few sophists to avoid using words such as thelkterion in his program.
217
 In one of his speeches, 
moreover, Isocrates complains how the Athenian citizenry worship Peitho and yet do not seek to 
exercise her rhetorical arts. To him, they presumably have an incorrect view of Peitho: 
ὃ δ᾽ οὐ μόνον ταραχῆς σημεῖόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὀλιγωρίας: τὴν 
μὲν γὰρ Πειθὼ μίαν τῶν θεῶν νομίζουσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶσι καθ᾽ ἕκαστον 
τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν θυσίαν αὐτῇ ποιουμένην, τοὺς δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως ἧς ἡ θεὸς ἔχει 
μετασχεῖν βουλομένους ὡς κακοῦ πράγματος ἐπιθυμοῦντας διαφθείρεσθαί φασιν.  
       (Isocr. Antid. 15. 249.1-6) 
 
But as a symptom, not only of their confusion of mind, but of their contempt for the 
gods, they recognize that Persuasion is one of the gods, and they observe that the 
city makes sacrifices to her every year, but when men aspire to share the power 
which the goddess possesses, they claim that such aspirants are being corrupted, as 
though their desire were for some evil thing (tr. Norlin). 
 
By Isocrates’ time, therefore, it seems that Peitho has effectively become an accepted—if slightly 
suspect—goddess of rhetoric. An Athenian red figure kylix (c. dated 400 BCE) also seems to 
present the goddess Peitho engaged in persuasive speech.
218
 Here she dialogues eagerly with 
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 Ironically, Aristotle uses many magical terms to describe Isocrates’ use of poetical terms and homoeoteleuton, 
describing it as follows: φθέγγονταί τε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται δῆλον ὅτι ὁμοίως 
ἔχοντες. διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἥρμοσεν· ἔνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποιήσις (“Thus do people speak when possessed, and listeners 
accept it because they are in a similar state. That is why it is appropriate in poetry, for poetry is inspired,” Arist. Rh. 
1408b11, tr. De Romilly). Possession (ἐνθουσιάζοντες) and inspiration (ἔνθεον) are words from the realm of magic. It 
is doubly surprising that these words appear in Aristotle, the philosopher who had so stripped rhetoric of any 
association with magic. Also see de Romilly 1975, 74-75. 
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 Although her name is not inscribed (and therefore her identity is uncertain) the following scholars consider this 
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Fig. 5. Demonassa with Peitho(?) and Eros. Interior of kylix by Meidias. c.400 BCE. 
Malibu 82.AE.38. Photo from collections of the J. Paul Getty Museum, Malibu. 
 
 
The kylix is also unusual because Eros stands in Peitho’s more typical role as a silent onlooker 
while Peitho works not with jewelry, but possibly, one might imagine, with logical argumentation.  
 In dramas performed after Aeschylus, Peitho becomes more fully involved with civic 
speech as well. In Aristophanes’ Lysistrata, the women protagonists of the drama invoke Peitho 
before swearing an oath to renounce sexual intercourse in order to obtain, as Stafford notes, a 
political end.
219
 Lysistrata leads their pledge with the following lines: δέσποινα Πειθοῖ καὶ κύλιξ 
φιλοτησία, / τὰ σφάγια δέξαι ταῖς γυναιξὶν εὐμενής (“O Peitho our Mistress and Loving Cup, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
figure most likely to be Peitho: Icard-Gianolio 1994, 148; Shapiro 1993, 197. 
219
 See Stafford 2000, 126. Stafford also thinks that this may also be an allusion to the temple of Aphrodite Pandemos 
and Peitho, which would have been quite near the set of this play (the main gate to the Athenian Acropolis). 
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receive this sacrifice, thinking kindly upon these women,” Ar. Lys. 203-204). We find a similar 
request in New Comedy: Menander stages a character calling upon Peitho for aid in speech. In the 
Epitrepontes, Habroton, the slave woman, comes up with a scheme to pose as the lost mother of 
her master’s baby. In this way, she hopes to win his love and, more importantly, to win freedom for 
herself. In order to accomplish this task, she calls upon Peitho: φίλη Πειθοῖ, παροῦσα σύμμαχος / 
πόει κατορθοῦν τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἂν λέγω (“Dear goddess Peitho, come near as an ally and make 
straight the words which I speak,” Men. Epit.555-556). In response to her prayer, Habroton’s 
friend and fellow slave Onesimus observes: τοπαστικὸν τὸ γύναιον· ὡς ᾔσθηθ᾿ ὅτι / κατὰ τὸν 
ἔρωτ᾿ οὐκ ἔστ᾿ ἐλευθερίας τυχεῖν, / …τὴν ἑτέραν πορεύεται / ὁδόν (“That girl’s a wizard! 
Realizing that she can’t win freedom by the lure of love…she now takes the other route,” Men. 
Epit. 557-560, tr. Arnott). Habroton’s appeal to Peitho is not so much to a love goddess as to a 
clever and effective artist of words. 
 Peitho appears in even less erotic contexts affiliated with political and civic speech.
220
 The 
Chorus of Aristophanes’ Clouds at one point calls upon Pheidippides to demonstrate his sophistic 
learning. They challenge him: σὸν ἔργον ὦ καινῶν ἐπῶν κινητὰ καὶ / πειθώ τινα ζητεῖν, ὅπως 
δόξεις λέγειν δίκαια (“It is your business, you author and upheaver of new words, to seek some 
P/peitho, so that you shall seem to speak justly,” Ar. Nub. 1397-1398, tr. Hickie). Pheidippides 
responds in kind, using the language of the sophists to exult his new knowledge about how to 
speak rhetorically, i.e.: γνώμαις δὲ λεπταῖς καὶ λόγοις…καὶ μερίμναις (“with subtle thoughts and 
arguments and speculations,” Ar. Nub.1404, tr. Hickie). Another example comes from the orators 
themselves. At one point, in a fit of frustration, the orator Aeschines accuses the Athenians of 
trusting his competitor Demosthenes so much that they look upon him as the goddess Peitho 
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 For a more complete selection of such passages, see texts of Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato and Aristophanes in 
Chapter One Section III. 
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herself, and not as the sycophant (συκοφάντηs) that (in Aeschines’ mind) he really was: 
οἴεται γὰρ ὑμᾶς εἰς τοσοῦτον εὐηθείας ἤδη προβεβηκέναι ὥστε καὶ ταῦτα 
ἀναπεισθήσεσθαι, ὥσπερ Πειθὼ τρέφοντας, ἀλλ’ οὐ συκοφάντην 
ἄνθρωπον…(Aeschin. In Ctes. 256) 
 
For he supposes that you have by this time come to such a pitch of folly that you 
will credit even this, as though it were the goddess Persuasion that you have been 
nurturing…and not a slanderer [professional swindler]! (tr. Adams). 
 
Even from this translation, one can see that to the Athenians of the Aeschines’ and Demosthenes’ 
time, Peitho seems to have become a goddess patroness of rhetoric itself.  
 In sum, although Aeschylus in the Eumenides associates Peitho with both civic speech and 
magic, by the end of the Oresteia, a certain amount of purification has occurred.
221
 She has 
changed from an evil force to become a goddess who, through her magic, effects the good of the 
entire Athenian society. Kane writes: “At the end of the trilogy, Peitho has been transformed into a 
benign deity, the goddess of political persuasion.”222 She charms the Erinyes, but it is only under 
the auspices of Zeus “Agoraios” (Aesch. Eu. 973) and through the reasonable words and 
arguments of Athena. She may still work magic; but, after having been “redeemed,”as Rynearson 
puts it,
223
 and purified through the course of the trilogy, the magical Peitho of the Eumenides is fit 
for the political and civic role which rhetoric will hold in the near future for Athenian society.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 Aeschylus’ Oresteia marks a transition point for the Greek understanding of goddess 
Peitho in connection with the art of civic, political speech (rhetoric) in the fifth and fourth 
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centuries. In the Agamemnon, Peitho appears with that irresistible quality adopted by Gorgias’ idea 
of rhetoric and rejected by Plato. As the deceitful co-worker of Hermes, Peitho in the Choephoroi 
becomes co-patron and model for the sophists and other craftsmen of words. Finally, after 
assisting the political arguments of Athena in the Eumenides, Aeschylus’ Peitho takes up an 
established role in civic society, ensuring her direct involvement and influence on the political 
speech of orators, politicians, and philosophers for years to come. In these ways, Aeschylus takes 
this deity from her mythological tradition and opens her up to connection with new and developing 
ideas about the art of persuasion. As Wright suggests: “later theories of rhetoric can be seen in part 
as a working and partial endorsement of the implications of the mythic-poetic tradition.” 224 In 
other words, from Aeschylus’ dramatic manipulations with Peitho, one can trace a direct line to 
Greek conceptions of the art soon to be called “rhetoric.” 
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CHAPTER THREE: The Centrality of Πείθω to the Oresteia 
 
I. Introduction 
 The uniqueness of Aeschylus’ preoccupation and emphasis on πειθώ can be seen through 
Rosenmeyer’s general comments on the nature of tragic drama. He writes: “no Attic tragedy can 
do without the awareness that men are easily moved by persuasion, though in some of the plays the 
power of persuasion is more prominent and more overtly identified than in others."
225
 Such a 
drama, I would argue, is the Oresteia, where the primacy of πειθώ emerges with remarkable 
clarity.
226
 In the hands of Aeschylus, the dynamic complexity and nuanced meanings which he 
attaches to πειθώ (as a noun, goddess, and verb) are readily developed on stage. In fact, Aeschylus 
uses his new ideas about πειθώ to structure the entire dramatic performance of the Oresteia. In 
particular, I argue in this chapter that Aeschylus highlights πειθώ as a central structural principle, 
an important theme, and a term which describes the main actions of the entire trilogy and thereby 
presents his ideas of πειθώ as worthy of his audience’s close attention. 
 The importance of πειθώ to Aeschylus’ Oresteia has been discussed by many scholars.227 
The most common assessments limit their scope to πειθώ’s thematic development from evil and 
ruinous towards a gradually purified, beneficent and civilized state. In other words, πειθώ’s 
development mirrors the general movement of the trilogy from the sinister, private and 
blood-thirsty actions of the Agamemnon and Choephoroi towards the redemptive establishment of 
the court system, the righteous acquittal of Orestes, and the integration of the Furies into Athenian 
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society in the Eumenides.
228
 While this is a worthy and helpful analysis for literary interpretation, 
it does not suffice for an assessment of the drama as a site of rhetorical innovation. Two important 
treatments of the topic, Buxton 1982 and Pepe 1967, trace πειθώ’s development in the Oresteia, 
but without reference to its/her influence on the main action of the play. Conversely, Bers 1994 
speaks about how the play occurs through “tests of persuasion,”229 but does not discuss πειθώ as a 
theme. The scholar who comes closest to the present analysis is Zweig 1982, who considers 
various personified gods in the Oresteia as agents of dramatic action. She focuses most extensively 
on the personifications Ate and Dike; and, her discussion of the goddess Peitho in the Choephoroi 
is minimal. This chapter complements these and other such studies by analyzing πειθώ from a 
variety of perspectives throughout the Oresteia. 
 What is more, I examine πειθώ as a force, theme, and concept present in central moments 
of the dramatic action, in sung “para-narratives,” and in references to the personified Peitho which 
mirror and emphasize those main actions. Although “parallel” or “mirroring” narratives have been 
discussed in works on Greek drama in general
230
 and on Sophocles or Euripides in particular,
231
 
few scholars have used narratology to analyze such myths throughout Aeschylus’ Oresteia.232 
Also, I am not aware of any scholarship that has combined such an analysis in the Oresteia with a 
structural and thematic study of πειθώ. Yet several of these scholars affirm that both personified 
deities and staged narration can effectively guide audience interpretation and focus their attention 
on concepts of the playwright’s choosing.233 My work uses methodologies which reveal the 
significance of πειθώ throughout the drama and the possible impression which this concept made 
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 73  
upon its audience. 
 In sum, there are three ways in which I argue for the prominence of πειθώ in the Oresteia. 
In the first place, Aeschylus constructs his entire trilogy not on a predetermined fate, but on 
instances where one character “wins over” another (πείθω). Aeschylus highlights these actions 
further by staging the singing of parallel myths at moments crucial to the main actions of each 
play. Each of these myths features a reference to the word and action of πειθώ. Finally, Aeschylus 
gives these turning points even greater dramatic prominence by having the Chorus or other 
characters invoke the goddess Peitho herself. Through these strategically timed invocations and 
the parallel choral narratives featuring πειθώ, Aeschylus not only crafts a persuasive drama, but 
subtly invites his audience to ponder that very persuasiveness. 
 
II. Definitions  
 In order to best observe how Aeschylus, working within the limits of his medium, invites 
his audience to think about πειθώ throughout the Oresteia, we must first define the concepts 
through which this analysis will take place, namely: dramatic prominence, significant action, 
personification and mirror narrative.  
 
Dramatic Prominence 
 Dramatic prominence is a quality which the playwright gives to certain actions or scenes 
such that the ideal audience interprets them as important and is prompted to reflect on the nature of 
that importance. Usually the playwright signals the dramatic prominence of a scene or action by 
using certain techniques, as Mastronarde points out: 
  …when tragedians want their audience to make inferences about psychological 
motivations and processes which lie behind words or action (or behind silence or 
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inaction), they are careful to give in almost every case explicit clues as to what 
inferences should be made.”234 
 
Aeschylus gives dramatic prominence to scenes and actions which suggest the centrality and 
importance of πειθώ. There seem to be two main “clues” which Aeschylus uses in order to prompt 
“inferences” about the “psychological motivation or process” called πειθώ. The first is the 
presence of the personified deity Peitho.
235
 The second is the appearance and centrality of πειθώ 
both in the main action of each play and in mythic narratives which parallel that main action.  
 
Main Action 
 Rather than define the “main or significant actions” of a drama in terms of character exit 
and entrance, changes in fortune, or traditional Aristotelian ideas of plot,
236
 I identify them as 
staged interactions which trigger moments of change and lead directly to the end results of each 
play.
237
 The end results in the Oresteia are two deaths (Agamemnon’s and Clytemnestra’s), and a 
transformation (of the Erinyes).
238
 According to this definition, the main or significant action of 
the Agamemnon, for instance, consists of the persuasion of Agamemnon by Clytemnestra, who 
convinces him to walk into the house to his doom. These verbal conflicts are what the playwright 
stages, what the audience watches, and what we should analyze as the most important moments of 
the drama. In the Oresteia, Aeschylus often marks these conflicts with the presence of the verb 
πείθω (or a close derivative), thereby highlighting πειθώ as a core theme and structural principle 
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throughout the trilogy. 
 
Personification 
 While it can be difficult to distinguish among images, themes, and personified deities in 
Greek tragedy, Zweig defines personification as: "the animation of something inanimate so that 
this entity needs nothing other than its own self-consciousness to perform some activity."
239
 I 
identify personification as a kind of deified abstraction which, like a theme, can guide audience 
interpretation, and yet, like a divinity, can also exert a certain influence on dramatic action. 
 Since Personifications like Peitho have a contemporaneous cult in society outside of the 
drama, they can influence the audience in different ways. In the first place, they immediately 
capture the audience’s attention by their familiarity. As a result of the connection between the play 
and real life, the dramatic appearance or invocation of a personified god creates an impression on 
the audience’s imagination. Even if the audience does not immediately recognize the divinity, 
Rutherford argues that “where the divine or daemonic bursts into the human sphere, there the 
audience is forced to see events in a new light.”240 A personified god can also come alive, as it 
were, and play a part in the drama itself “with the vitality of a full-fledged dramatic character," as 
Zweig describes it.
241
 By their nature, personifications were tools for ancient Greek thought about 
complicated phenomena of human experience.
242
 When a goddess such as Peitho would come on 
the scene of a tragic drama, she would prompt the audience to think about her involvement with or 
influence upon the dramatic action. 
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Parallel or Mirroring Narratives 
 Scholars tend to categorize narrative myths told by characters on the dramatic stage as 
paradigmatic, etiological, or parallel/mirroring.
243
 While these categories often intersect, 
paradigms are typically used in instances where one character is exhorting another to adopt a given 
course of action.
244
 As Alden explains, these persuasive exempla provide practical wisdom 
through a situation “remarkably similar to that of the addressee.”245 Rutherford notes that this is 
“the simplest use of the device…[and] Aeschylus has already gone beyond this.”246 Aeschylus 
generally uses myths to provide a lens through which the audience can interpret the larger action of 
the drama itself.
247
 The myths which perform this function do this in either an etiological or 
parallel way.
248
 According to Anderson, etiological myths often call to mind “the beginning of 
evils,” thereby “locat[ing] the present action and its principal thematic concerns within the wider 
mythic context”249 and, as Buxton comments, “explaining the present in terms of its origins.”250  
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 Other myths in Aeschylus function as mirrors of dramatic action.
251
 Sommerstein 
identifies these myths as “secondary mythical allusions” whereby “the characters or choruses in a 
drama try to illuminate the story being enacted by referring or alluding to a different story that can 
be seen as in some way related to it.”252 Through these parallel narratives, Markantonatos 
explains: "a new perceptual screen is introduced through which the staged events are evaluated or 
even explicated."
253
 These myths can also guide the interpretation of the audience by reinforcing 
certain themes of the play.
254
 As Goward writes: “Where the poet lingers, we are entitled to look 
for his particular concerns.”255 He continues: 
 …however tense and thrilling the dialogues between stage figures may be, with 
their displays of aggression (hubris), persuasion (peitho), friendship (philia) or 
advice (parainesis), it is often rightly left to the extraordinary capacities of 




While there are a number of important mythic stories narrated by the Chorus in the Oresteia, my 
analysis will focus specifically on parallel or mirroring myths which feature a central action 
described by the verb πείθω. The three narratives I examine are the myth of Paris and Helen at 
Agamemnon 385-411, the myth of Minos and Scylla at Choephoroi 613-622, and the myth of 
Apollo and the Fates at Eumenides 723-730. Each of these myths, occurring closely before the 
decisive moments in the dramatic action, contains a centralized reference to the verb πείθω, thus 
serving to highlight the importance of this concept for the audience.
257
  
                                                          
251
 The term “mirror” is used by De Jong 1987, 66, 86, but also by Alden 2000, 11; Mastronarde 2010, 66. See also 
Létoublon 1983, 27. 
252
 Sommerstein 2007, 174. See also Segal 1986, 64. 
253
 Markantonatos 2002, 13. Alden writes that these myths "exert influence, directly or indirectly, on the audience's 
reception of the text," (Alden 2000, 13). 
254
 On the subject of paradigms as mirrors, Anderson explains how the mythological paradigms of the Iliad mirror or 
correspond to something in the main narrative, reflecting its elements with a different cast. The connection is 
established not through content, but through theme...that is, the elements of the two stories mirror eachother," (Alden 
2000, 296, referring to Anderson 1987, 8-9). 
255
 Goward 1999, 20. Also Mastronarde 2010, 148; Segal 1986, 52. 
256
 Goward 1999, 20. 
257
 These myths are also significant because, with the exception of the last one (in the Eumenides), they occur early on 
in the Choral songs to which they belong. Mastronarde argues that choral song often uses mythic narrative openings in 
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 To sum up, then, in creating his work, the playwright highlights certain scenes and actions 
in a given performance, thereby inviting his audience to think about certain ideas and themes such 
as πειθώ. Scenes with such an effect have been endowed with dramatic prominence. Some of the 
specific clues which a playwright uses to create this effect consist of his choice of the drama’s 
central conflict or main action, and his strategic positioning of influential personified deities and 
mirroring choral narratives. Aeschylus, as shall be seen, employs all of these dramatic techniques 
in his efforts to present πειθώ as a concept deserving of special consideration. 
 
III. The Dramatic Prominence of Πειθώ 
 Throughout the Agamemnon, Choephoroi, and Eumenides, Aeschylus presents and 
dramatically highlights πειθώ through his use of mirroring myths, the personified goddess, 
together with new and convincing story lines marked by main actions which are scenes of 
persuasion rather than plot movement marked by the inevitability of fate. Additionally, each of the 
references to πειθώ in the individual plays highlights the precise kind of action which is 
simultaneous unfolding on the stage of each respective drama. Aeschylus, therefore, presents as 
central to the trilogy his own particular aspects of πειθώ, namely: its evil forcefulness, trickery, 
and potentially benevolent but beguiling qualities. 
 
A. Πειθώ in the Agamemnon 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
order to highlight certain relevant themes to which the playwright wishes to draw attention (Mastronarde 2010, 148). 
The myth of Paris and Helen and, then, Minos and Scylla both take place within the first twenty lines of the Chorus’ 
first stasimon within their respective plays (Ag. 355-487; Cho. 585-651). For more on how position can affect the 
weight and importance of a given narrative myth, see Rutherford 2007, 22; Markantonatos 2002, 14. De Romilly 
writes that “quite often Aeschylus keeps for the center of his play the most distant ‘flashback’ as we should say now, 
and joins it there with an anticipation and prediction about future events so that the whole sequence of events stands 
there in the middle, as one great unity, where time’s continuous course is gathered into a legible pattern,” (De Romilly 
1968, 72-73). 
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 In the Agamemnon, Aeschylus stages the homecoming of the Greek hero and the 
treacherous welcome of his wife Clytemnestra. What takes place on the stage is a combat of wills, 
a clash which is only resolved with πειθώ. The quality of πειθώ in this play is a forceful and 
ruinous one, which Aeschylus highlights with a choral song about a wretched Peitho and the story 
of Paris and Helen. 
 
Main Action (Ag. 931-943) 
  The most significant moment for the action of the Agamemnon takes place at Ag. 931-943, 
where the embittered Clytemnestra convinces her husband to obey her and tread on the tapestries 
to his doom. After some cunning speeches, Clytemnestra’s attempt to win over her husband 
culminates in an intense stichomythic exchange at the end of which she utters: πιθοῦ·κρατεῖς 
μέντοι παρεὶς ἑκὼν ἐμοί (“Give in! You are the winner, you know, if you willingly hand it over to 
me,” Ag. 943).258 At this, Agamemnon does indeed yield, muttering: ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ταῦθ' (“But 
if you insist on these things,”Ag. 944), and walks into the house. The presence of the word πιθοῦ, 
the aorist imperative of πείθομαι, marks the climax and conclusion of the main conflict in the play, 
a conflict which ends in Agamemnon’s death. 
 Although adherence to a fundamental story line requires that Agamemnon die, it is 
Aeschylus’s genius that the events leading up to his death become complicated, and only resolved 
with the power expressed by the verb πιθοῦ in Ag. 943.259 Aeschylus alters several details of the 
Agamemnon myth such that his version will necessitate the presence and action of πειθώ in the 
                                                          
258
 Raeburn and Thomas: “The emended line still lacks a main caesura, but its division into six disyllabic words could 
be a special effect to mark Clytemnestra’s final insistence which causes Agamemnon to yield,” (Raeburn and Thomas 
2011, 168). My translation is inspired by Denniston and Page 1957, 153. On the seductive potential of the word πιθοῦ, 
Raeburn and Thomas also comment that “the dipthong of πιθοῦ and its circumflex accent can be delivered with a 
seductive cooing effect,” (Raeburn and Thomas 2011, 168); this observation may seem dubious to some (cf. Victor 
Bers, personal correspondence). For more on the quality of entreaty in this line, see Fraenkel 1950, 428-429. 
259
 See Dawe 1963, 48-49 n.2; Easterling 1973, 5; Buxton 1982, 107. 
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play. The earliest known version of Agamemnon is the story found in Homer’s Odyssey Books 3, 
4, and 11. By contrast with the Homeric tradition, Aeschylus’ play omits two details of note. In the 
first place, Aeschylus does not mention any magical mythological events such as those 
surrounding the story of Thyestes and Atreus. Sommerstein writes: “By omitting the golden ram 
and the portent, Aeschylus has turned a tale of myth and magic into one of power, revenge and 
cruelty."
260
 Aeschylus also elevates Clytemnestra’s role whereas Homer and the lyric poets make 
Aegisthus the killer and Clytemnestra as his assistant. In the Oresteia, however, Sommerstein 
continues: “What we find nowhere before Aeschylus is what he has given us: Clytemnestra as sole 
killer, with Aegisthus not even there.”261 With these alterations, Aeschylus stages a play of 
striking human interaction, undetermined by previous magical occurrences and uncluttered by 
multiple human agents. The focal point of the Agamemnon becomes the deadly conflict between 
two individuals, Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, an encounter encapsulated in Clytemnestra’s 
definitive and climactic πιθοῦ. 
 The scene between Clytemnestra and Cassandra in the Agamemnon also contains frequent 
use of πείθομαι and its derivatives (πείθοι’ ἄν, εἰ πείθοι’, ἀπειθοίης, Ag. 1049; πείθω, Ag. 1052; 
πείθου, Ag. 1054). Yet, their staged encounter depicts the failure of persuasion. Cassandra enters 
the house to her death not because Clytemnestra has won her over, but because she sees (among 
other tragic visions) that this is her fate (Ag.1290). Thus, the remarkably dense frequency of words 
related to πείθω seems to serve another function: perhaps as a characterization or, better yet, as a 
foil to the more essential (and successful) πιθοῦ uttered between Clytemnestra and Agamemnon. 
Ultimately Cassandra enters into the house not because of the seductive qualities of Clytemnestra, 
but because of the inescapable force of Ate which seems to have extended its power not only over 
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 Sommerstein 2010, 138. 
261
 Ibid., 139. 
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Agamemnon, but also over the other dramatis personae as well.
262
 In that sense, it is also 
according to the will and workings of Peitho, daughter of Ate, that Cassandra submits and enters 
into the house as her master did. 
 
A Ruinous Goddess (Ag. 385) 
 The ruinous persuasion of Agamemnon by Clytemnestra at Ag. 943 (and all that follows) is 
anticipated by the Chorus’ mention of a wretched and forceful Peitho at Ag. 385.263 Peitho here, at 
the service of Ate, represents the evil force behind Clytemnestra’s action and its ruinous 
consequences, not only for Agamemnon but for the entire house of Atreus.
264
 This first reference 
to a fully personified Peitho occurs towards the beginning of the Choral stasimon which divides act 
one (featuring the news of Agamemnon’s arrival) from act two (depicting his defeat and 
destruction at the hands of Clytemnestra).
265
 At this point, the Herald has already announced the 
news of Agamemnon’s homecoming. Clytemnestra has entered into dialogue with him and with 
the Chorus about this event and the destruction of Troy. Now Aeschylus is about to stage the most 
crucial encounter of the play: Agamemnon’s arrival, Clytemnestra’s welcome, and their fatal 
encounter. 
 Peitho therefore occurs in a transitional moment within the song. Up till now, the Chorus 
has been singing about how man brings about his own destruction through Κόρος (“Insolence,” 
                                                          
262
 Cassandra herself attributes the destruction of Agamemnon (Ag. 1267) and of herself (Ag. 1226-1230) to the power 
of Ate, who, in this play, has Peitho as her primary assistant. 
263
 Note that this may contradict or, rather, disprove, Smith’s observation that with Aeschylus, thematic development 
“is introduced with a verbal idea and continued in nominal form," (Smith 1965, 70). Here, it seems to be the other way 
around. For confirmation of the personified Peitho’s presence here, see Buxton 1977, 880; Headlam 1906, 118; Bailey 
1962, 74. 
264
 On the goddess Peitho as dangerous power and important theme for the drama of the Agamemnon, see Goward 
2005, 95-97. 
265
 In my identification of act dividing songs, I adhere to Taplin 1977. 
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Ag. 382), a hubristic attitude engendered by the possession of excess wealth (Ag. 367-384).
266
 The 
Chorus continues to sing about this with the first lines of the antistrophe: 
 βιᾶται δ' ἁ τάλαινα Πειθώ  
 προβούλου παῖς ἄφερτος ἄτας. (Aesch. Ag. 385-386) 
 
 Wretched Peitho compels him,  
 the unbearable daughter of deliberating Ruin. 
 
The Chorus shifts from commentary on Κόρος to the workings of the goddess Peitho, daughter of 
Ate (Infatuation/Ruin). On this passage, Goward explains that “[i]f a man does not use his wealth 
with justice, slowly but surely he will be persuaded into some disaster.”267 Raeburn and Thomas 
comment: “Ate…uses her daughter Πειθώ as her instrument to effect the come-uppance: the 
sinner, through folly, can be persuaded to horrendous actions.”268 While Ate is the one who plans 
and dictates what must be done, Peitho effects it.
269
 Aeschylus also modifies Peitho with the 
neologism ἄφερτος (“unbearable,” Ag. 386).270 Peitho emerges from this passage as an 
insufferable, unavoidable force, described by Rutherford as “tinged with tragic fatality,”271 and 
actively at work: in Bailey’s words, an “agent provocateur” who induces and seduces with a 
menace.
272
 And in her, Aeschylus presents a divine agent working behind the human affairs and 
actions central to the Agamemnon’s plot.273    
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 Rosenmeyer 1982, 315. 
267
 Goward 2005, 75. See also Headlam 1906, 118. 
268
 Raeburn and Thomas 2011, 112. Looking forward to the rest of the choral song, Fraenkel explains that Peitho 
either “overpowers a man by persuading him that he is obliged to do what it is not right for him to do, and at the same 
time talks him out of his resistance…or… she works through another person (her instrument) and thereby “persuades 
the doer of the crime to his action,” (Fraenkel 1950, 201). 
269
 On the meaning of προβούλου as “setting up the agenda” or “exercising forethought” see Raeburn and Thomas 
2011, 113. On the significance of this adjective in terms of its connection with the legal body of Athens at the time, see 
Fraenkel 1950, 200. For more on legal terminology throughout the Oresteia, see Rutherford 2012, 131-132. Such 
terminology appears in the following passages: Ag. 41, 47, 451, 534, 537, 813-17, 1412-1413, 1421; Cho. 987, 
989-990, 1026-1033; Eu (trial scene and compensation of Erinyes). 
270
 Fraenkel 1950, 200 n. 2 notes that this term is found eight other times throughout the Oresteia, five of those being 
in the Agamemnon. See also Dodds 1973, 56 n. 2. 
271
 Rutherford 2012, 156. 
272
 Bailey 1962, 75. 
273
 Aeschylus “fashions his personified being so as to be engaged in the action independently and from the outset and 
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Parallel Myth (Ag. 387-411) 
 Peitho also functions as the agent behind the mythological events recounted in the song 
which follows at Ag. 387-411. This song tells the story of Paris and Helen, a narrative which 
mirrors the conquest of Agamemnon by Clytemnestra and evokes consideration of an earlier 
defeat to which he had submitted when he allowed himself to be persuaded to kill his daughter 
Iphigenia.  
 βιᾶται δ᾽ ἁ τάλαινα Πειθώ,   385 
 προβούλου παῖς ἄφερτος ἄτας. 
 ἄκος δὲ πᾶν μάταιον. οὐκ ἐκρύφθη,  
 πρέπει δέ, φῶς αἰνολαμπές, σίνος 
 κακοῦ δὲ χαλκοῦ τρόπον    
 τρίβῳ τε καὶ προσβολαῖς  
 μελαμπαγὴς πέλει  
 δικαιωθείς, ἐπεὶ  
 διώκει παῖς ποτανὸν ὄρνιν,  
 πόλει πρόστριμμα θεὶς ἄφερτον.  395  
 λιτᾶν δ᾽ ἀκούει μὲν οὔτις θεῶν  
   τὸν δ᾽ ἐπίστροφον τῶν  
 φῶτ᾽ ἄδικον καθαιρεῖ.  
 οἷος καὶ Πάρις ἐλθὼν  
 ἐς δόμον τὸν Ἀτρειδᾶν    
 ᾔσχυνε ξενίαν τράπε-  
   ζαν κλοπαῖσι γυναικός.  
 λιποῦσα δ᾽ ἀστοῖσιν ἀσπίστοράς  
 κλόνους λογχίμους τε καὶ  
 ναυβάτας θ᾽ ὁπλισμούς,   405 
 ἄγουσά τ᾽ ἀντίφερνον Ἰλίῳ φθορὰν  
 βέβακει ῥίμφα διὰ  
 πυλᾶν ἄτλητα τλᾶσα: πολὺ δ᾽ ἀνέστενον  
 τόδ᾽ ἐννέποντες δόμων προφῆται·  
 ‘ἰὼ ἰὼ δῶμα δῶμα καὶ πρόμοι,   
 ἰὼ λέχος καὶ στίβοι φιλάνορες.’ (Aesch. Ag. 385-411) 
 
 Wretched Peitho compels him, 
 The insufferable daughter of deliberating-beforehand Ruin; 
 And every remedy is vain; its bane is not hidden,  
 but is conspicuous, a horrid-gleaming light;  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not as a description in retrospect or from a distance," (Zweig 1982, 7). 
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 and in the way that cheap bronze,  
 with rubbing and with the application of a touchstone, 
 It comes out black-clotted 
 After having been punished, since  
 He is chasing, as a boy, a bird on the wing,  
 having placed on the city unbearable affliction. 
 And none of the gods hears his prayers  
   But since he deals with these things  
 They destroy him, as a man unjust. 
 Such a one was Paris, who came  
 to the house of the sons of Atreus   
 And dishonored the table of guest-friendship  
   By theft of a woman. 
 And leaving to her townspeople shielded-warriors,  
 clashing throngs of spears, and  
 seamen preparing for war,   
 And bringing to Ilium destruction instead of a dowry,  
 she [Helen] stepped forth lightly through  
 the gates, having dared an insufferable thing. But the prophets groaned much  
 for the house [of Atreus] when speaking of this: 
 “Alas, alas, for the house and its princes, 
 Alas for the marriage bed and for the footsteps of lovers!” 
 
After emphasizing the irremedial (ἄκος δὲ πᾶν μάταιο, 387) and baneful (σίνος, 388) nature of 
Peitho’s actions, this myth describes how under her influence, a man’s crimes incur punishment 
both for himself and his city (393-395).
274
 The thought concludes: “such a one was Paris,” (οἷος 
καὶ Πάρις, 399). Having been seduced by the insufferable (ἄτλητα, 408) Peitho, Paris transgresses 
against guest friendship (ᾔσχυνε ξενίαν τράπεζαν, 401-402); and, bringing his prize home, she 
becomes his destruction (φθοράν, 406). In this story, Helen appears to be a mere instrument for 
Peitho who works upon Paris. Helen herself, however, is not depicted as the guilty seductress; nor 
is she forced. She goes along with Paris freely and lightly (βέβακει ῥίμφα διὰ / πυλᾶν, Ag. 
407-408) and departs swiftly, thoughtless of impunity.
275
 In Aeschylus’ version of the myth, 
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 Note the occurrence of the word ἄφερτον again in line 395. 
275
 See Raeburn and Thomas 2011, 114. See also Ag. 394, 420-426, 690-692; Blondell 2013, 130; Fraenkel 1950, 270; 
214. In Hesiod, the abduction of Helen is presented ambiguously (Hes. Catalogue of Women 204. 81-84; Blondell 
2013, 35-36); so also in the Cypria (Blondell 2013, 26). Gantz writes: “No source...goes so far as to argue that she is 
actually kidnapped against her will, although this may be implied in some of the versions in which she never arrives at 
 85  
Peitho is the seductress who uses Helen to bring Paris to his doom.
276
 A ten-years’ war, Paris’ own 
death, and the ruin of Troy are the results.
277
  
 The story of Paris and Helen ends not long before Agamemnon’s conflict and engagement 
with his wife before his death. As a mirroring narrtative, this myth tells of the same kind of forceful 
and destructive allurement, embodied in Peitho, by which both Paris and Agamemnon are 
seduced.
278
 Headlam writes: “Agamemnon falls from precisely the same causes, by precisely the 
same means, as Trojan Paris.”279 Bailey posits that just as with Paris, “[i]n the case of 
Agamemnon, Peitho is working from within as well as from without. His own pride and ambition 
spur him on to action to which Clytemnestra is also moving him.”280 Raeburn and Thomas 
summarize: “Paris was rich, sinned, and has been punished. Agamemnon is rich, has blood on his 
hands, and…[t]he Chorus can draw the conclusion, but dare not voice it.”281 The result of both 
their crimes is, moreover, a ruptured marital relationship (Ag.411, 208-210); and, as Bailey 
continues: “as Paris will pay the penalty for his sin at the hands of Agamemnon, so will 
Agamemnon pay for his sin at the hands of Clytemnestra.”282 Just as with Paris, Agamemnon’s 
transgression and submission result not only in his own death,
283
 but in the destruction of many 
others. A continued cycle of murder, blood, and vengeance threatens to destroy not only his 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Troy,” (Gantz 1993, 573-574, e.g., Stesichorus’ account in 192-193 PMG). 
276
 On Helen as the instrument of Ate, Headlam refers to the next lyric passage (Ag. 717-736): “Helen is the 
instrument of Ate; and the point is enforced by a technical device widely practiced in the choral lyric. The stress of the 
last sentence, which of course would be accentuated in the singing, falls upon the word ᾌτας,” (Headlam 1906, 120). 
277
 Even Helen’s name, as mentioned in the choral song which follows later (especially Ag. 687) can be understood to 
mean “to take, capture, or kill.” Therefore, Blondell argues that Helen is “actively destructive in her very essence,” 
(Blondell 2013, 130). Also, see Ag. 819-820 for reference to the destruction of Troy as an effect of Ate, mother of 
Peitho. 
278
 One could argue that this myth also suggests a close parallel between Helen and Clytemnestra, but Aeschylus 
fleshes out this comparison more in the second stasimon (Ag. 681-809). For more on parallels between the two 
half-sisters, see Blondell 2013, 123-124; 127. 
279
 Headlam 1906, 119. 
280
 Bailey 1962, 58. 
281
 Raeburn and Thomas 2011, 109-110. 
282
 Bailey 1962, 49. 
283
 See the connection between Ate and Agamemnon’s fate in the words of Cassandra at Ag. 1226-1230. 
 86  
progeny (Orestes) but through the wrath of the Erinyes, the city of Athens as well (Eu. 810-817).
284
 
Aeschylus underscores the contention that without Peitho, none of this would even have happened, 
either to Paris or to Agamemnon.
285
 
 Through meter and context, this myth is also linked with the story of Iphigenia at Aulis, 
which the Chorus sings in the parodos of the play (Ag. 191-257). Through its reference also to 
πειθώ, this song commemorates Agamemnon’s earlier action (the sacrifice of his daughter) as 
another instance of the power of Peitho working upon him for ruin.
286
 The main action of 
Agamemnon in this earlier story is also marked by the presence of the verb πείθω. The Chorus 
notes that when confronted with the choice between submission to Artemis (with her promise of 
favorable winds for the voyage to Troy) and the death of his daughter, Agamemnon fatally chooses 
to obey (πιθέσθαι, Ag. 206) the goddess. While deliberating over this decision, he laments:       
 βαρεῖα μὲν κὴρ τὸ μὴ πιθέσθαι 
   βαρεῖα δ', εἰ  
 τέκνον δαΐξω, δόμων ἄγαλμα,  
 μιαίνων παρθενοσφάγοισιν  
 ῥείθροις πατρῴους χέρας πέλας βω- 
 μοῦ. τί τῶνδ' ἄνευ κακῶν; (Aesch. Ag. 205-211) 
 
  A grievous fate it is to not obey,  
   but grievous if  
 I should slay my child, the delight of the house,  
 staining with streams of a slaughtered maiden’s blood  
 these father’s hands near the altar.  
 What of these things is without evils? 
 
This depiction is uniquely Aeschylean in its emphasis on the individual nature of Agamemnon’s 
decision.
287
 The image of Agamemnon donning the yoke of Necessity (ἀνάγκας… λέπαδνον, Ag. 
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 On how Helen and Clytemnestra become Erinyes thematically and dramatically, see Blondell 2013, 138 who 
references Ag. 749. Also, Bailey 1962, 236; Rutherford 2012, 225-26. 
285
 Raeburn and Thomas comment: “The Chorus’ track of lyric utterance and movement has led it to another ominous 
conclusion. This is not just mood-setting; its words considered as speech-acts have moved the drama on towards 
Agamemnon’s destruction,” (Raeburn and Thomas 2011, 119). 
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 See Raeburn and Thomas 2011, 109-110. Sommerstein 2010, 149 calls the meter of this song the “Aulis rhythm.” 
287
 Sommerstein says that “no one before Aeschylus had envisaged Agamemnon as killing Iphigenia with his own 
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218) fits well with his forceful depiction of Peitho in the play.
288
 Agamemnon, here, allows 
himself to be persuaded by the omen as interpreted by Calchas, a sign of the anger of Artemis. In 
this way, he perpetuates the cycle of death as it would soon be inflicted through the πειθώ of 
Iphigenia’s vengeful and bitter mother.289 And, with the verb πιθέσθαι (Ag. 206), Aeschylus again 
points to the ultimate origin of these evils: the ineluctable power of πειθώ. 
 
B. Πειθώ in the Choephoroi  
 By depicting the personification Peitho as an agent of dramatic action (through her 
invocation and through the mirror myth at Ag. 385-411), Aeschylus highlights the importance of 
πειθώ in the Agamemnon as a menacing, forceful power bringing about the ruin of Clytemnestra’s 
husband. In the Choephoroi, πειθώ appears with a similarly sinister mien, but in the main action, a 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
hand,” (Sommerstein 2010, 138). 
288
 See also Denniston and Page 1957, xxviii. 
289
 Anderson argues: “The chorus laments the horrific events at Aulis in their first song. Agamemnon unwittingly 
replicates the sacrifice in symbolic form when he tramples the costly tapestries (950-65). Clytemnestra invokes 
Iphigenia’s sacrifice as justification for murder (1432; 1523-29), and she repeats the sacrilege by staging 
Agamemnon’s death as a sacrifice (1384-87 and 1432-33),” (Anderson 2005, 133). 
290
 One could perhaps say that Peitho works with trickery in the Agamemnon as well. A connection between these two 
different qualities of Peitho seems to be articulated in a passage of the Persae, a play which predates the Oresteia by 
fourteen years. The Chorus sings: 
 
  δολόμητιν δ᾽ ἀπάταν θεοῦ τίς ἀνὴρ θανατὸς ἀλύξει;  
 τίς ὁ κραιπνῷ ποδὶ πηδήματος εὐπετέος ἀνᾴσσων;  
 φιλόφρων γὰρ ποτισαίνουσα τὸ πρῶτον παράγει 
 βροτὸν εἰς ἄρκυας Ἄτα,  
 τόθεν οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπὲρ θνατὸν ἀλύξαντα φυγεῖν. (Aesch. Pers. 94-100)  
 
 But what mortal man can escape the guileful deception of a god? 
 Who is so light of foot that he has power to leap easily away? 
 For Ruin begins by fawning on a man in a friendly way 
 and leads him astray into her net. 
 from which it is impossible for a mortal to escape and flee (tr. Sommerstein). 
 
Aeschylus conflates the action of Ate and, by association, Peitho with δολόμητιν δ᾽ ἀπάταν (guileful deception) and 
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Actions of Trickery (Cho. 556-557) 
 The turning-point action of the Choephoroi takes place at Cho. 652-718 when the 
disguised Orestes artfully uses cunning persuasion to gain access to his mother’s home and 
accomplish his revenge. From the moment when he first reveals his plan to the audience, Orestes 
describes it in terms of δόλος:291  
 ὡς ἂν δόλῳ κτείναντες ἄνδρα τίμιον 
 δόλοισι καὶ ληφθῶσιν ἐν ταὐτῷ βρόχῳ 
 θανόντες, … (Aesch. Cho. 556-557) 
 
 Just as, by trickery, they killed an honorable man  
 In trickery also will they be seized in the same net 
 and die,…  
 
After this, at Cho. 674 Orestes arrives at the door pretending to be a stranger from Phocis. He 
refuses provide any identification to the porter. When Clytemnestra emerges to inquire about him, 
he claims to have come from Strophius,
292
 adding a false report about his own (Orestes’) death 
(Cho. 682).
293
 Seemingly taken in, Clytemnestra opens the door to her son.
294
 After realizing her 
fatal error later on, however, Clytemnestra protests: “we are destroyed by trickery” (δόλοις 
ὀλούμεθ, Cho. 885). In other words, the central action and conclusion (Clytemnestra’s death) in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
with ποτισαίνουσα (fawning). Aeschylus uses this latter term (at Ag. 681-809) to describe Helen, ruinous agent of 
Peitho, as a lion cub who acts with “the fawning blandishments of simulated friendliness,” (Headlam 1906, 134, 126). 
For a similar image in Pindar, see Pyth 2.83. For more on the lion cub image in the Agamemnon, see Ag. 725-726, 
735-736. The main action of the Choephoroi consists in a kind of trickery, and the primary agent is a tricky Peitho at 
the service of Ate [N.B. The last word of the Choephoroi is ἄτης (Cho. 1076).] But instead of using the forceful 
inducement of Peitho, Orestes uses her powers of deception to enter into his mother’s house and effect her ruin. 
Headlam 1906, 176-177 considers the main actions of both the Agamemnon and Choephoroi a species of doloi; 
Pontani 2007, 207 points out the differences. 
291
 See also Bailey 1962, 100. 
292
 See Cho. 679. The first reference to Orestes and his stay in Phocis with Strophius is made by Clytemnestra to 
Agamemnon. Her last comment on Orestes’ current state foreshadows the deception with which he will involve 
himself when he returns. She asserts to Agamemnon, words dripping with irony: τοιάδε μέντοι σκῆψις οὐ δόλον φέρει 
(“But such is my excuse, and it is not a trick,” Aesch. Ag. 386). Lebeck comments: "The woman who welcomes him 
tricks the man who returns; a man who returns tricks the woman who welcomes him," (Lebeck 1967, 182). See also 
Rosenmeyer 1982, 350. 
293
 On the significance of this see McCall 1990, 25. 
294
 Pontani 2007 points out that Clytemnestra must not have been entirely taken in by Orestes’ deceptive tale, for at 
Cho. 768-782 she did tell Aegisthus to come in the company of his body guards (Pontani 2007, 212). Nonetheless, his 
deception worked sufficiently to gain him entrance into the house, so, for our purposes, the argument still holds. 
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this play result from the deceptive and destructive “winning-over” carried out by Orestes against 
his mother. 
 As if to emphasize the centrality of the tricky action of πειθώ in the Choephoroi, Aeschylus 
once again makes adjustments to the plot. Pontani, in particular, notes that Orestes’ mention of 
Strophius (Cho. 679) hints at his tricky motives, since this name is connected with Hermes' epithet 
Στροφαῖος, which in turn is linked to Hermes’ deceitful modus operandi: στρέφεσθαι καὶ 
πανουργεῖν (“to turn about and play the knave”).295 Aeschylus’ Orestes also approaches 
Clytemnestra with a false report about his own death, a verbal deceit which Sommerstein considers 
to be quite innovative, at least within the context of the play: 
Aeschylus makes no mention beforehand of the idea of giving a false report of his 
own death…because Aeschylus wants to keep it from the audience—which 
suggests that it is an innovation, overlaid on an earlier conception in which Orestes 




Compared with the story in Homer’s Odyssey, Aeschylus has Orestes engage directly in a personal 
encounter with his mother; then, he kills her in cold blood.
297
 These changes focus attention on the 
charged and emotional one-on-one conflict between mother and son. With these innovations, 
Aeschylus creates a version of the Orestes myth which highlights the important role of trickery in 
the main action of the play: a moment of persuasive deception between Orestes and Clytemnestra 
which sets in motion the entire plan of destruction and revenge. 
 While Orestes’ deceptive gaining of entry into the palace is the main action of the 
                                                          
295
 This name could also be connected with Hermes’ role with door hinges and with the goal of Orestes’ trickery: to 
gain access to his victims through entering the main door. See Garvie 1970: 87-88. For the other Greek phrase 
mentioned in the text, see schol. vet. Ar, Plut. 1153-54; 1154a; Suid. σ1218 from Pontani 2007, 205 n.5. Pontani also 
suggests a possible connection with Laertes’ servant Dolios from the Odyssey, who appears in the lying recognition 
scene at the end of this poem (Pontani 2007, n.5). 
296
 Sommerstein 2010, 143. Pontani agrees (2007, 212 n.31), but Käppel thinks this tale was just a spontaneous 
reaction to the situation which presented itself with the appearance of Clytemnestra (Käppel 1998, 221, 230). 
297
 In Odyssey 3.309-10, Homer only mentions that Orestes “made a funeral feast over both of them…and that on the 
day of this feast Menelaus came home,” (Sommerstein 2010, 136). See also Pontani 2007, 209, 213-222. On 
Aeschylus’ depiction of an unarmed Clytemnestra, see Sommerstein 2010, 143. 
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Choephoroi, other acts of trickery follow upon the first. Take for instance, the events leading up to 
the death of Aegisthus. Reiterating Orestes’ deceit, the Chorus prompts the Nurse, Cilissa, to carry 
out her own work of deceit.
298
 In response to the Chorus, moreover, Cilissa responds with an 
explicit use of the verb πείθομαι. She says: ἀλλ᾽ εἶμι καὶ σοῖς ταῦτα πείσομαι λόγοις (“All right, 
I’m going and I will obey your words with respect to these things,” Cho. 781). She then fetches 
Aegisthus on the false premise that Orestes has died and that the visiting strangers would tell him 
more if he would only come in to meet them. Remarkably, Aegisthus heeds her summons and its 
deceptive message (Cho. 838-841), which is corroborated by the Chorus (Cho. 848-850). Then 
Aegisthus comes to Orestes uttering these last words: οὔτοι φρέν᾽ ἂν κλέψειεν ὠμματωμένην 
(“These men could not deceive a mind that has its eyes open,” Cho. 854). Yet this is precisely what 
happens. Aegisthus succumbs to the deceit of Orestes and his Nurse: going in to meet the 
“strangers” he goes to his death, as arranged by the craftiness of Orestes and the deceitful 
complicity of Cilissa and the Chorus. 
 
Tricky Peitho (Cho. 726) 
 As if to signal Peitho’s key role behind the action of the Choephoroi, Aeschylus has the 
Chorus sing to her just as Orestes makes his way into the house after winning over his mother: 
 νῦν γὰρ ἀκμάζει Πειθὼ δολίαν  
ξυγκαταβῆναι, χθόνιον δ᾽ Ἑρμῆν  
καὶ τὸν νύχιον τοῖσδ᾽ ἐφοδεῦσαι  
ξιφοδηλήτοισιν ἀγῶσιν.  (Aesch. Cho. 726-729) 
 
 Now is the moment for tricky Peitho  
 to go down (into the arena) and for Hermes of the underworld,   
 gloomy as night, to watch over 
                                                          
298
 Some scholars even say that the Nurse demonstrates precisely how deceitfully Peitho works in this play (Cho. 726; 
Zweig 1982, 131; Kitto 1959, 50). Bailey goes so far as to say that “the nurse is Peitho. What sort of Peitho she will 
employ is clearly indicated by the epithet δολίαν—she will deliver the false message dictated by the chorus 
(770sqq.),” (Bailey 1962, 95). 
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 contests of death by the sword.  
 
Not only does this passage further develop the theme of πειθώ, but it happens at precisely at the 
moment when the audience is about to witness the completion of Orestes’ deceitful act.299 
Aeschylus explicitly links Peitho with δολίαν (726) and Hermes (727).300 Hand in hand with the 
god of cunning craft, Peitho enters into the arena of the stage (ξυγκαταβῆναι, 727) as Orestes 
enters into his mother’s house. Peitho watches over (ἐφοδεῦσαι, 728) and aids Orestes in his 
struggle (ἀγῶσιν, 729).301 Her presence here also clearly indicates that the main action of the 
Choephoroi involves persuasion through deceit. It is under the influence of Πειθὼ δολία influence 
that Orestes will accomplish his vengeful task. 
 
Parallel Myth (Cho. 613-622) 
 Immediately before Orestes approaches the house and tricks his mother, Aeschylus stages 
a choral song (Cho. 613-622) which features the myth of Nisus, Minos, and Scylla. This myth not 
only mirrors Orestes’ deception of his mother, but it also points to the ultimate “origin of evils” for 
the Choephoroi: Apollo’s deception of Orestes. Like the story of Paris and Helen in the 
Agamemnon, the story of Nisus, Minos and Scylla occurs within a stasimon at the center of the 
drama which functions as an act-dividing song.
302
 In the Choephoroi this song separates act one 
(at the tomb of Agamemnon, where Orestes renews his resolve) from act two (when Orestes makes 
                                                          
299
 “The prayer for the help of deceitful Persuasion is obviously in place as Orestes’ plot develops,” (Garvie 1986, 
240, 242); compare Verrall: “The power of Persuasion (or Deception) is to prevent premature discovery of the fraud,” 
(Verrall 1893, 104). 
300
 Buxton thinks that Peitho in the Choephoroi is really just “deception masquerading as peitho,” (Buxton 1977, 85). 
For more on the significance of Peitho’s companionship with Hermes, see Zweig 1982, 131 and Chapter Two Section 
III. 
301
 There is controversy over the translation of ἐφοδεῦσαι, 728. Compare Verrall 1893, 104, for instance, with Garvie 
1986, 242-43 (who is in favor of discarding the word altogether and using something else). On ἀγῶσιν, see Ag. 1377 
and Ag. 1528, instances where Clytemnestra and her crime are similarly described. Garvie comments: “Once again the 
language links the various crimes, each being seen as retribution for the last,”(Garvie 1986, 243). 
302
 Kranz 1933, 169 calls it a “Verbindungsstück.” 
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good on his resolve and murders Clytemnestra). As Garvie puts it, the Chorus sings this song 
“while we wait for the actors to develop the intrigue.”303  
 The entire choral ode (Cho. 584-651) features three stories recounting the murderous deeds 
of evil women.
304
 The first mythical reference recounts Althaea’s killing of her son Meleager; the 
second, Scylla’s murder of her father Nisus; and the third, the destructive deaths imposed by the 
Lemnian women upon their husbands. While the ostensible purpose of this song as a whole is to 
bewail inter-family perversions and strife (particularly those involving women),
305
 inner 
dynamics of the story about Nisus, Minos, and Scylla also mirror aspects of what takes place 
between Orestes and his mother.
306
 
 The story of Minos, Nisus and Scylla would have been particularly well known to an 
Athenian audience because the victim, Nisus, was the brother of Aegeus, an Athenian king. In the 
myth, Minos from Crete besieges Megara, but in order to win the kingdom he seduces (and/or 
bribes) the king’s daughter, Scylla. She, in turn, kills her father Nisus by cutting off his magic lock 
of hair while he sleeps. The Chorus sings the myth as follows: 
ἄλλαν δεῖ τιν᾽ ἐν λόγοις στυγεῖν  
φοινίαν κόραν,  
ἅτ᾽ ἐχθρῶν ὑπαὶ  
φῶτ᾽ ἀπώλεσεν φίλον Κρητικοῖς  
χρυσοκμήτοισιν ὅρμοις  
πιθήσασα δώροισι Μίνω,  
Νῖσον ἀθανάτας τριχὸς  
νοσφίσασ᾽ ἀπροβούλως  
πνέονθ᾽ ἁ κυνόφρων ὕπνῳ.  
                                                          
303
 Garvie 1986, 202. 
304
 Garvie notes that this is the “first choral ode in extant tragedy…and the only one in Aeschylus in which we find the 
illustrative use of myth on anything like this scale,” (Garvie 1986, 202). 
305
 On ruthlessness in these myths, see Stinton 1979, 257. For the reference to family murders and the crimes of the 
house of Atreus in these myths, see Garvie 1986, 203. Sommerstein claims that the audience would assess the entire 
ode as one depicting “feminine ‘desires’”…which are not “exclusively or even mainly sexual,” (Sommerstein 2007, 
177). See also Rutherford 2007, 19. 
306
 The meter of the mythic strophic pairs, incidentally, is that of syncopated iambics with aeolic clausula, reminding 
one of the rhythm of the stories in the Agamemnon which also involved, for example, that of Agamemnon and 
Iphigenia, and of Paris and Helen. 
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κιγχάνει δέ μιν Ἑρμῆς. (Aesch. Cho. 613-622) 
 
One should hate another woman from the legends, 
the murderous girl 
who under the influence of enemies 
destroyed a close relative, since with Cretan 
necklaces wrought with gold, 
the gifts of Minos, she was seduced; 
And the immortal hair from Nisus  
she removed, while thoughtlessly 
he breathed in sleep—this dog-minded woman!— 
but Hermes took him.  
 
While a parallel between Scylla and Clytemnestra may have been the Chorus’ more overt intention 
in this song,
307
 the ode is open to interpretation on other levels, such as a comparison between 
Scylla and Orestes.
308
 Here as in the play, a child enters a parent’s quarters to murder them 
“treacherously by stealth,” as Stinton puts it.309 Helpless, Nisus dies while sleeping unawares 
(ἀπροβούλως, 620), so Clytemnestra dies baring her breast to Orestes’ knife.310  
 This myth also mirrors the main action of the Choephoroi by its explicit mention of 
Hermes at the end of the tale and by the ambiguity surrounding the object of Hermes’ action in this 
line (622). While many scholars assume that the “μιν” whom Hermes took refers to Nisus, some 
point out that it could also refer to Scylla herself. In most of the later versions of the myth, Garvie 
explains, Scylla ends miserably: either murdered by a disgusted Minos or transformed into a 
sea-bird and chased forever by her vengeful father.
311
 In like manner, Orestes, another 
                                                          
307
 Scholars often point out parallels between the ways that both Scylla and Clytemenstra are compared to a dog. 
Compare Cho. 622 with Cho. 420-422, for example. Garvie also notes that Aeschylus seems to be playing with the 
etymology of her name as Homer did in Od. 12.85: the word Σκύλαξ means a young dog (Garvie 1986, 214). See also 
Ag. 1233, where Aeschylus compares Clytemnestra with the Homeric Scylla. 
308
 Lebeck writes: “The first two exempla give back a looking-glass reflection of the parallel crimes committed by 
Agamemnon and Orestes.…Thus there is a triplicate reference which calls up the murder of Iphigenia, of 
Agamemnon, of Clytemnestra,”(Lebeck 1967, 183). In fact, many scholars agree that the women in the first two 
myths, Althaea and Scylla, do not properly mirror Clytemnestra at all (Sommerstein 2010, 128; Rutherford 2007, 6; 
Garvie 1986, 202). Garvie points out that Aeschylus (like Sophocles in Electra 837ff) could easily have thought of 
better parallel myths such as the stories of Eriphyle and Amphiarus or that of Aerope and Atreus (Garvie 1986, 203). 
309
 Stinton 1979, 253. 
310
 On the parallel between Scylla and Orestes, see Lebeck 1967, 183-184; also Stinton 1979, 256. 
311
 See Garvie 1986, 214. 
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 A final and perhaps most obvious connection between this myth and the tricky πείθω of the 
Choephoroi lies in Aeschylus’ use of the verb πιθήσασα (617) to describe how Minos convinces 
Scylla to kill her father.
314
 Although Cho. 613-622 is the first extant occurrence of the story of 
Minos and Scylla in ancient Greek literature,
315
 Aeschylus’ version of the story contains elements 
which are absent from later accounts and yet which bring to the fore the presence of Πειθὼ 
δολία.316 While there has always been great ambiguity surrounding Scylla’s motives for this evil 
deed,
317
 no later version of the story mentions the bribe (616-617) made by Minos to win Scylla 
over to his plan.
318
 The golden necklaces, however, call to mind Peitho’s typical iconography.319 
Thus, while some scholars may argue the contrary, I do not believe that the bribe here negates the 
possibility of an erotic motivation for Scylla’s evil deed.320 Rather, these necklaces thematically 
connect her accomplishment to the powerful and tricky seductiveness of the goddess Peitho.
321
 
With the necklaces, Minos seduces and tricks Scylla into carrying out a deceitful and evil deed. In 
like manner, the god Apollo convinces Orestes to perform his own act of tricky Peitho, the central 
                                                          
312
 Stinton 1979, 255. By contrast with Althaea in the previous myth, Stinton considers Scylla to be “guilty but 
unpardonable;” this latter description is quite apt for Orestes as well, considering the pursuit of the Erinyes in the 
Choephoroi and into the Eumenides. 
313
 He is also accompanied by Hermes throughout the next play, although not to Hades (Eu. 90). 
314
 According to Garvie, this epic form of the aorist participle is found only here in tragedy (Garvie 1986, 213). Also 
Sideras 1971, 107. 
315
 Garvie 1986, 212. 
316
 Later accounts include Pseudo-Apollodorus 3.15.8; Pausanias 2.34.7; scholar to Euripides Hippolytus 1200 and to 
Lycophron Alexandra 650; Propertius 3.19.21-28; Ovid Metamorphoses 8.6-151; Hyginus Fabulae 198. 
317
 See March 1998, 335. 
318
 See Sommerstein 2007, 17. 
319
 See Buxton 1982, 36 for details on these “traditional instruments of erotic enticement” used frequently by Peitho. 
Also see Chapter Two. 
320
 Sommerstein 2007, 176-177 argues the contrary. 
321
 Orestes, by comparison, also speaks to the inducements of Apollo using erotic terminology in the word φίλτρα 
(Cho. 1029-1033). Interestingly, much much later the author Nonnus will describe Scylla’s deed precisely with 
reference to Peitho. Here, however, she is working with a brazen spear, rather than with golden necklaces: Πειθὼ / 
χάλκεον ἔγχος ἔπαλλε καὶ ἔπλετο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη, / μαρναμένῳ Μίνωι συνέμπορος, ἐν δὲ κυδοιμοῖς (“Peitho shook a 
brazen spear and turned into Pallas Athena to stand by Minos in the fray," Nonn. Dion. 25.150-152. tr. Rouse). 
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dramatic action in this play.
322
 All in all then, this story serves as a thematic echo of the main 
action and the origin of evils—rooted as they are in a tricky πειθώ—in the plot of the Choephoroi.   
 While earlier poets might not give clear reasons behind Orestes’ choice of action, 
Aeschylus clearly indicates that Orestes acted under the deceitful influence of someone greater 
than himself: Apollo.
323
 In both the Choephoroi and the Eumenides, Aeschylus points to Apollo’s 
tricky manipulation of Orestes with words related to πειθώ, δόλος, or both. Towards the beginning 
of the Choephoroi, Orestes explains his submission to Apollo’s commands in this way: 
 τοιοῖσδε χρησμοῖς ἆρα χρὴ πεποιθέναι;  
 κεἰ μὴ πέποιθα, τοὔργον ἔστ᾽ ἐργαστέον. (Aesch. Cho. 297-98) 
 
 It is necessary to trust such oracles, is it not? 




Although πεποιθέναι may be translated “to trust,”325 the connection with the original sense of the 
middle πείθομαι (“to acquiesce, to be persuaded, to yield”) is also present. When announcing his 
plan of action, Orestes not only mentions the trickery of the act, but insinuates that Apollo himself 
had prescribed the deceit. He says, finishing lines 556-557 from the passage above:
326
 
 …καὶ Λοξίας ἐφήμισεν, 
 ἄναξ Ἀπόλλων, μάντις ἀψευδὴς τὸ πρίν. (Aesch. Cho. 557-558).  
 
 …and Loxias has decreed it, 
 The lord Apollo, a seer not false before. 
 
Much later, when Orestes hesitates to kill his mother, it is Pylades’ reminder of his need to obey 
                                                          
322
 For Apollo’s responsibility for Orestes’ actions see Zweig 1982, 133; Kitto 1959, 53; and also Apollo’s own words 
in Eu. 579-80. 
323
 Sommerstein comments: “The result is that in Aeschylus, Orestes, while not exactly a reluctant avenger, is also not 
an eager one: he takes the vengeance because ‘the deed has to be done,’ (Cho. 298),” (Sommerstein 2010, 142). 
324
 Orestes is yet operating under a πειθώ which implies a certain amount of negative force and necessity. This, 
however, is to be expected, for πειθώ in the Choephoroi has not yet been “purified” or established within the more just 
and freedom-respecting setting of the Athenian courts as in the Eumenides. Also, since it is a relationship between 
unequals (cf. Agamemnon’s conundrum at Ag. 205-211), the element of necessity is not surprising. 
325
 See Rivier 1968, 25-26. 
326
 See Pontani 2007, 206, 206 n.7. 
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Apollo that sets his resolve (Cho. 900-902).
327
 Apollo himself acknowledges that he had won 
Orestes over to this deed, saying at one point: καὶ γὰρ κτανεῖν σ᾽ ἔπεισα μητρῷον δέμας (“For, 
indeed, I convinced you to kill your mother,” Eu. 84). Later in this last play, Orestes again admits 
Apollo’s influence on his action, using the word πέποιθ’ (“I trusted,” Eu. 598). In short, if it were 
not for Apollo’s success in winning Orestes’ obedience, there would have been no deceptive 
murders in the first place. 
 Orestes’ trust in Apollo, however, turns out to be quite unfounded; for the god’s πειθώ is, 
like the action he prescribes, an act of trickery.
328
 Apollo wins over Orestes by using threats of 
punishment (Cho. 269-296). Bailey comments that what Apollo does not reveal to Orestes is that 
“the very instruments with which [he] threatens Orestes if he fails to avenge his father, will be 
awakened against him if he slays his mother.”329 Apollo also seems to have promised Orestes 
protection. Yet, as shall be seen, he cannot and does not keep to this promise. Here lies the irony of 
Orestes’ supposition when he calls Apollo’s oracle “a seer not false before” (μάντις ἀψευδὴς τὸ 
πρίν, Cho. 558). Orestes, while he might have intimations of Apollo’s trickery, does not give much 
weight to these suspicions.
330
  
 The Chorus, however, catches on to Apollo’s deceit, although perhaps too late. At the very 
                                                          
327
 The lines spoken by Pylades also contain a word distantly related to πείθομαι, πιστὰ:  
 
 ποῦ δὴ τὰ λοιπὰ Λοξίου μαντεύματα  
 τὰ πυθόχρηστα, πιστὰ δ᾽ εὐορκώματα;  
 ἅπαντας ἐχθροὺς τῶν θεῶν ἡγοῦ πλέον. (Aesch. Cho.900-902)  
 
 But what about the rest: the oracles of Loxias 
 declared by the Pythian, and trusted oaths? 
 Consider all men enemies rather than the gods. 
 
328
 Orestes uses φίλτρα (“inducements,” Cho. 1029) when referring to Apollo’s persuasiveness. 
329
 Bailey 1962, 101. 
330
 See Gow 1999, 66-67. He does not take seriously Apollo’s close kinship with that master trickster Hermes or 
implications of having a surname as Loxias (Cho. 557) meaning “oblique, ambiguous.” Apollo is the half-brother of 
Hermes. But Zweig comments that the name Loxias “emphasizes the enigmatic and crafty quality of his oracles,” 
(Zweig 1982, 131). 
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moment when Orestes is killing his mother, the Chorus complains about Apollo (Cho. 953) and his 
trickery (ἀδόλως δόλοις, Cho. 955).331 The Chorus of Erinyes in the Eumenides likewise hold 
Apollo in suspicion, calling him a young thief of a god (ἐπίκλοπος, Eu. 149; ἐξέκλεψας, Eu. 153), 
and scorning Orestes’ trust in him. At the trial scene, they ask Orestes who had sanctioned his 
vengeful deed: πρὸς τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπείσθης (“And by whom were you persuaded?” Eu. 593). Then they 
cry: νεκροῖσί νυν πέπισθι μητέρα κτανών (“Put your trust in corpses, having killed your 
mother!” Eu. 599). The Erinyes know that Apollo’s promises for purification at Delphi count for 
nothing: Orestes’ deeds will demand a vindication which Apollo cannot prevent. Hence, after 
accomplishing his deceitful revenge, Orestes finds himself hounded by the Erinyes and become, 
himself, the victim of Πειθὼ δολία. 
 
C. Πειθώ in the Eumenides 
 In the Eumenides, the vicious cycle of revenge comes to an end. This play makes πειθώ a a 
central plot element as well. Aeschylus stages a main action featuring πειθώ, a mirroring narrative, 
and a beneficent and enchanting Peitho, who, through speech, now ensures reconciliation, peace 
and the common good for Orestes, for the Erinyes, and for the citizens of Athens. 
 
Actions of Benevolence (Eu. 778-891) 
 In terms of the ultimate resolution and peaceful outcome of the trilogy, the main action of 
                                                          
331
 The text is very vexed. Following Page, it runs as follows:  
 
 τάνπερ ὁ Λοξίας ὁ Παρνασσίας  
 μέγαν ἔχων μυχὸν χθονὸς ἐπωρθία- 
 ξεν ἀδόλως δόλοις… (Aesch. Cho. 953-955) 
  
 Which Loxias of Parnassus,  
 who holds the great cavern of the earth,  
 loudly proclaimed, guilelessly with guile… 
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the Eumenides consists in the appeasement of the Erinyes by Athena in several speeches which 
feature the verbal notion of πείθω. As a result of what had occurred in the Choephoroi, Orestes 
flees to Delphi and then to Athens, seeking asylum. The Erinyes follow in pursuit. A trial is held in 
which the two sides, Apollo for the defense and the Erinyes, the prosecution, present their 
arguments; but the agon ends in a stalemate. In the end, Orestes is legally acquitted by ballot, in the 
first ever homicide trial. But this hardly matters to the Erinyes. They threaten to destroy Athens 
and its people, no doubt including Orestes. In other words, the trial in itself does not bring about 
peace and resolution. Also, nowhere in the trial scene does Aeschylus use a word related to πειθώ 
to describe the action taking place aside from the brief comment made by the Erinyes referring to 
Orestes’ submission to Apollo (Eu. 593).332 While in contemporary Athenian society the court 
would have been the proper place for πειθώ, this trial scene seems different.333 Indeed, after the 
final vote, there is still much need for persuasion. Only once the Erinyes are persuaded to accept 
the results of the trial can Orestes, can the people of Athens live out their lives in security. 
 The most significant action of the play consists of Athena’s work to appease these deities 
with beguiling speech. It is near the end of the play, at Eu. 778-891, that Athena embarks upon this 
task. Aeschylus marks this scene and Athena’s work of persuasion with the new, purified, and 
benign πειθώ of speech.334 With four delicate, carefully wrought speeches, Athena addresses the 
Erinyes’ concerns, mollifies them, and ensconces them permanently beneath Athens as resident 
deities who will protect rather than destroy.
335
 
                                                          
332
 Throughout the trilogy, there are several references to πιστός, but I have generally avoided discussion of this word, 
considering it a rather distant derivative of πειθώ and therefore not adding much to the theme of the drama. 
333
 Buxton, however, argues that from the beginning of the trial, “By refusing to allow trial by oath, Athene puts her 
faith in the settling of disputes by argument,” (Buxton 1977, 106). Others comment that as soon as the Erinyes allow 
Athena to be their arbiter and Orestes to speak, Peitho is present and has won an initial victory. See Zweig 1982, 162; 
Kitto 1959, 61, 62-63. 
334
 See Rosenmeyer 1982, 350 for a pithy comparison of Athena’s πειθώ with that of Clytemnestra in the Agamemnon. 
Buxton calls the πειθώ of the Eumenides the “true” πειθώ (Buxton 1977, 85). 
335
 See Chapter Three Section V for more on these speeches and their rhetorical qualities. 
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 Throughout this process, moreover, Athena several times refers to her own actions with 
words related to πείθω. In the first line of her first speech to the angry goddesses, she says: 
ἐμοὶ πίθεσθε μὴ βαρυστόνως φέρειν. (Aesch. Eu. 794) 
 
Be persuaded by me to not bear it with heavy groaning. 
 
She then provides the Erinyes with reasons why they should moderate their behavior. In her 
second speech, Athena uses an adjectival derivative of πειθώ to explain that she herself submits 
and trusts (πέποιθα, Eu. 826) in someone—Zeus— and that the Erinyes should follow her 
example: 
    ….σὺ δ᾽εὐπιθὴς ἐμοὶ 
γλώσσης ματαίας μὴ ᾽κβάλῃς ἔπη χθονί 
καρπὸν φέροντα πάντα μὴ πράσσειν καλῶς. (Aesch. Eu. 829-831) 
 
  …and you, obedient to me 
do not throw to the earth words from an idle tongue  
that all fruit-bearing things should fare badly. 
 
Athena ultimately does get the Erinyes to acquiesce through her continued verbal arguments, 
exhortations, promises and kindly speech. At the end, the fearsome goddesses become Semnai 
Theai and process off-stage singing in harmony and at peace beneath the rule of Zeus and his 
daughter Athena.  
 Innovative details in the plot of this last play further highlight the centrality of the Athena’s 
πειθώ in the closing scenes. Other accounts tell the story that Orestes obtains purification at Delphi 
and/or wards off the Erinyes with a special bow and arrow given to him by Apollo.
336
 In the 
Eumenides, however, Orestes is stained,
337
 weaponless, and helpless: a marked man. He can 
neither overcome these angry goddesses nor absolve himself of guilt through force. Aeschylus’ 
                                                          
336
 See Pindar’s account in Pyth. 11. 15-37 (c. 474 BCE). See also Stesichorus PMG 217; Sommerstein 1989, 5. 
337
 Although he is technically purified (Eu. 276-289), the Erinyes do not see his purification as a valid one. 
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Erinyes, moreover, are fearsome and implacable.
338
 Also, given their rightful claims in a play 
whose central interest is justice, the Erinyes can be neither destroyed nor easily dismissed. Instead, 
they must be assuaged and won over in a more delicate fashion than is recounted in earlier 
myths.
339
 The fact that the trial and/or physical force will not suffice for resolution in Aeschylus’ 
play further emphasizes the importance of Athena’s work with πειθώ at the end. 
 The appeasement of the Erinyes takes place, significantly, against the “backdrop” of a 
newly established court in Athens on the Areopagus.
340
 At this point in the play, the trial of 
Orestes is over (indeed, Orestes has already left the stage), but Athena lays the last stone—the 
most important one—still within the law court before the assembly of jurors. This setting itself 
re-emphasizes Athena’s πειθώ and invites connections with the proceedings of justice and 
reasonable spoken arguments common to a fifth century Athenian courtroom.  
 After Athena works her persuasion, the Erinyes agree to become Semnai Theai in Athens. 
This is again a remarkable innovation which points to the power of Athena’s πειθώ. Although the 
Semnai Theai were worshiped in Athens during the fifth century BCE, they had never been 
previously associated with the Erinyes. While the Semnai would watch over suppliants, the 
Erinyes never did so.
341
 The Erinyes were goddesses who avenged crimes against kin. More often 
than not, they would hound suppliants—such as Orestes—who had the blood of a family member 
on their hands. Aeschylus’ connection of the Erinyes with the Semnai Theai thus emphasizes the 
striking efficacy of πειθώ. Through Athena’s actions, achived through πειθώ, the Erinyes embrace 
a role almost contrary to their original nature. As Semnai, moreover, the formerly implacable 
                                                          
338
 See Prag 1985, 48-51. 
339
 See Sommerstein 1989, 5. 
340
 Previous accounts also tell of a trial which Orestes must go through, but the location of the trial is not explicitly 
Athens or the Areopagus, nor does it have any aetiological implications. In other versions of the myth which, though 
later, may refer to an earlier pre-Oresteia version of the myth, the trial also has a jury composed of Clytemnestra’s 
relatives and/or some divinities, see Eur. Or. 1650-1652; Dem. 23.66; Aristid. Or. 1.48. 
341
 See Sommerstein 1989, 11; 2010, 145-146. 
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Erinyes will continue to allow themselves to be prevailed upon by suppliants for ages to come. In 
Aeschylus’ Eumenides, then, Athena resolves the Orestes story only through πειθώ, and, in the 
process of placating traditionally implacable deities, he embeds this same πειθώ in the Erinyes’ 
new nature and function. 
 
Parallel Myth (Eu. 723-730) 
 Athena’s persuasion at the end of the Eumenides seems to be foreshadowed in a narrative 
recounted at Eu. 723-730. In an emotionally-charged exchange, the Erinyes remind Apollo of his 
transgression—through a species of πειθώ—against elder divinities. Apollo, for the sake of 
Admetus, had beguiled the Moirae by getting them drunk.  
 This narrative forms part of an argument which takes place during the trial of Orestes. The 
Erinyes are trying—again—to prove Apollo wrong, this time by using an exemplum comparable to 
the present situation.
342
 Unlike the mirroring myths of the Agamemnon and Choephoroi, this story 
does not occur in extended song and, therefore, may not call the audience’s attention in the same 
way.
343
 Nonetheless, a closer examination of the scene and the entire passage in which this myth is 
framed reveals its impact and significance. It seems to both foreshadow and mirror the central 
action of the Eumenides: Athena’s persuasive beguilement of the Erinyes.  
 The context in which the Erinyes recount this tale could first invite the audience’s special 
attention. The story is told during the trial of Orestes in a moment of high suspense. While Apollo 
and the Erinyes bicker in these lines (Eu. 711-733), the jurors are casting their vote deciding 
Orestes immediate fate. Also, as a highly formalized set of couplets, these lines recall the frantic 
                                                          
342
 This might be identified as a paradigm myth “intended for exhortation” according to Willcock 1964, 142 and 
DeJong 1987. 
343
 For this reason, Rutherford omits this story from his examination of parallel myths (Rutherford 2007, 3-4). The ode 
of Eu. 490-565 is more comparable in size and position to the stasima of Ag. 385-411 and of Cho. 613-622; this ode, 
however, does not contain any narrative. See also Zweig 1982, 164. 
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and ineffective deliberation of the Chorus during the murder of Agamemnon (Ag. 1346-1371).
344
 
Similarly, here in the Eumenides the speakers are powerless to affect the happenings being staged. 
The outcomes of their argument make no difference to the action of the play. Thus their 
conversation and the myth contained within it, functions rather as a set-piece inviting a reaction 
from the audience such as a sense of anticipation for the more momentous clash which is to come 
(between Athena and the Erinyes). 
 The first ten lines of the couplet prefigure the emotional dynamics between the Erinyes and 
the younger gods which reach their climax when Athena confronts them at Eu. 778-891. In the 
couplet at Eu. 711-712, for instance, Erinyes’ threaten—for the first time in the play—to destroy 
the city and people of Athens, a threat which increasingly escalates (Eu. 780-787) until eventually 
met by Athena’s later responses. Answering this first couplet, moreover, Apollo argues in a way 
that demands fear and respect for Zeus (Eu. 713-714); Athena will use an almost identical 
argumentative technique with the Erinyes (Eu. 826-828), and with a similarly inconsequential 
result. In response to Apollo in this earlier passage, the Erinyes start to act in a contradictory and 
overwrought manner. The Erinyes deny Apollo the right to issue his oracles (Eu. 715-716), and, 
after Apollo mentions Zeus’ just and compassionate treatment of the murderer Ixion (Eu. 
717-718), they reply with more threats upon the land (Eu. 719-720).
345
  The Erinyes frenzied 
condition is something which will be perpetuated in their responses to Apollo’s half-sister, Athena, 
particularly at Eu. 778-792. 
 When Apollo responds with confidence that the jurors will vote in favor of Orestes, the 
Erinyes break down with an ad hominem argument. They accuse him with the story of his 
persuasive beguilement of the Moirae. This myth and Apollo’s response in the second half of the 
                                                          
344
 This observation is made by Sommerstein 1989, 221. 
345
 Ixion was the first mythological murderer of a kinsman (his father-in-law Eioneus). He, however, was pardoned by 
Zeus. Ixion committed yet another infraction and in the end received punishment. See Sommerstein 1989, 227. 
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couplet even more clearly mirrors the action of Athena towards the Erinyes later in the play: 
 Χορός 
 τοιαῦτ᾽ ἔδρασας καὶ Φέρητος ἐν δόμοις:  
 Μοίρας ἔπεισας ἀφθίτους θεῖναι βροτούς.  
 
 Ἀπόλλων 
 οὔκουν δίκαιον τὸν σέβοντ᾽ εὐεργετεῖν,   725 
 ἄλλως τε πάντως χὤτε δεόμενος τύχοι;  
 
 Χορός 
 σύ τοι παλαιὰς διανομὰς καταφθίσας  
 οἴνῳ παρηπάτησας ἀρχαίας θεάς.  
 
 Ἀπόλλων 
 σύ τοι τάχ᾽οὐκ ἔχουσα τῆς δίκης τέλος  
 ἐμῇ τὸν ἰὸν οὐδὲν ἐχθροῖσιν βαρύν.    730 
 
 Χορός 
 ἐπεὶ καθιππάζῃ με πρεσβῦτιν νέος,  
 δίκης γενέσθαι τῆσδ᾽ ἐπήκοος μένω,  
 ὡς ἀμφίβουλος οὖσα θυμοῦσθαι πόλει. (Aesch. Eu. 723-733) 
 
 Chorus:  
 You did such things also in the house of Pheres:  
 you convinced the Moirae to make men immortal. 
 
 Apollo:  
 Is it not just to do well to the one who reveres you,  
 in all circumstances and especially when he is in need of luck? 
 
 Chorus:  
 You destroyed the ancient allotment 
 After having beguiled ancient goddesses with wine. 
 
 Apollo:  
 When you fail to gain the final victory in the trial,  
 you will spew out your poison, nothing grievous to your enemies. 
 
 Chorus:  
 Since you, a younger god, would trample upon me in my old age,  
 I must stay here listening to what becomes of the trial 
 Since I am undecided whether to be angry with the state.  
 
The Erinyes tell their story about Apollo and the Moirae in a grossly exaggerated way. 
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Sommerstein comments that with the words ἀφθίτους…βροτούς (724), they “wildly accus[e] 
Apollo of making mortals immortal…when all he had done was to save one mortal from premature 
death.”346 In response to this untruth, Apollo responds in an uncharacteristically rational manner 
(729-730), foreshadowing yet again how Athena, another younger god, will approach the Erinyes 
with reason. While accusing Apollo through the story about the Moirae, the Erinyes themselves 
ignore logic, reason, and justice. They refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of Apollo’s points 
about suppliants’ rights (717-718, 725-726), and in doing so forget their own supposed concern 
with justice and their own personal status as foreigners—and, indeed, as suppliants—in Athens.347 
Athena, however, will pick up on these points later when she offers a warm welcome to them as 
resident aliens in exchange for their forgiveness of Orestes (851-852, 885-890). All in all then, 
these couplets and their mythological reference set the scene for the attitudes and arguments with 
which Athena and the Erinyes will clash before the end of the play.
348
  
 The content of the story of the Moirae, Apollo, and Admetus (Eu. 723-724, 727-728) also 
parallels the relationship and actions among the Erinyes, Athena, and Orestes. The Erinyes 
describe Apollo’s deed with the verb ἔπεισας (“you convinced,” 724). This is the same verb that 
Athena uses to describe what she is doing to the Erinyes in Eu. 794. In the second couplet of the 
current passage, the Erinyes use a different word, παρηπάτησας (“you beguiled,” 728), to lay 
blame on the sinister and degrading means which Apollo used to manipulate the Moirae. Also, by 
mentioning Apollo’s use of wine (οἴνῳ, 728) to accomplish the deed, the Erinyes emphasize their 
disapproval of young divinities dishonorably trampling the rights and respect due their elders.
349
 
                                                          
346
 Sommerstein 1989, 221. 
347
 Sommerstein notes that this is the first time in the trilogy where suppliants’ rights are clearly articulated and in a 
rational way, by Apollo, no less (1989, 221). 
348
 They also increase the tension between the two generation of gods and marking a shift in the play’s focus from 
Orestes to the Erinyes. 
349
 Wine is not attested in earlier accounts of the same story. It is likely an innovation. 
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The Erinyes voice this same complaint many times from this point forward (Eu. 731, 747, 778-79, 
837-846). But just as Apollo mollified the Moirae for the sake of Admetus, so also will Athena 
eventually convince the Erinyes to spare Orestes, accept his acquittal, and bring benefits to 
mankind.
350
 Like Orestes, Admetus in the story is in danger of death because of a transgression 
against the gods. Also like Orestes, Admetus appeals to one of the younger gods, Apollo.
351
 Just as 
Apollo persuades the Moirae with wine, Athena will beguile the Erinyes with instruments which 
have a similar effect: γλώσσης…μείλιγμα καὶ θελκτήριον (“the soothing charm and enchantment 
of the tongue,” Eu. 886). In these various ways, the deliberative couplets and parallel narrative at 
Eu. 711-733 look forward to the central event about to take place: the work of a benevolent and 
magically beguiling πειθώ. 
 
Enchanting Peitho (Eu. 885, 970) 
 Athena’s final and climactic work of beguilement in the Eumenides takes place under the 
auspices of a benign and relatively purified Peitho. She appears twice as a goddess in this last play 
and both times at crucial moments which highlight Athena’s persuasion at Eu. 778-891.  
 Peitho first appears in Athena’s last speech to the Erinyes, which takes place right before 
the stichomythia where the Erinyes submit to her entreaties (Eu. 892-902). Towards the beginning 
of her speech, Athena calls upon the Erinyes to reverence Peitho and to lay aside their anger in 
favor of her promises and their new honors as beneficent protective deities of the land: 
ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἁγνόν ἐστί σοι Πειθοῦς σέβας 
γλώσσης ἐμῆς μείλιγμα καὶ θελκτήριον, 
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 Aeschylus suggests many parallels between the Erinyes and their sisters, the Moirae. In the first place, “One of the 
most persistent claims made by the Erinyes is that they hold their office by the dispensation of Moira,” (Bailey 1962, 
126; see Eu .171, 208, 227, 334, 385, 391, 727). Secondly, in the ending songs of the Eumenides, the Erinyes 
themselves almost become identified with the Moirae (See Conacher 1987, 173); when the Erinyes are completely 
reconciled with Athena, the city, and Zeus, the handmaidens, singing in procession, explicitly says that Zeus works 
closely with the Moirae as well (Eu. 1045-46). 
351
 See also March 1998, 197. 
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σὺ δ᾽ οὖν μένοις ἄν·... (Aesch. Eu. 885-887) 
 
But if you have holy reverence for Peitho  
regarding the soothing charm and enchantment of my tongue,  
then you certainly might remain;… 
 
With these lines, Athena urges the Erinyes to adopt towards Peitho the same attitude of reverence 
which they demand for themselves.
352
 This Peitho, however, is no longer a menacing deity but a 
benevolent, holy one, who soothes, heals, charms, and bonds together.
353
 Thomson states: 
This is the spirit which tempted Agamemnon to commit the crime we have seen 
visited on him and his children; which tempted Paris to plunge the world in war; 
which was embodied in Helen and again in Clytemnestra, and was summoned to 
the support of Orestes when he plotted to kill his mother. Now the same spirit, 




It is, indeed, the same Peitho who has accompanied the main actions of “winning over” which have 
taken place throughout the trilogy, but now her mien is gentle and her influence for the good of the 
house of Atreus (and the entire nation) rather than for its ruin.
355
 It is no wonder, then, that seven 
lines after this invocation, the Erinyes open themselves up to reasoned discussion. Referring to 
Peitho’s influence as described by Athena above (Eu. 886), they exclaim: θέλξειν μ᾽ ἔοικας καὶ 
μεθίσταμαι κότου (“It seems likely that you will charm me, and I am shifting from my wrath,” Eu. 
900). Peitho, in the end, prevails, and brings the trilogy to a happy end for all. 
 Once the Erinyes have finally submitted, they sing in harmony with Athena and process off 
the stage. Their song (Eu. 916-1020) consists of six blessings in lekythion and syncopated 
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 At the same time, interestingly, Athena almost identifies herself (and her gentle speech) with this goddess. 
353
 This is part of a general trend, well commented upon, for the imagery of the Oresteia. Rutherford summarizes that 
“in the earlier plays, the imagery is used to express something sinister or even repulsive…By contrast in the third play, 
despite threatening signs at first, in the end the different images are purged of their dark associations,” (Rutherford 
2012, 130-131). 
354
 Thomson 1966, 65. 
355
 “Persuasion, then, is the mechanism which overcomes heroism and heroes and reduces them to the status of 
socially integrated citizenship. It accompanies love; it is wielded by demagogues, including tyrants. It implies bribery, 
and instruction; it bewitches, and helps to secure insight. In using Persuasion and appealing to her power, Athena 
employs the skills of an expert negotiator to break the resistance of the Furies and to apply the coup de grace to the old 
order of heroism and clan loyalty,” (Rosenmeyer 1982, 352).  
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iambic-trochaic meters interwoven with five intervening recitative anapests from Athena. At the 
midpoint of these alternating songs, Athena mentions Peitho one more time. The Chorus has just 
sung a stanza about preventing the death of young men and about fostering marriage (Eu. 
956-967). Athena responds with a song of thanksgiving for the Erinyes’ transformation: 
 …στέργω δ᾽ ὄμματα Πειθοῦς,  
ὅτι μοι γλῶσσαν καὶ στόμ᾽ ἐπωπᾷ  
πρὸς τάσδ᾽ ἀγρίως ἀπανηναμένας: (Aesch. Eu. 970-973) 
 
I am grateful to the eyes of Peitho, 
that kept watch over my tongue and mouth 
when I encountered their fierce refusal. 
 
Athena herself offers reverence and acknowledgment of Peitho’s agency in her task of persuasion. 
It is specifically due to to this now-gentle deity that she and the Erinyes can sing together as friends 
and co-beneficiaries of Athens.  
 Aeschylus then, not only again makes the main action of the Eumenides one of πειθώ, but 
he also emphasizes πειθώ through choral narratives and in these two invocations of the personified 
goddess at Eu. 885 and 970. Peitho appears at the climax of Athena’s persuasive process and then 
again at its fulfillment: the successful and joyous integration of the Erinyes into Athenian society. 
She is one of the last goddesses mentioned in the Oresteia and indeed, without her, the play itself 
could have hardly been conclusive or convincing. 
 
IV. Conclusion  
 Through the main action, parallel narratives, and personified representation of the goddess 
Peitho in the Agamemnon, Chorephoroi, and Eumenides, Aeschylus gives dramatic prominence to 
πειθώ throughout the entire Oresteia. At the same time, he presents aspects of πειθώ which vary 
from ruin and trickery to enchanting benevolence. Aeschylus’ new conceptualizations of πειθώ 
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emerge as central to the theme and action of this important drama; and throughout the 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Πειθώ and Athena’s Rhetoric at Eumenides 778-891 
 
I. Introduction 
 Aeschylus stages the last scene of the Oresteia (Eu. 778-891) with distinct dramatic 
prominence as an extremely suspenseful and resounding conclusion to the entire trilogy. And in an 
unprecedented display of persuasion, Athena convinces the enraged Erinyes to change their entire 
worldview and submit to the jurisdiction of Zeus, herself, and the goddess Peitho, in a new regime. 
Aeschylus also presents Athena’s speeches as something to be understood in terms of the πειθώ 
which he has used and displayed throughout the trilogy: with force, trickery, and benign 
beguilement. Thus he frames Athena’s work by frequent and ostensible reference to πειθώ, both in 
verb form and as a goddess. Aeschylus constructs her speeches with such craft that they seem to 
anticipate, in practice, what Aristotle’s Rhetoric will later classify, in theory, as effectively-argued, 
well-structured, deliberative speech. With this self-consciously crafted work of πειθώ at 
Eumenides 778-891, Aeschylus resolves his entire dramatic trilogy. 
 
II. The Prominence of Athena's Πειθώ in Eumenides 778-891 
 At Eumenides 778-891, Aeschylus dramatizes a face-off between the younger and older 
generations of gods, and the resolution of a seemingly endless cycle of blood guilt and revenge in 
the Oresteia. In this scene Athena addresses the Chorus of Erinyes, goddesses notorious for 
wreaking vengeance against those guilty of crimes against kin. Orestes has just been acquitted for 
the murder of his mother, Clytemnestra. The Erinyes lament the injustice of this verdict, consider it 
a personal offense, and threaten to retaliate by obliterating the city. Athena, then, must convince 
these goddesses to submit to the court decision and relent from their anger. At stake are the 
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establishment of the law court, the preservation of Athens, and a peaceful pact between variant 
generations of gods.
356
 By virtue of this speech’s climactic placement and conclusive role, its 
significance is undeniable. 
 There are two specific ways in which Aeschylus highlights this scene and invites his 
audience to immerse themselves within it. First, he uses a number of staging techniques which 
focus attention on the scene itself. Secondly, he gives Athena’s task special prominence because of 
its great urgency and enduring effect: she must not only get the Erinyes to do something, but to 
acquiesce to a new role within the world. The Erinyes’ new role, moreover, will involve complete 
submission to the jurisdiction of Zeus, to herself, and to Peitho. The dynamics of this scene 
heighten its dramatic interest for the audience and prompt deeper engagement with the idea and 
action of πειθώ which Athena’s work displays. 
 
A. The Scene in Performance 
 Aeschylus uses various dramatic techniques to prepare for the last scene in general, and to 
the encounter between Athena and the Erinyes in particular. Unexpected character exits together 
with the emotional tenor and prolongation of the conflict give Eumenides 778-891 an intensity 
which invites audience members to immerse themselves in the dialogue which ensues. 
 
A New Section of the Play 
 The audience’s attention is first focused on the scene by an abrupt break in the action 
caused by the unexpected exit of Apollo and Orestes and the immediate shift to the Erinyes’ 
                                                          
356
 On the thematic resolution of this last act, see Lebeck 1971, 131-133; Taplin 1977, 409-415; Rehm 1992, 106-108; 
Sommerstein 2010, 180-181; for political implications see Porter 2005, 248; Pelling 2007, 83-100; Rynearson 2013, 2; 
for its resolving effect on the audience (whether or not the resolution is real) see Rosenmeyer 1982, 347; Rabinowitz 
2008, 108; Mitchell-Boyask 2009, 88. 
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lament at Eu. 778. This break is noteworthy for two reasons. In the first place, as Taplin notes, 
between one act and another there would usually be an “act-dividing song;” but, instead of 
marking the event with a “detached stasimon,” the Chorus of Erinyes turn directly to their own 
concerns about the trial.
357
 This structural alteration is not only unique in the Oresteia, but in all of 
extant tragedy, and would thereby prompt greater audience attention to the next scene.
358
 
Secondly, the main protagonists, Apollo and Orestes, instead of remaining on stage until the end of 
the Eumenides, seem to exit at Eu. 777, immediately before this last scene. Taplin considers this 
abrupt exit to be: 
 …a remarkable twist and reversal of the usual pattern of the suppliant play…For 
usually….the pursuer [in this case, the Erinyes] has to be rebuffed and sent packing 





What follows is a new section, a final unit almost a third of the length of the entire play. Taplin 
comments: “Whether or not Aeschylus or his audience would see the transition as marking a new 
μέρος, they would recognize the formal shaping effect within the play.”360 With these dramatic 
techniques, Aeschylus shifts the focus from Apollo and Orestes to Erinyes and Athena, and 
prompts the audience to attend closely to the clash between with these deities. 
 
A Riveting Clash  
 Aeschylus presents this scene as emotional in the extreme, thereby calling even greater 
attention to it. The degree of emotion present in this scene can be helpfully analyzed with 
conceptual tools developed in particular by Mastronade in Contact and Discontinuity (1979): 
The relationship of contact (or lack thereof) between a tragic character and other 
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 Ibid, 407. 
360
 Ibid, 408. 
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characters or the chorus or the imaginary locus created by the dramatists’ words is 
frequently indicative of social and psychological forces important to the dramatic 




In an extreme case of lack of contact (what Mastronarde calls “discontinuity”), the Erinyes here 
wail and lament in frenzied lyrics while Athena responds with rational iambs. This remarkable 
clash, I argue, intensifies the audience’s suspense. Andujar states that this contrast in musical form 
is something which playwrights use as “a crucial frame within which to stage problems of 
communication.”362 As other scholars point out, Aeschylus further underscores the Chorus’ 
inability to conduct dialogue by having them repeat their howls verbatim, twice over.
363
 
Rutherford, for instance, points out that these passages “include passionate exclamations and 
angry questions; there is no argument, only unconnected cries of outrage, with hardly a connecting 
particle in sight.”364 Athena herself draws attention to the stress of the situation by repeatedly 
remarking on the Erinyes’ frenzy (Eu. 794, 848, 881).365 Extremely distraught, the Erinyes will 
not—or perhaps cannot—communicate.  
 Further emphasis on the lack of contact in this scene arises from the Erinyes’ failure to 
respond directly to any of Athena’s remarks. For example, in their first song, the Erinyes omit any 
reference to previous events and dwell on their own concerns: ἰὼ θεοὶ νεώτεροι, παλαιοὺς νόμους 
/ καθιππάσασθε κἀκ χερῶν εἵλεσθέ μου (“Oh, younger gods, you have trampled underfoot the 
ancient laws and have snatched them from my hands for yourselves,” Eu. 808-809). After two 
speeches from Athena, the Erinyes refuse to respond. Instead, they open their lyrics with laments: 
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 Mastronarde 1979, 4. 
362
 Andujar 2011, 207. Cf. iambic trimeter and dochmiacs at Ag.1071-1197 between Cassandra and the Chorus. 
Thanks to Victor Bers for pointing this out in a personal correspondence. 
363
 On verbatim repetition, see Lloyd-Jones 1970, 62; Mitchell-Boyask 2009, 88. Mastronarde characterizes Eu. 
778-891 as an example of extreme discontinuity which communicates an emotion intensity that, in Aeschylus, is only 
matched perhaps in Aesch. Sept. 250-257. See Mastronarde 1979, 2-3, 76. Rosenmeyer calls this “uneven/broken 
contact,” (Rosenmeyer 1982, 206). See also Sommerstein 1989, 240.  
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 Rutherford 2012, 254.   
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 See Taplin 1972, 58, 96-97; 1977, 318. 
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ἐμὲ παθεῖν τάδε, φεῦ (“For me to suffer these things—woe!” Eu. 837-839). Mastronarde terms 
opening lines which ignore the words of the other interlocutor “apostrophaic.” He suggests that 
apostrophaic choral openings affect the audience, prompting them to form their own judgment of 
the situation.
366
     
 While other instances of character interaction in Aeschylus also feature a discontinuous 
and vague interaction between characters, few are as sharply and emotionally discontinuous as this 
scene in the Eumenides. One possible exception is scene between Cassandra and Clytemnestra in 
the Agamemnon. Here, as with the Erinyes at Eu.778-891, Cassandra’s non-communicative 
status—caused by a trance, not a passing emotion—is repeatedly commented upon by characters 
on the stage (Ag.1050-1053,1060-1061). Such an exhibition of discontinuity prompts Taplin to 
remark that “Her silence…is the centre of dramatic attention.”367 Mastronarde suggests that as a 
result of this break in contact, the “mystified” audience will likely think more about Cassandra’s 
enigmatic behavior and speech.
368
 Others think that this scene prompts the audience to question 
the end results of Cassandra’s puzzling reports of visions.369 It seems that something similar could 
be said for the exchange between Athena and the Erinyes in Eu. 778-891: the high emotional level 
of the conflict likely aroused concern and wonder about the outcome of the conflict.  
 
A Prolonged Conflict 
 Aeschylus extends this emotional conflict over a significant number of lines, another 
feature which calls attention to the scene.
370
 More commonly, Aeschylus relegates inter-character 
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 See Mastronarde 2010, 148-149; 1979, 74; also Taplin 1972, 78, 96; Fraenkel 1950, 485; Kitto 1939, 75-76. 
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 Taplin 1977, 318. See also Mastronarde 1979, 78. Gow argues that the lack of communication in the Cassandra 
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 Mastronarde 1979, 74. 
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 Taplin 1972, 78; 96; Kitto 1939, 75-76; also Knox 1979, 39-55. 
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 See Taplin 1977, 409. 
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encounters to short, punctuated exchanges. At Agamemnon 931-94 Clytemnestra works her wiles 
upon Agamemnon primarily through stichomythia. Likewise, the Chorus of the Choephoroi 
persuades the nurse to fetch Aegisthus with a pithy exchange (Cho. 766-783); and Clytemnestra 
begs Orestes to spare her life in one-line pleas (Cho. 892-929). At Eumenides 778-891, however, 
Athena and the Erinyes address each other for over a hundred lines in full speeches or songs 
averaging about thirteen or fourteen lines each.
371
 Taplin points out that “Aeschylus signals the 
importance of the last scene (Eu. 778-1047) by making it longer than the trial itself.”372 The 
extended nature of the exchange between these goddesses is yet another indication of its 
significance. Through this technique, Aeschylus again invites his spectators to shift their attention 
from the previous scene, the trial of Orestes, to a riveting, drawn-out clash between Athena and the 
Chorus of Erinyes. This emotional engagement also displays a remarkable work of πειθώ. 
 
B. Athena's Purpose and Approach 
 Among all the moments of persuasion in the Oresteia, Athena’s persuasion of the Erinyes 
stands out as unique. Athena’s task throughout Eumenides 778-891 is to convince the Erinyes to 
change their entire conviction whereby persons guilty of crimes against kin fully deserve 
punishment (and often, their descendants after them). She must get them to accept a different 
social order, and a newly established court system wherein such criminals can be acquitted by 
vote. Finally, she must implictrly convince them of the goodness of a regime where such a system 
of justice is central, where Peitho trumps force, and where younger deities hold sway. Finally, she 
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 Athena’s speeches (Eu. 794-807, 824-836, 847-869, 881-891) are fourteen, thirteen, twenty-two, and eleven lines 
long, respectively. The Erinyes’ responding laments (Eu. 778-793, 808-823, 837-847, 870-880) are fifteen, fifteen, ten 
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must entice them to adopt a different way of life, residing beneath Athens in a predominantly 
beneficent role, rather than one that exclusively metes out vengeance. The immensity and depth of 
Athena’s persuasion project, together with the attentive approach which she takes in carrying it 
out, can hardly compare to the other instances of persuasion which Aeschylus has staged 
previously in the Oresteia. Aeschylus has carefully crafted Athena’s work to be especially 
noteworthy. 
 Some contrasting examples of persuasive encounters can be found in the Agamemnon. 
Clytemnestra’s persuasion of Agamemnon has been discussed at length above.373 In contrast with 
the grand purpose of Athena, Clytemnestra’s goal was relatively straightforward: to get her 
husband to walk on the tapestries. Also, her success is accomplished primarily through a short 
series of stichomythic lines by contrast with Athena’s drawn-out argumentation. The scene where 
Clytemnestra tries to persuade Cassandra to enter the house is a bit more lengthly. Yet this scene 
too pales before Eu. 778-891. In this scene, Clytemnestra issues a series of sharp commands (Ag. 
1035, 1047-1049, 1053) which do not require crafted argument; and, again, her ultimate goal is 
simply to convince someone (Cassandra) to come inside the house. Cassandra will eventually 
perform this action, but not as a result of Clytemnestra’s persuasive wiles; rather, because 
Cassandra, as a prophetess, sees and accepts her fate. 
 The Choephoroi, too, offers little by comparison with Athena’s project in terms of its 
purpose and import as a work of argumentative persuasion. The speech segments of the kommos 
exceed the length of the speech exchange between Athena and the Erinyes; and, similarly, they aim 
at the persuasion of Orestes to affirm his murderous resolve against Clytemnestra. Yet, as a ritual 
lament, persuasion is not the primary end of the kommos.
374
 Also, the persuasion in which the 
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 Sansone writes in a personal correspondence that “The ostensible purpose of the kommos is to arouse the spirit of 
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Chorus and Electra engage does not involve a dramatic change in Orestes’ world view or 
lifestyle.
375
 For all of these reasons, the kommos stands as a significant exchange of speech, but 
one in which persuasion is a secondary concern.
376
 
 The speeches of Athena at Eu. 778-891 also far surpass other attempts at persuasion in the 
Eumenides. Take, for instance, the argument between Apollo and the Erinyes at the trial of 
Orestes.
377
 Although at Eu. 609-673 the Erinyes and Apollo engage in a sharp and lengthy 
exchange over Orestes and his case, neither party seems to care for winning over the other.
378
 Part 
of the reason for this lies in the nature of the trial. As a trial by oath, the defense and the 
prosecution do not so much seek to persuade each other or offer evidence to support their claims 
for or against Orestes.
379
 Since the trial is going to be resolved by ballot, speeches at the trial are 
not aimed at convincing the other about wider considerations. Consequently, at the trial 
interlocutors hurl insults at each other, ad hominem arguments, claims of self-defense, and other 
generalizing assertions.
380
 Also, the arguments which Apollo presents in defense of Orestes are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Agamemnon and enlist his aid, but the scene also serves the purpose of psyching up the participants and also 
displaying to the gods the justice of their claims.” 
375
 Rutherford 2012, 250 argues that Orestes was already pretty set on murdering his mother due to Apollo’s earlier 
persuasion. Bers (personal correspondence) points out, however, that Orestes does not seem fully resolved until his 
exchange with Pylades (Cho. 899-903). 
376
 For this reason, some scholars speculate that it must be by some other power, then, that Orestes emerges from the 
kommos more fully committed to his vengeful deed. This, according to Rosenmeyer, is some sort of vague “mutual 
influencing…understanding and contagion,” (Rosenmeyer 1982, 247). Several scholars also note the surprising lack 
of “contact” between the characters singing the kommos. This is most likely due to the ritual purpose of the piece. 
Rosenmeyer, for example, notes that the utterances of Orestes, Electra, and the Chorus “are not, for the most part, 
either formally or in their substance addressed to the partners,” (Rosenmeyer 1982, 247). Most of the questions which 
the singers ask could be classed as “aporetic” or “agnoetic”: the types of questions which express doubt about 
contemplated action but function primarily as utterances about one’s puzzling predicament (aporia) which do not 
expect an answer (Mastronarde 1979, 10-11). 
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 Kane (1986, 107) classifies both the trial scene and Eu. 778-891 as agones. The trial scene has been discussed 
briefly already in Chapter Three Section III. 
378
 Ireland claims that “Between Apollo and the Erinyes no resolution of the issue is possible; that much is ensured by 
the degree of antipathy that separates them,” (Ireland 1986, 29). 
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question and answer format of the procedure.  
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 On Apollo’s insulting comment at Eu. 644, Sommerstein writes: “The vulgarity of Apollo’s reaction is without 
parallel in tragedy,” (Sommerstein 1989, 204). Some scholars think that Apollo’s attempt at argument is a parody 
 117  
specious at best, and, at worst, provocative towards the prosecution.
381
    
 Whether or not Aeschylus intends Athena’s persuasive work at Eu. 778-891 to be 
contrasted with other instances of persuasion throughout the Oresteia, her persuasive speeches are 
recognizably distinct.
382
 Hence the movement of the drama shifts to focus on them and their 
results. The audience discovers, that, as Winnington-Ingram puts it, “[t]here is a problem to be 
solved in Eumenides which lies deeper than the mere fate of Orestes.”383 Athena’s work of 
persuasion is momentous for the Oresteia and outstanding in its scope. Athena must face and 
address Erinyes’ perception of the world and their place within it.384  
 In order to measure up to the occasion, Athena must achieve an approach that is personal, 
attentive, and engaged. She gives the Erinyes full acknowledgment of their distress: ἐμοὶ πίθεσθε 
μὴ βαρυστόνως φέρειν (“Be persuaded by me to not bear it with heavy groaning,” Eu. 794), and 
even seems to show empathy with their frustrations: ὀργὰς ξυνοίσω σοι· (“I will bear with you in 
your anger;” Eu. 848).385 Sensitive to their frenzied state, Athena allows the Erinyes to emote 
before addressing the legitimate and objective issues which they raise.
386
 Athena’s contact with 
her interlocutors remains full and continuous throughout: she carefully responds to the Erinyes’ 
questions, even if they are not looking for a response. For instance, when the Erinyes in the first 
two laments repeat: τί ῥέξω; (“What shall I do?” Eu. 788; 818), Athena gives them concrete 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Rosenmeyer 1955, 258; 1982, 362; Lebeck 1971, 135). 
381
 On Apollo’s arguments or lack thereof, see Sommerstein 1989, 204, 208. Also, Winnington-Ingram 1983, 124. 
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 On a different note, Sansone observes: “The speeches of Athena have no counterpart in the actual practice of the 
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of law,” (personal correspondence). 
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 Winnington-Ingram 1983, 164. 
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 Through these speeches, Athena must effectively civilize and integrate the Erinyes into Athenian society. For 
discussion on the civilizing efficacy of Athena’s peitho, see Porter 2005, 301-331; McClure 1997, 140; 
Winningtam-Ingram 1983, 169; Rosenmeyer 1982, 352; Rabinowitz 1981, 183. For more on this process and what it 
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 Also, she says: οὔτοι καμοῦμαί σοι λέγουσα τἀγαθά (“Indeed I shall not tire of telling you these good things,” Eu. 
881). 
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 See Athena’ responses at Eu.796-799, 804-807, discussed in Section V below.  
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imperatives: ἐμοὶ πίθεσθε (Eu. 794) and μηδὲ…σκήψητε…μὴ θυμοῦσθε, μηδ…τεύξητ᾽… (Eu. 
801-802).
387
 Athena leaves no question unanswered and she provides specific directives and 
suggestions as part of her personal, deliberate and (ultimately) successful persuasion. In both her 
basic approach and long-term goal, Athena’s work of persuasion would likely strike the audience 
as particularly powerful. 
 
C. Speeches Framed by Πειθώ  
 As an additional touch, Aeschylus frames the climactic encounter between Athena and the 
Erinyes in terms of πειθώ. In both verb form and as a goddess, πειθώ occurs several times 
throughout the scene. 
 Athena herself uses the verb πείθω to describe her action and its intended result in the 
Erinyes.
388
 In the first line of the speech, she says: 
 ἐμοὶ πίθεσθε μὴ βαρυστόνως φέρειν. (Aesch. Eu. 794) 
 
 Be persuaded by me to not bear it with heavy groaning. 
 
Early on in her next speech, she again utters the verbal form, urging the Erinyes to “trust” 
(πέποιθα, Eu. 826)—as she does—in Zeus. Three lines later, Athena repeats her request, though a 
bit less explicitly, when she suggests that the Erinyes be εὐπιθής (“well-persuaded/obedient,” 
Eu. 829) to her in this matter.   
 In a sort of ring-composition, Athena will finish her persuasive work with a gracious nod 
and song of thanksgiving to the goddess Peitho. She asks the Erinyes to revere her with the phrase: 
ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἁγνόν ἐστί σοι Πειθοῦς σέβας (“But if you have holy reverence for Peitho,” Eu. 
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 See above and also Eu. 824-825, 830. 
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 See Chapter Two Section III for an analysis of all the same passages to be discussed below. The previous analysis 
contains more of the surrounding text and presents these references to πείθω with a different focus for the argument of 
the chapter. 
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885-887). With these words, Athena once more acknowledges Peitho’s crucial role in her work. 
She further confirms her debt to Peitho in a lyric stanza after she has won over the Erinyes: στέργω 
δ᾽ ὄμματα Πειθοῦς (“I am grateful to the eyes of Peitho,” Eu. 970). With these references, 
Aeschylus effectively frames Eumenides 778-891 in terms of πειθώ. 
  Athena’s work of πειθώ at Eu. 778-891 also seems also to anticipate the Aristotelian 
conception of well-structured and successfully-argued deliberative rhetoric. Aeschylus’ display of 
a sophisticated argumentation in speech framed by πειθώ, is, I argue, yet another way the 
playwright contributes to the development of rhetoric. He not only resolves a complicated civic 
and political issue through πειθώ, but he does it with πειθώ of carefully crafted public speech. 
 
III. The Aristotelian Model 
 Before analyzing Athena’s persuasive work for the way it anticipates Aristotelian 
principles of rhetorical speech, a word must be said about Aristotle’s model. Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
holds a special position in the history of rhetoric as the earliest extant theoretical presentation of 
the art. His text is also one of the most comprehensive explications of rhetoric from the fifth and 
fourth centuries BCE.
389
 As a collection of scholarly notes on the topic composed between 
350-336 BCE, Aristotle’s Rhetoric explicates or compiles the theory from practices of dramatists 
and sophists; he gives underlying principles for the techniques found in texts and the model speech 
handbooks of his predecessors. Aristotle compiled his Rhetoric from his knowledge of these older 
sources: the sophists, court speeches, and most extensively, tragic dialogue.
390
 For this reason, 
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Aristotle’s text is important and relevant to a study of Aeschylean speeches. 
 Aristotle’s theoretical conception of rhetoric also makes his text an excellent lens with 
which to examine speech in early tragedy.
391
 At the beginning of the Rhetoric, Aristotle puts forth 
this definition: ἕστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν (“Let 
rhetoric be the ability, in each case, to see the available means of persuasion,”Arist. Rh. 1355b 
25-26, tr. Kennedy).
392
 Sansone and Kennedy suggest that the theoretical perspective of his model 
is evident from the use of θεωρῆσαι (to see), the root of the word “theory.”393 His 
conceptualization of this art and its exercise differs from that of those who merely compiled model 
speeches for memorization and imitation. Aristotle considers any art (τεχνή), such as rhetoric, to 
be a virtue of thought (Nic.Eth. 1139b15, 1140a20-21). He explains: ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ 
γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι 
(“All art deals with bringing some thing into existence; and to pursue an art means to study 
[theorize about] how to bring into existence a thing which may either exist or not,” Nic. Eth. 
1140a10-14, tr. Rackham). According to Aristotle, the δύναμις of rhetoric, when acted upon with 
the appropriate knowledge and skill, will produce rhetorical speech.
394
 Aristotle gives pride of 
place to the conceptual abilities of a true rhetor; only at the end of the Rhetoric does he append 
some practical details on structure, style, and delivery of the speech. 
  Soon after defining rhetoric, Aristotle discusses the content (or topics) appropriate to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2007, 37. Nevertheless, since Aristotle only mentions Aeschylus once in his Rhetoric, these observations, while 
interesting, may not be entirely helpful for this particular project. 
391
 Kennedy remarks that “Aristotle was the first person to give serious consideration… to defining the relationship 
between the various disciplines of the arts and sciences [rhetoric being among them],” Kennedy 2007, 16. For 
example, Aristotle classifies rhetoric as an art closely affiliated with politics, (Arist. Nic.Eth.1094a26-1094b3; also 
Rh. 1356a25-26, 30-33). 
392
 See also Topics 6.12.149b26-28. All translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in this dissertation are taken from 
Kennedy 2007 unless otherwise noted. Kennedy translates τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν as “what is inherently and 
potentially persuasive,” (Kennedy 2007, 37). 
393
 See Kennedy 2007, 16; Sansone 2012, 23-30. 
394
 See Kennedy 2007, 37. 
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different situations where speech is required. Aristotle names three different types of speech, 
deliberative, judicial, and epideictic (συμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν, Arist. 
Rh.1358b7-8) based on their different situations and audiences. Continuing, Aristotle says that 
deliberative, judicial, and epideictic speech also possess other characteristics: time (future, past or 
present), manner (exhortation, accusation or praise etc) and an ultimate end or purpose (to 
convince their audience of the advantageous, the just, or the honorable, respectively).
395
 Aristotle 
also expounds the specific topics that are appropriate to each kind of speech. Deliberative speech 
discusses topics of a political or ethical nature; judicial speech addresses issues of wrongdoing, 
justice, and injustice; epideictic speech deals with vice, virtue, the honorable, and the shameful 
(Rh.1359a30-1377b11). 
 After examining the classes of speech more generally, Aristotle discusses the πίστεις (Rh. 
1355b35). These πίστεις396 are part of what he means by the “available means of persuasion” (τὸ 
ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν) at Rh.1355b26. Aristotle classes these means of persuasion as atechnic (αἱ 
ἄτεχνοι) otherwise known as “non-artistic” or “extrinsic;” and entechnic (αἱ ἔντεχνοι) often 
translated as “artistic” or “internal” (Rh. 1355b35).397 Extrinsic means of persuasion come from 
pre-existing external evidence such as laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, or oaths (νόμοι, 
μάρτυρες, συνθῆκαι, βάσανοι, ὅρκοι, Rh.1375a24-25).398 Internal means of persuasion are “those 
which can be prepared by method and by us” (ὅσα διὰ τῆς μεθόδου καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν κατασκευασθῆναι 
δυνατόν, Rh. 1355b38). Aristotle classifies the three internal means of persuasion as ethos, pathos, 
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“extrinsic,” and entechnic as “internal.” 
398
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 τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἔστιν· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ 
ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ 
διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι… (Rh. 1356a1-4) 
 
 Of the pisteis provided through speech there are three species; for some are in the 
character of the speaker, and some in disposing the listener in some way, and some 
in the speech itself, by showing or seeming to show something… (tr. Kennedy). 
 
Explaining further, Kennedy writes that these three means of persuasion are: 
…derived from presenting the character (ethos) of the speaker in a favorable light, 
[from] awakening emotion (pathos) in the audience so as to induce them to make 
the judgment desired, [and from] showing the probability of what is said by logical 




With mastery of these intellectual skills, the orator is fully equipped to thoughtfully utilize speech 
to persuade his interlocutors. 
 Aristotle relegates any discussion of speech structure or stylistic devices to the very end of 
his text (approximately between Rh. 1404a-1420b), almost as if it were an afterthought. Many 
scholars (and, indeed, also the early sophists and handbook writers) considered the parts of speech 
as essential to any presentation of rhetoric.
401
 Aristotle, however, begs to differ. He briefly skims 
delivery and style, and then ends with some discussion of the necessary parts of a speech: the 
prooemium, refutatio (ways of meeting a prejudicial attack or diabole), narration, the proof, 
interrogation, and the epilogue.
402
 But ultimately, as he lays it out in his Rhetoric, the only truly 
necessary parts of a speech are the propositions (the topics appropriate for deliberative, judicial or 
epideictic speech) and the means of persuasion discussed above (ἀναγκαῖα ἄρα μόρια πρόθεσις 
καὶ πίστις, Rh. 1414b7-8). Aristotle works from a broad definition of rhetoric where types of 
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 Kennedy 2007, 111. Aristotle says that the two basic methods of argumentation by logos are enthymeme 
(ἐνθύμημα, Rh. 1356b8) and example (παράδειγμα, Rh. 1356b8). 
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 See Mastronarde 2010, 209-210. 
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speech and the basic modes of persuasion are primary. While he briefly touches on style, delivery, 
and the partitions of a speech,
403
 these elements—which are very often misconstrued as 
constituting the essence of rhetoric—take second place.404 For all these reasons, the Rhetoric can 
provide a retrospective lens for understanding the nuanced construction of Athena’s speeches in 
the Eumenides. 
 All this being said, Aristotle’s insights certainly cannot and do not fully describe the 
persuasive techniques of Aeschylean tragedy. My analysis does not attempt to measure Aeschylus 
in terms of a discipline which had not yet fully developed. Nor does it assume that the Aristotelian 
model is the only measure for rhetoric in antiquity. Nonetheless, due to its comprehensiveness and 
clear categorizations, Aristotle’s rhetorical model can shed light on the basic principles which 
seem to be illustrated by the speech presentation of Eumenides 778-891. More specifically, as shall 
be seen, the content of Athena’s speeches seems to anticipate what Aristotle would later call 
“deliberative rhetoric,” and the way in which she structures her approach to the Erinyes 
anticipates, as it were, Aristotle’s three internal means of persuasion: ethos, pathos, and logos. 
 
IV. Athena's work as Deliberative Speech 
 At Eu. 778-891, Athena must convince the Erinyes to calm down, start thinking, and 
engage in fruitful dialogue about what will be most advantageous for all the persons involved in 
the present situation. In these and other ways, her speech anticipates what Aristotle will later call 
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 Style and delivery are discussed at Rh. 1403b1-1414b. 
404
 Not only does Aristotle refuse to give stylistic technique and speech pride of place, but he also does not consider 
logical enthymemes absolutely essential to rhetoric. As Kennedy comments, Aristotle admits that rhetoric often is 
“addressed to an audience that cannot be assumed to follow intricate logical argument,” (Kennedy 2007, 42). Also, 
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Aristotle’s presentation of rhetoric can be a useful one for examining early indications of rhetorical speech in 
Aeschylus. 
 124  
deliberative speech. Other characteristics of her speech, including the topics Athena chooses to 
address, likewise support my assessment of Eu. 778-891 as a work of persuasion anticipating 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 
 While Aristotle will describe the time, manner, and end of deliberative speech 
theoretically, Aeschylus presents these qualities, in practice, in Athena’s speeches. Athena’s 
concerns are for the future. As shall be seen throughout her speeches, she presents the Erinyes with 
future goods and promises in order to win them over. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle considers such a 
forward-looking vision to be typical of deliberative speech (Rh. 1358b14). Athena also anticipates 
Aristotle’s deliberative speech because the manner of her approach consists both of exhortation 
and dissuasion, or as Aristotle would phrase it: protreptic and apotreptic (τὸ μὲν προπροπή, τὸ δὲ 
ἀποτροπή, Rh. 1358b15). Finally, her ultimate goal or end is to convey and convince the Erinyes of 
what will be truly advantageous (τὸ συμφέρον, Rh. 1358b22) for all involved, particularly for the 
Erinyes. To this end, moreover, Athena emphasizes the benefit the Erinyes will reap from 
remaining as beneficent deities in Athens, but at the same time, she contrasts this offer with the 
harmful, namely, the Erinyes’ nostalgia for Athens if they leave.405 In order to further build up the 
advantageous, Athena presents the good that will result to the Erinyes and avoids discussing the 
justice of the court’s decision about Orestes. Aristotle notes that by making other factors merely 
“incidental” (πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, Rh.1358b 24-25) or perhaps by not even mentioning 
them at all, the speaker can make the συμφέρον that much more effective in deliberative speech. 
 Aristotle’s Rhetoric also discusses a number of topics common to deliberative speech:406  
 σχεδὸν γάρ, περὶ ὧν βουλεύονται πάντες καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγορεύουσιν οἱ 
συμβουλεύοντες, τὰ μέγιστα τυγχάνει πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν περί 
τε πόρων, καὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας, καὶ τῶν 
                                                          
405
 See Aristotle on the harmful, τὸ βλαβερόν, Rh.1358b22. 
406
 Kennedy 2007, 52 entitles this section (Rh. 1359b19-1360a25): “Book One Chapter 4: Political Topics for 
Deliberative Rhetoric.” 
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εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἐξαγομένων, καὶ νομοθεσίας. (Rh. 1359b19-23)  
  
 The most important subjects on which people deliberate and on which deliberative 
orators give advice in public are mostly five in number, and these are finances, war 
and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws (tr. 
Kennedy).  
 
Athena, the jurors and even the audience all share a concern for the city of Athens, whose fate the 
Erinyes threaten. They are in a distinctly political situation; the Athenian citizenry (both the jurors 
on the stage and the audience in the theater) watch Athena at work. Thus, a central topic of 
Athena’s speech is the defense of the city (περί φυλακῆς τὴς χώρας, Rh. 1359b20). She constantly 
rebukes the Erinyes’ desire to ruin Athens and its citizens. Athena, ultimately, must convince the 
foreign Erinyes to adopt and protect Athens as their own. The main way she does this is by 
promising the Erinyes that the Athenian people will welcome and love them if they acquiesce. 
 By proposing to the Erinyes what will bring them happiness, Athena again anticipates the 
Aristotelian model of deliberative speech. Aristotle claims that any attempt to exhort or dissuade 
must be rooted in an appeal to the interlocutors’ innate desire for happiness because what is good 
and brings happiness will be perceived by the interlocutors as the most advantageous.
407
 Aristotle 
states that to some people, happiness consists in “the pleasantest life combined with security” (ὁ 
βίος ὁ μετὰ ἀσφαλείας ἥδιστος, Rh.1360b1). Whether or not the Erinyes care for security, Athena 
does promise this to them, together with a pleasant life: εὖ δρῶσαν, εὖ πάσχουσαν, εὖ τιμωμένην / 
χώρας μετασχεῖν τῆσδε θεοφιλεστάτης (“acting well, being well, honored well, you can have a 
portion of this god-beloved land,” Eu. 868-69). Athena also appeals to Erinyes’ desire for 
possessions, reputation, honor, and friendship.
408
 As if closely tracking Athena’s efforts, the 
                                                          
407
 Such topics of discussion are categorized by Kennedy 2007, 56 as “ethical.” 
408
 For Athena’s attempt to appeal to their desire for wealth see Aesch. Eu. 834, 857, 869, 890-91 and Arist. Rh. 
1361a13-24); for her reference to their good reputation see Eu. 853; 868-69 and Rh.1361a25-27; for her emphasis on 
the honor they will receive, see Eu. 807, 834, 854, 891 and Rh.1361a28-1361b1; and for possible new friendships see 
Eu. 833, 855 and Rh. 1361b35-38. 
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Rhetoric continues: 
 καὶ τὰ ἴδια…καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα αὐτοῖς: τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος 
καὶ δύναμιν,…καὶ ὧν ἐλλείπειν οἴονται… καὶ πρὸς ἃ εὐφυεῖς εἰσιν καὶ ἔμπειροι 
 …καὶ μάλιστα ἕκαστοι πρὸς ἃ φιλοτοίουτοι (Rh. 1363a 26-31, 35-37; 1363b1-2). 
 
 [people value] things that are peculiarly their own… and things that are suited to 
them and such things as are befitting their family and power…and things they think 
they are lacking in…and what they are naturally good at and experienced in;…and, 
most of all, each category of people [values] that to which their character is 
disposed (tr. Kennedy). 
 
Long before Aristotle, Aeschylus had presented Athena tailoring her arguments to the Erinyes’ 
values precisely in the ways outlined above. At Eu.833 and 856, Athena offers the Erinyes 
something particularly their own: to be her special companion and to live near the halls of 
Erectheus. Athena also promises to give the Erinyes, “in justice, the underground thrones of this 
land” (ἕδρας τε καὶ κευθμῶνας ἐνδίκου χθονός, Eu. 805). The middle of this phrase includes the 
word ἐνδίκου, which could be taken adverbially to mean “in justice,” as translated above. It could 
also function as an adjective with χθονός.409 Either way, with this word Athena emphasizes that 
these things would be—as Aristotle puts it—both fitting and just (τὰ ἁρμόττοντα…τά τε 
προσήκοντα). Throughout her speeches, Athena offers the Erinyes the thing which they think they 
have lost (ὧν ἐλλείπειν οἴονται): their honor. Finally, she extends to them a role which fits well 
with their character, experience and original realm and choice of action (πρὸς ἃ εὐφυεῖς εἰσιν καὶ 
ἔμπειροι… πρὸς ἃ φιλοτοίουτοι): they are to watch over marriage, childbearing, and child birth in 
the land, and will be honored accordingly (Eu. 834-836, 856-857, 890-891).  
 The content of Athena’s speeches, her topics, her approach, and other characteristics of her 
work all seem to point towards Aristotle’s later categories for deliberative rhetoric. In addition, the 
time of Athena’s speeches is future, her manner, exhortative, and her end, the advantageous. She 
                                                          
409
 Sommerstein, however, thinks ἐνδίκου is corrupt since it comes so soon after the word πανδίκως in line 804, 
which, since it contains “-δίκ-,” could “suggest the idea that the honors being offered to the Erinyes are honours to 
which they are justly entitled (cf. 891),” (Sommerstein 1989, 244). 
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touches on what the Rhetoric considers common and effective political and ethical topics. In sum, 
Athena’s work in Eumenides 778-891 is representative of what Aristotle will later categorize as 
deliberative speech.  
 
V. Structure and Argument in Athena's Speech 
 Similarly, Athena’s work at Eu. 778-891 anticipates Aristotle’s ideas about speech 
structure and the internal means of persuasion, namely, through ethos, pathos, logos. While 
Athena’s persuasion takes place over the course of four speeches, these speeches, I argue, 
effectively form an entire work. As such, The Erinyes’ interruptions between her speeches do not 
make the Eu. 778-891 an instance of real antithetical dialogue for they hardly respond to her words 
at all. Furthermore, the elements of deliberative speech fundamental to Aristotle’s exposition 
(time, manner, end, topics, etc) apply even when the skeletal structure does not take the form of a 
continuous uninterrupted speech.
410
 Additionally, Athena’s speech segments are internally unified 
by her single purpose and by a steady strengthening of her persuasiveness.
411
   
 In this analysis, then, Athena’s speeches will be treated as a single instance of deliberative 
speech complete with a proemium, refutatio, and brief narratio in the first speech, with internal 
arguments throughout all of the speeches, and with various elements of epilogue in the last 
segment. I will also demonstrate that with each speech,
412
 Athena gradually modulates her 
persuasive technique so that she proceeds almost systematically through the three internal modes 
of persuasion: ethos, pathos, logos, and then—in the epilogue—with a combination of all three. 
                                                          
410
 Knudsen objects that herein lies the main difference between tragic and epic speech (and, hence, the greater 
importance of epic speech to the development of rhetoric). She says: "tragic persuasion often does not occur within a 
single, self-contained speech. More often, it comes about through an extended dialogue scene involving a series of 
challenges and responses by the interlocutors. Dialogue is integral to the rhetoric of tragedy in a way that it is not the 
rhetoric if epic," (Knudsen 2014, 136-137). 
411
 See Sommerstein 1989, 240. 
412
 For ease of reference, I will call each section a “speech.” 
 128  
 
A. Proemium, Refutatio, Narratio, and Logos (Eu. 794-807) 
 In her first response to the Erinyes (Eu. 794-807), Athena opens her speech project with 
what Aristotle will later term a proemium, a refutatio, a short quasi-narratio, and a careful use of 




 At the beginning of Eumenides 778-891, Athena finds the Erinyes in an emotional state 
that is hardly open to a reasoning dialogue. In their opening song (Eu. 778-792) they cry out: ἰὼ 
θεοὶ νεώτεροι, παλαιοὺς νόμους / καθιππάσασθε κἀκ χερῶν εἵλεσθέ μου (“Oh, younger gods, you 
have trampled underfoot the ancient laws and have snatched them from my hands for yourselves,” 
Eu. 778-789). The juxtaposition of “θεοὶ νεώτεροι” with “παλαιοὺς νόμους” reveals the conflict as 
a battle between two generations of deities.
414
 The Erinyes claim that the younger gods (Apollo, 
Athena, Zeus) have trampled the old laws, which had previously upheld Erinyes’ honor. What is 
more, the positioning of the words καθιππάσασθε and εἵλεσθέ immediately before κἀκ χερῶν and 
then μου portray the decision of the trial as a deep degradation and unjust seizures of another’s 
goods. Then after calling to mind their utterly dishonored status (Eu. 780), the Erinyes’ speech 
deteriorates; they cry: ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἄτιμος ἁ τάλαινα βαρύκοτος / ἐν γᾷ τᾷδε, φεῦ, / ἰὸν ἰὸν ἀντιπενθῆ / 
μεθεῖσα καρδίας, σταλαγμὸν χθονὶ / ἄφορον· (“But I—without honor, wretched, heavy in wrath, 
on this land! Woe! Letting go from my heart poison—poison—a drop for the land, causing 
barrenness!” Eu. 780-84). The Erinyes’ words devolve into angry exclamations, threats and 
laments. 
                                                          
413
 Most of these terms were also used before Aristotle, as can be seen in Rh. 1354b18 (Victor Bers, personal 
correspondence). 
414
 See also Heath 2005, 243. 
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 In response to their distress, Athena paves the way for dialogue through reasoned 
argumentation in her opening proemium: ἐμοὶ πίθεσθε μὴ βαρυστόνως φέρειν (“Be persuaded by 
me to not bear it with heavy groaning,” Eu. 794). She tells them that the point of her speech is, 
before all else, to facilitate and prompt discussion about choosing advantageous options for their 
future. This opening line serves a double function. Firstly, it introduces the speech clearly so that 
the interlocutors can apply their mind to the topic at hand, if they wish. Aristotle later affirms this 
primary function of the proemium “to make clear what is the purpose for which the speech [is 
being given]” (ἵνα προειδῶσι περὶ οὗ [ᾖ] ὁ λόγος, Rh. 1415a12-13). Secondly, Athena urges them 
to shift from groaning and instead cultivate an even-tempered openness. 
 Athena next suggests that the Erinyes calm down and try to understand her perspective on 
the trial. In order to do this, Athena begins with a refutatio, another technique which Aristotle will 
later note as appropriate to the beginning of such speeches (Rh. 1416a2). With the first γάρ (Eu. 
795), Athena refutes the Erinyes’ complaint about their dishonor. She denies their claim directly: 
οὐ γὰρ νενίκησθ᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ἰσόψηφος δίκη / ἐξῆλθ᾽ ἀληθῶς, οὐκ ἀτιμίᾳ σέθεν· (“For, you have not 
been conquered, but the trial came out in truth with an equal vote, not with any dishonor for you;” 
Eu. 795-796).
415
 At the end of this speech, as if to clinch her refutatio with ring-composition, she 
reaffirms their honored status by ending her speech with the word τιμαλφουμένας (“being 
honored,” Eu. 807).416 
 Additionally, lines 795-796 pose as a first form of internal argumentation through logos. In 
this mode of persuasion, Aristotle says, the person tries to win the other over “through proving or 
appearing to prove something” (διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι, Rh.1356a35-36). Athena 
                                                          
415
 The veracity of Athena’s claim here may be compromised due to the fact that “in the Athenian court system, a 
plaintiff was penalized for not winning even a certain share of the votes; [and] the Erinyes have clearly passed this 
threshold,” (Joel Lidov, personal correspondence). 
416
 Many thanks to Andrew Miller for pointing out this detail (personal correspondence).  
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here proposes a sort of enthymeme operating on the premise that a trial which ends with a tie does 
not bring dishonor to either the prosecutor or the defendant. The trial was conducted fairly and 
Orestes was acquitted by equal vote (or perhaps, by Athena’s additional vote in his favor).417As a 
result, Athena argues, the Erinyes have insufficient grounds for assuming they have been 
dishonored. The cause of their dishonor, in Athena’s view, is simply not present. Aristotle would 
classify this as an argument from cause and effect, an enthymeme topic proper to any kind of 
speech.
418
 Asserting its effectiveness, Aristotle says: ἅμα γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ οὗ αἴτιον, καὶ ἄνευ 
αἰτίου οὐθὲν ἔστιν (“The cause and that of which it is the cause go together, and without the cause 
there is nothing,” Arist. Rh.1400a24-25). With this logical argument about the cause of the 
acquittal, then, Athena seeks, at the very least, to assuage the deep sense of injustice which the 
Erinyes still nurse. 
 With the second γάρ (Eu. 797), Athena begins a logical argument from authority. In the 
Rhetoric, such an argument falls under one of the common topics for enthymemes. Aristotle says 
that this kind of argument is: 
  …ἐκ κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου μάλιστα μὲν εἰ πάντες καὶ ἀεί, εἰ 
δὲ μή…εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ οἷς μὴ καλὸν 
ἐναντίον κρίνειν, οἷον θεοῖς ἢ πατρὶ ἢ διδασκάλοις…(Arist. Rh.1398b21-26).  
  
 …from a previous judgment about the same or a similar or opposite matter, 
especially if all always [make this judgment]—but if not…if the judges themselves 
[have so decided], or those whom the judges approve, or those whose judgment 
cannot be honorably opposed, for example, the gods, a father, or teachers… (tr. 
Kennedy). 
 
Athena appeals to Zeus’ testimony and to Apollo’s role as witness: 
 ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ Διὸς γὰρ λαμπρὰ μαρτύρια παρῆν, 
 αὐτός θ᾽ ὁ χρήσας αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ μαρτυρῶν, 
                                                          
417
 On the debate about the vote of Athena see Long 2015, 59-62. She summarizes scholarship on the number of jurors 
who voted. In general, there is simply disagreement about whether the number was odd or even, and whether Athena’s 
vote changed the verdict or merely affirmed it as previously decided upon. 
418
 Aristotle lists a total of twenty-eight topics for enthymemes (Rh. 1397a-1400b). 
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 ὡς ταῦτ᾽ Ὀρέστην δρῶντα μὴ βλάβας ἔχειν. (Aesch. Eu. 797-99) 
 
 But, from Zeus
419
 there was clear testimony 
 and the very one who gave the oracle that Orestes (although he did these things)  
 would not suffer harm, was himself the witness.  
 
This argument also seems to be a sort of truncated narratio: a glance back at the recent happenings 
in the trial of Orestes.
420
 
 Yet soon afterward Athena apparently remembers that the authority of these younger gods 
will not carry much weight with the elder Erinyes. Instead of continuing with another attempt at an 
enthymeme, she again attacks the Erinyes’ insensate anger and urges their reasonable cooperation: 
 ὑμεῖς δὲ μὴ θυμοῦσθε μηδὲ τῇδε γῇ  
 βαρὺν κότον σκήψητε, μηδ᾽ ἀκαρπίαν 
 τεύξητ᾽, ἀφεῖσαι δαιμόνων σταλάγματα, 
 βρωτῆρας αἰχμὰς σπερμάτων ἀνημέρους. (Aesch. Eu. 800-803) 
  
 But you—do not be enraged, do not let fall  
 upon the earth your heavy wrath, and do not send down  
 barrenness, hurling forth drops from the gods,  
 savage spears that devour offspring! 
 
Athena ends her speech with promises of a favorable and reasonable alternative (Eu. 804-807). 
She has urged them to think, provided them with arguments which can be logically understood, 




                                                          
419
 According to Bers (personal correspondence), the validity of Zeus’ testimony (via Apollo) is questionable since he 
himself justified oath breaking (Eu. 213-218). 
420
 There is no other example of narratio in Athena’s speeches but this is not surprising since, as Aristotle puts it: ἐν δὲ 
δημηγορίᾳ ἥκιστα διήγησις ἔστιν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων οὐθεὶς διηγεῖται· ἀλλ’ ἐάν περ διήγησις ᾖ, τῶν γενομένων 
ἔστω, ἵνα ἀναμνησθέντες ἐκείνων βέλτιον βουλεύσωνται περὶ τῶν ὕστερον, (“Narrative is least common in 
deliberative oratory, because no one narrates future events, but if there is narrative, it will be of events in the past, in 
order that by being reminded of those things the audience will take better counsel about what is to come,” 
Rh.1417b12-15). 
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B. Pathos (Eu. 824-836) 
 The next section of the speech, Eu. 824-836, reveals Athena’s versatility as a master rhetor 
who knows how to shift her persuasive approach to fit the circumstances. In response to the logical 
arguments of Athena’s proemium, the Erinyes repeat their lament word-for-word (Eu. 808-22) as 
if they had not even heard her. Continuing her work, then, Athena tries modes of persuasion which 
provoke pathos in the Erinyes.
421
 This is precisely the kind of internal argument which Aristotle 
later recommends for a speaker who needs to prompt a different type of judgment in the hearer. 
More specifically: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις…οἷον 
ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία (“The emotions…are those things 
through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments…for example, 
anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their opposites,” Rh. 1378a19-22). He then proceeds to 
discuss a number of different emotions and how they can be provoked by the orator. Some of the 
emotions Aristotle mentions are shame, fear, and friendly feelings, all of which can already be 
seen in this speech of Athena. 
 Athena provokes the emotion of shame in the Erinyes at the beginning of her speech. 
Aristotle later says: ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν 
κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, ἡ δ’ ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια (“Let 
shame [αἰσχύνη] be [defined as] a sort of pain and agitation concerning the class of evils, whether 
present or past or future, that seem to bring a person into disrespect,” Rh.1383b12-15). Athena tries 
to prevent the Erinyes from venting their wrath upon mankind by subtly shaming them: οὐκ ἔστ᾽ 
ἄτιμοι, μηδ᾽ ὑπερθύμως ἄγαν / θεαὶ βροτῶν κτίσητε δύσκηλον χθόνα (“You are not without honor, 
                                                          
421
 Aristotle writes: διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς 
κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες, ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες (“[There is persuasion] through the hearers when they 
are led to feel emotion [pathos] by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or 
when being friendly and hostile,” Rh. 1356a14-16). 
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and in your great wrath, goddesses, do not make the land troubled with disease for mortals,” Eu. 
824-825). In the second of these lines, Athena is probably emphasizing the Erinyes’ role as 
goddesses by placing the word θεαί in the first position of the line. While everyone knows they are 
superhuman, Athena brings forward their divine status and immediately juxtaposes the word 
βροτῶν (“mortals”).422 This comes across as a hint: the Erinyes have been threatening to treat 
mortals in a way that appears beneath the dignity to which they are entitled.
423
 One way to 
explicate this argument could be as follows: You are goddesses; it is inappropriate for divinities to 
harm mortals in excessive wrath. For shame, goddesses! Do not blight mortals. Most likely, 
Aristotle in his Rhetoric would affirm Athena’s choice of argument here, for he himself writes that 
persons are often ashamed when faced with their misdeeds, vice, cowardice, or injustice (Rh. 
1383b18-22). By pointing out the injustice of the deed which they propose to do, Athena provokes 
the Erinyes to shame. 
 Athena also persuades by threatening, a technique which Aristotle considers particularly 
appropriate for the end of deliberative speech. He writes explicitly that “fear makes people 
inclined to deliberation” (ὁ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ, Rh. 1383a 6-7). Athena begins with a 
forceful κἀγὼ πέποιθα Ζηνί, καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν; (“I also have trust...in Zeus…and why should I 
mention it?” Eu. 826-29). Instead of completing the line with an assertion such as “and Zeus is 
more powerful than you,” Athena breaks off and lets them ponder the potency of Zeus. She 
finishes the line with a rhetorical question: …καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν; (“…and why should I mention it?” 
Eu. 826).
424
 With this line and this question, Athena tries to emotionally rouse the Erinyes and 
                                                          
422
 Heath says that the juxtaposition makes us“focus on their separated and elevated status, as well as to suggest the 
new responsibilities to mortals,” (Heath 2005, 243). 
423
 Aristotle says that words can be positioned in this way in order to make an implicit argument: τἀναντία 
γνωριμώτατα καὶ παρ’ ἄλληλα μᾶλλον γνώριμα, καὶ ὅτι ἔοικεν συλλογισμῷ· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συναγωγὴ τῶν 
ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν (“opposites are most knowable and more knowable when put beside each other and because they 
are like a syllogism...for refutation…is a bringing together of contraries,” Rh.1410a21-23). 
424
 Mastronarde observes that this kind of rhetorical question is often used to elicit “silent agreement or assent,” 
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draw out from them a fear and respect for the awesomeness of Zeus which accords with her own 
(Eu. 826). She continues: 
 καὶ κλῇδας οἶδα δώματος μόνη θεῶν, 
 ἐν ᾧ κεραυνός ἐστιν ἐσφραγισμένος· 
 ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ δεῖ·… (Aesch. Eu. 827-29) 
 
 I alone of the gods also know the keys of the chamber  
 in which his thunderbolt has been sealed;  
 but there is no need of it;… 
 
With this threat, Athena hints at her power, but brushes it aside with ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ δεῖ (“but 
there is no need of it,” Eu. 829).425 Such a twist of phrase likely startles the Erinyes, perhaps 
stirring up in them a pang of apprehension such as they evince in their response: οἶ οἶ δᾶ, φεῦ. / τίς 
μ᾽ ὑποδύεται πλευρὰς ὀδύνα; (“Ai! Ai! Alas! Woe! What pain plunges beneath my ribs?” Aesch. 
Eu. 843). Athena concludes by switching suddenly to the second person singular “σύ” as her mode 
of address.
426
 In this way, she calls them to account: as it were, grabbing their leader by the collar 
and glaring into her eyes with the words: σὺ δ᾽ εὐπιθὴς ἐμοὶ / γλώσσης ματαίας μὴ ᾽κβάλῃς ἔπη 
χθονί / καρπὸν φέροντα πάντα μὴ πράσσειν καλῶς (“But you, obedient to me, do not throw words 
from an idle tongue to the earth so that all fruit-bearing things fare badly,” Eu.829-31). Athena’s 
approach has become fearsome and threatening. 
 But Athena next transforms into a benefactress, intending (as Aristotle might explain it) to 
arouse the emotion of philia, or friendly feelings within the Erinyes. Aristotle will define this 
attitude as: τὸ βούλεσθαί τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ (“wanting for someone 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Mastronarde 1979, 7-8). 
425
 McDonald considers this an example of praeteritio (McDonald 2007, 476). The “thunderbolt threat” and the role it 
plays in Athena’s success, has been much discussed in Aeschylean scholarship. Some claim that the force behind this 
threat was crucial to the Erinyes’ capitulation (Pucci 1992, 522; Porter 2005, 324-325). By contrast, Gagarin argues 
that Athena’s persuasion holds greater sway over the Erinyes than her threat of force (Gagarin 1976, 83; see also 
Rynearson 2013, 2). Allowing for the duality of force and persuasion to exist simultaneously, Bers asserts that 
Athena’s victory “both had to be, and still might have been allowed to fail, for Athena holds bolts of lightning in 
reserve,” (Bers 1994, 178). See also Konishi 1990, 250. 
426
 Although it was common in tragedy to use the singular in addressing the Chorus or chorus leader, here it is a 
startling change since Athena had previously been using the plural. See Sommerstein 1989, 247. 
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what one thinks are good things for him, and not what one thinks benefits oneself,” 
Rh.1380b35-1381a1). Athena hopes that the Erinyes may begin to desire something good for 
Athens, its citizens, and perhaps even for its patron deity. Athena must, however, first approach the 
Erinyes with the delicacy needed for persons whom Aristotle might class as people affected by 
power (δύναμις, Rh. 1391a21). According to him, such individuals are ambitious for honor, 
solicitous for their responsibilities, and willing to commit wrong on a large scale (Rh. 1391a 
20-29).  
 Athena also seems keenly aware of the Erinyes’ touchiness as elderly deities accustomed to 
unquestioned power and privileges. As a result, her concluding words in this speech expand upon 




 κοίμα κελαινοῦ κύματος πικρὸν μένος 
 ὡς σεμνότιμος καὶ ξυνοικήτωρ ἐμοί· 
 πολλῆς δὲ χώρας τῆσδ᾽ ἔτ᾽ἀκροθίνια 
 θύη πρὸ παίδων καὶ γαμηλίου τέλους 
 ἔχουσ᾽ ἐς αἰεὶ τόνδ᾽ ἐπαινέσεις λόγον. (Aesch. Eu.832-836) 
 
 Put to sleep the sharp might of dark swelling passion  
 as one who is reverently honored and a housemate to me;  
 And since from this large land you will forever have  
 the first-fruits of sacrifices before children and before marriage, 
 you will applaud this speech. 
 
Throughout this passage, Athena prompts good will by demonstrating her own friendly 
attentiveness. She reiterates words and concepts central to the concerns which the Erinyes 
articulated in their twice-repeated, distraught speech (Eu. 778-792, 808-822). For instance, 
Athena’s mention of fruit (καρπόν, Eu. 831) references the Erinyes’ threat to destroy growing 
things (ἄφυλλος, Eu. 815). Instead of directly contradicting the Erinyes’ complaint about dishonor 
(ἄτιμος, Eu. 810; ἀτιμοπενθεῖς, Eu. 812) as she had earlier, Athena here uses the word σεμνότιμος 
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 See, however, Stanford 1967, 112 with 120 n. 59; who argues that kappas are not soothing. 
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(Eu. 833) to emphasize, instead, the great reverence they will receive if they comply. Finally, 
Athena promises them a respected position in her country (χώρας, Eu. 834) if they will only 
forbear from wreaking destruction upon it (χώρᾳ, Eu. 817). In doing this, Athena carefully 
addresses points of concern to the Erinyes and completes her attempt at cultivating philia with the 
goddesses. Throughout the entire speech she had shamed, threatened, cajoled, and even offered 
friendship, in the hopes that the irate goddess would respond emotionally and begin to open 
themselves to negotiation. 
 
C. Ethos (Eu. 848-869) 
 Yet except for the fact that they sing a different refrain, the Erinyes’ response to Athena’s 
efforts is hardly encouraging:  
 ἐμὲ παθεῖν τάδε, φεῦ, 
 ἐμὲ παλαιόφρονα κατά τε γᾶς οἰκεῖν, 
 ἀτίετον μύσος, 
 φεῦ. 
 πνέω τοι μένος ἅπαντά τε κότον.  
 οἶ οἶ δᾶ, φεῦ. 
 τίς μ᾽ ὑποδύεται πλευρὰς ὀδύνα; 
 ἄιε, μᾶτερ Νύξ· 
 ἀπὸ γάρ με τιμᾶν δαναιᾶν θεῶν 
 δυσπάλαμοι παρ᾽ οὐδὲν ἦραν δόλοι. (Aesch. Eu. 837-46) 
 
 For me to suffer these things—Woe! 
 And for me, old and wise, to dwell in this land 
 a dishonored, defiled thing— 
 Woe! 
 I breathe fury and vengeance towards everything!  
 Ai! Ai! Alas! Woe!  
 What pain plunges beneath my ribs?  
 Ah, mother Night!  
 For the irresistible cunning of the gods have taken away 
 From me my ancient honors so that I count for nothing.  
 
With even more emotion than before, in the opening lines (Eu. 837-839), the Erinyes cry out φεῦ 
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three times (“Woe!” Eu. 838, 841, 843) compared with the single instance in their first speech (Eu. 
781, 811); also, new indecipherable cries arise: οἶ οἶ δᾶ…ἄιε (“Ai! Ai! Alas!...Ah!” Eu. 843, 845). 
Although they have heard Athena speak, they dismiss her pleadings and promises as mere 
δυσπάλαμοι δόλοι (“hard-to-resist cunning and trickery,” Eu. 846). They protest the dishonor they 
have received (Eu. 839, 845-846), and in desperation, call upon their mother Night (Eu. 844).
428
 
Athena has hardly persuaded them. At most, she has quieted their threats against Athens and has 
caused them some sort of pain (ὀδύνα, Eu. 843).429 Infuriated, they hold obstinately to their need 
for honor due to their wisdom and parentage (Eu. 844). Athena has not yet won them over. 
 Athena must come up with yet another mode of persuasion for addressing their new 
lament. In her third speech (Eu. 848-869), then, Athena uses argumentation through ethos: she 
tries to convince the Erinyes to trust her. Aristotle says that διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἤθους, ὅταν οὕτω 
λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιό πιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα (“[There is persuasion] through character 
whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence,” 
Rh.1356a4-6). The masterful decision of Athena to shift to this mode of persuasion is reflected in 
his further comment: τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἁπλῶς, ἐν 
οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς (“we believe fair-minded people to a 
greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in 
cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt,” Rh.1356a6-8). As shall be seen, 
Athena’s third speech to a great extent rests on these premises. 
 In order to present herself as favorably as possible, Athena portrays herself in the three 
ways which Aristotle will later categorize as the three basic components of ethical argumentation: 
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 See Schauer 2002, 150. 
429
 “Self-pity, not curses now predominates in the Chorus’ song,” (Conacher 1987, 171). Sommerstein suggests that 
these are slight signs that the Erinyes “may be being persuaded despite themselves,” (Sommerstein 1989, 248). 
Conacher comments that lines 838-39 may be “at least an oblique answer to Athena’s plea,” (Conacher 1987, 171). 
See also Konishi 1990, 252. 
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according to her “practical wisdom and virtue and good will” (φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια, Rh. 
1378a8). She says:  
 ὀργὰς ξυνοίσω σοι· γεραιτέρα γὰρ εἶ. 
 καὶ τῷ μὲν <εἶ> σὺ κάρτ᾽ ἐμοῦ σοφωτέρα· 
 φρονεῖν δὲ κἀμοὶ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν οὐ κακῶς. (Aesch. Eu. 848-850) 
  
 I will bear with you in your anger; for you are older. 
 And by this your age—on the one hand—you are very much wiser than I; 
 but Zeus has also granted that I have good understanding. 
 
Athena begins her ethical mode of argumentation by rejecting and reversing the unpleasant 
opinion and suspicion which the Erinyes have expressed against her. Then Athena demonstrates 
her personal virtue (ἀρετή), specifically her patience and respect for her elders (Eu. 848). In the 
next two lines she argues for her own personal wisdom and understanding (φρόνησις): while she 
acknowledges verbally that they are wiser, she points out that she too possesses some of these and 
other qualities. Finally, Athena expresses her good will (εὔνοια) to prevent the Erinyes from 
making a decision they will later regret. With seemingly genuine concern, she says: ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ἐς 
ἀλλόφυλον ἐλθοῦσαι χθόνα / γῆς τῆσδ᾽ ἐρασθήσεσθε· (“But if you go to a foreign place, you will 
long for this land,” Eu. 851-852). Even in this first half of the speech, Athena shows herself to be a 
virtuous, understanding, and kindly younger deity who only wants the best for her elders.  
 In the rest of her speech, Athena continues her ethical argumentation by emphasizing the 
honor which she will procure for the Erinyes. On the various techniques which exist for presenting 
oneself as a good and trustworthy character, Aristotle comments: εἰς δὲ εὐμάθειαν ἅπαντα ἀνάξει, 
ἐάν τις βούληται, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικῆ φαίνεσθαι· προσέχουσι γὰρ μᾶλλον τούτοις (“All sorts of things 
will lead the audience to receptivity if the speaker wants, including his seeming to be a reasonable 
person. They pay more attention to these people,” Rh. 1415a39-1415b1). Towards a similar end, 
no doubt, Athena promises the Erinyes seats of honor close to her own on the Athenian acropolis:  
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 οὑπιρρέων γὰρ τιμιώτερος χρόνος 
 ἔσται πολίταις τοῖσδε. καὶ σὺ τιμίαν 
 ἕδραν ἔχουσα πρὸς δόμοις Ἐρεχθέως  
 τεύξῃ παρ᾽ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικείων στόλων, 
 ὅσων παρ᾽ ἄλλων οὔποτ᾽ ἂν σχέθοις βροτῶν. (Aesch. Eu. 853-857) 
 
 For onward-streaming time will confer more honor  
 on these citizens, and you, holding honored 
 seats near the halls of Erectheus,  
 will obtain from processions of men and women 
 as many things as you would never have from other mortals. 
 
Athena further strengthens her image by offering them continual companionship and friendship 
with her, as she had previously offered through her use of the word ξυνοικήτωρ (Eu. 833). She also 
promises them an eternal share of the honors offered by those who come to the Acropolis to 
worship. She ends with the following epilogue:
430
  
 τοιαῦθ᾽ ἑλέσθαι σοι πάρεστιν ἐξ ἐμοῦ, 
 εὖ δρῶσαν, εὖ πάσχουσαν, εὖ τιμωμένην 
 χώρας μετασχεῖν τῆσδε θεοφιλεστάτης. (Aesch. Eu.867-869) 
 
 Such things as I promised you can take from me:  
 acting well, being well, honored well,  
 you can have a share in this god-beloved land. 
 
With this eloquent conclusion, Athena depicts herself as a magnanimous benefactress.
431
 In line 
868, moreover, she uses a 3-4-5 syllable tricolon crescendo to invite the Erinyes to dwell on three 
wonderful components of their future existence.
432
 Athena shows herself to be a virtuous, wise, 
and well-meaning goddess, ostensibly respectful towards her elders and desiring their good. In 
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 Even though I use Page’s OCT for my Greek text, I agree with Taplin 1977, 407 and Sommerstein 1989, 251 that 
the middle portion of this speech (Eu. 858-866) seems to be an overlong and peculiar interpolation. Hence I omit it 
from my commentary. 
431
 Athena has earlier “offered good things” in a section which I identified as the mode of persuasion based on pathos; 
for, the distinction between the pathetic and ethical modes is often not very clear-cut. One could also argue that 
Athena has already touched upon ethos in her first speeches, but here it is most clearly used. See Carey 1994, 35. Also, 
Bers notes that Athena’s offering of a share in land, a sanctuary of their own (Eu. 869), is crucial to their eventual 
capitulation of the Erinyes; for, the goddesses affirm their interest in this “seat” in their first trimeter line: ἄνασσα’ 
Ἀθάνα, τίνα με φὴις ἔχειν ἕδραν; (“Queen Athena, what seat are you saying I have?” Eu. 892). 
432
 In his section of the Rhetoric on style, Aristotle calls this tricolon crescendo asyndeton, a technique quite suitable 
to oral delivery (Rh. 1413b19-21) and even more effective towards the end of a speech, as Athena uses it above (Rh. 
1420a6-8). For examples in other authors, see Marcovich 1984, 52 n.9. 
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doing so, moreover, she presents an excellent picture of Aristotle’s ethical mode of persuasion. 
 
D. Epilogue: Ethos, Pathos, and Logos (Eu. 881-891) 
 Athena’s use of all three modes of persuasion, however, seems unavailing. The Erinyes 
persist obstinately, repeating again their laments and grievances, word for word (Eu. 870-879). 
Undaunted, in her last speech (Eu. 881-891), Athena again proceeds through each of the modes of 
persuasion in order to finally persuade the Erinyes to listen.  
 Athena crafts this last speech as an epilogue to her work of deliberative rhetoric. At 
Rh.1419b, Aristotle says:  
 Ὁ δ’ ἐπίλογος σύγκειται ἐκ τεττάρων, ἔκ τε τοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσαι εὖ τὸν 
ἀκροατὴν;…καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐξῆσαι καὶ ταπεινῶσαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ εἰς τὰ πάθη τὸν 
ἀκροατὴν καταστῆσαι, καὶ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως. (Rh.1419b10-13)  
  
 The epilogue is made up of four things: disposing the hearer favorably toward the 
speaker;…amplifying and minimizing; moving the hearer into emotional reactions; 
and [giving] a reminder [of the chief points of the argument]. (tr. Kennedy). 
 
This is precisely what Athena herself does throughout this last speech. Augmenting her efforts, she 
utilizes the ethos, pathos and logos modes of persuasion to win the Erinyes over, to remind them of 
their dignity, to re-emphasize her promises and the import of their decision, and finally, to shame 
them into choosing the option which is most dignified and just.  
 In the first few lines of this last speech, for instance, she leads with a strong argument for 




 οὔτοι καμοῦμαί σοι λέγουσα τἀγαθά, 
 ὡς μή ποτ᾽εἴπῃς πρὸς νεωτέρας ἐμοῦ 
 θεὸς παλαιὰ καὶ πολισσούχων βροτῶν 
                                                          
433
 Aristotle writes: ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος (“character is almost, so to speak, the most 
authoritative form of persuasion,” Rh. 1356a13). 
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 ἄτιμος ἔρρει τοῦδ᾽ἀπόξενος πέδου. (Aesch. Eu.881-884) 
 
 Indeed I shall not tire of telling you of these good things,  
 so that you may never say that by me, the younger, 
 and by city-dwelling mortals, you, an ancient goddess,  
 wandered dishonored and forced away from this land. 
 
In the second and third lines of this passage, Athena juxtaposes her youth with the Erinyes’ age 
(νεωτέρας ἐμοῦ / θεὸς παλαιὰ, Eu. 882-83) in order to flatter them.434 Athena then puts aside her 
commanding tone. Almost assuming victory, she makes a last offer, a last appeal to their trust. 
With the word ἀπόξενος in line 884, Athena insinuates that the real dishonor for them would be to 
leave banished against their will; she also implies that they actually want to stay, even if they are 
not aware or refuse to admit it.
435
 In this way, Athena hints that she knows their deepest desires 
and so can take the best care of them if they remain under her protection.  
 Athena then shifts to argument through emotion (pathos). In the next colon, she says: ἀλλ᾽ 
εἰ μὲν ἁγνόν ἐστί σοι Πειθοῦς σέβας, / γλώσσης ἐμῆς μείλιγμα καὶ θελκτήριον, / σὺ δ᾽ οὖν μένοις 
ἄν· (“But if you have holy reverence for Peitho regarding the soothing charm and enchantment of 
my tongue, then you certainly might remain,” Eu. 885-87). With this line, almost an incantation, 
she leads them into an emotional submission, as later the Erinyes will admit (Eu. 900). But in the 
apodosis of this sentence, Athena breaks off with δ᾽οὖν436 and moves to a polite potential 
optative.
437
 Sommerstein explains that Athena starts off with “eloquent appeal, couched in 
high-flown language,” but lest she aggravate the Erinyes, moderates her approach and ends with a 
                                                          
434
 This technique is used earlier at Eu. 778 (by the Erinyes) and Eu. 825 (by Athena) above. 
435
 Sommerstein writes that the word ἀπόξενος “properly denotes one who is forced to depart (usually as an exile) 
from his own land (Ag. 1282, Ch. 1042; cf. Soph. El. 777, Eur. Hec. 1221); thus by using it here Athena is speaking as 
if (a) Attica were the Erinyes true home, (b) they (rather than she) were eager that they should dwell there. She 
presupposes the propositions that she wishes to persuade them to accept,” (Sommerstein 1989, 254). 
436
 The particle combination δ᾽οὖν, according to Denniston, signifies “a break-off in the thought” [and] “a resumption 
of the main issue,” (Denniston 1954, 443). 
437
 On the politeness expressed see Rijksbaron 1994, 40. This technique of praeteritio has also been seen in her second 
speech where it may have prompted the emotion of fear (Eu. 826, 829). See also Bers 1984, 136 on how this might be 
an over generalization. 
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gentle, “well, all that really matters is: please do stay.”438 
 What follows is Athena’s strongest attempt at logical (logos) persuasion yet: a direct 
appeal to the Erinyes’ sense of justice. 
 εἰ δὲ μὴ θέλεις μένειν, 
 οὔτ ἂν δικαίως τῇδ᾽ ἐπιρρέποις πόλει 
 μῆνίν τιν᾽ ἢ κότον τιν᾽ ἢ βλάβην στρατῷ. 
 ἔξεστι γάρ σοι τῆσδε γαμόρῳ χθονὸς  
 εἶναι δικαίως ἐς τὸ πᾶν τιμωμένῃ. (Aesch. Eu. 887-891) 
 
 But if you do not wish to remain,  
 you could not justly let fall upon this city  
 any rage or any vengeance or harm to the people;  
 for you have the power to be a land-holder of this place,  
 justly, and altogether honored.  
 
According to Aristotle, the argument in these lines could be classed as a refuting enthymeme (τὸ 
ἐλεγκτικὸν, Rh. 1396b26) of the type which comes “from [turning] what has been said against 
oneself upon the one who said it” (ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθ’ αὑτοῦ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, Rh.1398a37). 
According to the Rhetoric: τοῦτό τις [ἂν] εἴπειεν ἄλλος πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγόρου· ὅλως γὰρ 
βούλεται ὁ κατηγορῶν βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ φεύγοντος (“this [type of argument] should be used for 
discrediting the accuser; for the accuser always wants to be morally superior to the defendant,” Rh. 
1398a10-11). Athena’s argument in the passage anticipates this description. One could abstract the 
argument as follows: We are offering you honor and a position in this land and it is right to respect 
those who offer you good things. Therefore, even if you leave, you should respect us and our 
offer.You cannot justly harm us, your benefactors.
439
 After having once more gone through the 
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 Sommerstein 1989, 255. Bers, however, observes that at Soph. El. 1491, Orestes uses a potential optative in 
ordering Aegisthus to move so that he can kill him (personal correspondence). Regardless, Athena’s avoidance of 
hyperbole here is particularly apt to this situation. Aristotle writes: εἰσὶ δ’ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ μειρακιώδεις· σφοδρότητα 
γὰρ δηλοῦσιν (“hyperboles are part of adolescence; for they exhibit vehemence,” Rh. 1413a29). As such, then 
hyperbole is not appropriate for an older, mature person to use. As she has previously done, Athena soothes (pathos) 
the elderly Erinyes by talking to them gently and—at the same time—by impressing them with her maturity and 
respectful character (ethos). 
439
 Several scholars think that it is this last appeal to principle and justice which wins them over. See Sommerstein 
1989, 255; Konishi 1990, 254. 
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modes of persuasion based on ethos and pathos, Athena concludes with a final appeal to reason 
through logical argumentation.  
 And in the end, she succeeds. The Erinyes’ response to this last speech is not a frenetic 
wail, but a fully engaged question in the conversational rhythm of iambic trimeter: ἄνασσ᾽ Ἀθάνα, 
τίνα με φὴς ἔχειν ἕδραν; (“Queen Athena, what seat do you say I will hold?” Eu. 892). Once the 
Erinyes shift from their lyric laments to stichomythia, fruitful dialogue commences, and with it, 
Athena’s carefully crafted work is complete.440 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 By the end of the tense encounter staged throughout Eumenides 778-891, Athena has 
demonstrated what Aristotle will later classify as excellent, well-structured, and convincing 
deliberative speech. Aeschylus has given this scene and Athena’s work of persuasion a dramatic 
prominence highlighting the emotional nature of the conflict, the high stakes involved in the 
struggle, and the corresponding scope and quality of Athena’s persuasion. He likewise frames this 
display of rhetoric, this masterful moment of dramatic tension and resolution, in terms of πειθώ. 
Πειθώ has been central to the main action and theme of the entire drama. The goddess has been 
transformed to resemble a personified patroness of rhetoric, and here she presides over remarkably 
well-crafted deliberative speech, the kind which would fit seamlessly into Aristotle’s categories in 
the Rhetoric. This is yet one more example of how Aeschylus’ Oresteia contributes to the history 
of rhetoric: by setting up Eumenides 778-891 as a full realization of πειθώ’s meaning and 
importance. 
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 Rutherford comments, “Athena has persuaded them to abandon song for speech” (Rutherford 2012, 256). See also 
Rabinowitz 1981,183. 
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CONCLUSION  
 
 In this dissertation, I argue for the relevance of Aeschylus’ Oresteia to the history of 
rhetoric by pointing out the various ways in which he transforms, displays, and connects his 
understanding of πειθώ with nascent ideas and practices of rhetoric in the fifth and early fourth 
centuries BCE. After Chapter One’s review of scholarship on the topic and a catalog of pre- and 
post-Aeschylean usages of πειθώ as a verb, a goddess, and abstract noun, I suggest the importance 
of Aeschylus’ work on the concept. In Chapter Two, then, I analyze each place where the goddess 
Peitho appears in the Oresteia: as a ruinous and forceful deity in the Agamemnon, a tricky 
companion of Hermes in the Choephoroi, and a guide to Athena’s reasonable, if still slightly 
magical, civic speech in the Eumenides. In these depictions, Aeschylus alters Peitho’s tradition in 
ways which specifically open her up to a later association with ideas about rhetoric, as it was 
beginning to be employed by other dramatists as well as philosophers, sophists, and orators of the 
time.  
 Chapter Three discusses Aeschylus’ use and display of his new conceptions of πειθώ 
throughout the main action and theme of each play of the trilogy. The goddess Peitho occurs 
actively engaged in the drama at key moments in the plot. Aeschylus describes the main action of 
each play with reference to πείθω as a verb, and then reinforces this main action through parallel 
narratives as well. In these ways, Aeschylus’ πειθώ comes to the fore as central to drama as a 
whole and worthy of the audience’s close consideration. Finally, in Chapter Four, I examine the 
climactic scene of the drama, Eumenides 778-891. I first evaluate the dramatic prominence of this 
scene and the significance of Athena’s work within it. I then demonstrate how Aeschylus frames 
this entire section of the play in terms of πειθώ, and lends Athena’s persuasive speech qualities 
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which Aristotle would later consider genuinely rhetorical. Using the Rhetoric as a retrospective 
lens, I point out how Athena’s speeches at Eu. 778-891 seem to anticipate the content of what 
Aristotle will later call deliberative rhetoric and the form of an appropriately partitioned speech 
argued through ethos, pathos, and logos. Effectively, Aeschylus presents this last scene as a full 
realization of his idea of πειθώ, his word for the art of rhetoric. 
 Without imputing to Aeschylus the same self-consciousness as Euripides or Aristophanes, 
his staging of πειθώ is central enough to come to the attention of perceptive audience members. 
Also, as a result of the Oresteia’s continual re-performance throughout the fifth century and even 
after his death, the themes and issues which it dramatized likely had a lasting influence in ancient 
Greece.
441
 Yet, while later prose dialogues and displays of rhetoric form core chapters in modern 
surveys on the history of rhetoric, Aeschylus’ Oresteia rarely receives acknowledgment beyond a 
reference to his court scene in the Eumenides.  
 From my analysis in this dissertation, however, I believe it is clear that Aeschylus’ work 
with πειθώ should be given greater weight in terms of its potential for cultural influence and 
developing ideas about what will eventually be termed “rhetoric” in ancient Greece. Aeschylus’ 
Oresteia invites his audience to reflect on πειθώ as a concept, a goddess, and a practice. The 
reflections which he prompts, moreover, guide the audience to closely associate πειθώ with the art 
of rhetoric, the ideas and techniques used in fifth and fourth century prose discourse and aimed at 
persuasion in public, often political, speech. Given the cultural context and the longevity of 
Aeschylus’ work, the significance of πειθώ as staged in his drama should not be underestimated, 
but rather, be included in modern texts on rhetoric’s history and development in ancient Greece. 
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 The repeated re-performance of Aeschylus’ Oresteia has been defended by several scholars, particularly by Biles, 
who wrote an entire 2006 article on the subject. He argues for the re-performance of the drama based upon the ancient 
testimony of the following texts: Vita Aeschyli (=Test. 1 Radt, lines 48-49; Philostr. Vita Apolloniii 6.11; scholia on 
Ar. Ach. 10 and on Ar. Ran. 868; Quint. Inst. Orat. 10.1.66. See also Biles 2006, 211-212; Slater 1990, 385-395.  
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